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Abstract
This study uses wage data from the UBS Prices and Earnings survey to highlight Disparate
Wages in a Globalized World from di↵erent perspectives. This wage data is characterised
by remarkable consistency over the last 40 years, as well as unusual global comparability.
In the first chapter we analyse the convergence hypothesis for purchasing power ad-
justed wages across the world for 1970 to 2009. The results provide solid evidence for
the hypotheses of absolute and conditional convergence in real wages, with the key driver
being faster overall growing wage levels in lower wage countries compared to higher wage
countries. At the same time, the highest skilled professions have experienced the highest
wage growth, while low skilled workers’ wages have lagged, thus no convergence in this
sense is found between skill groups.
In the second chapter we examine deviations in international wages from Factor Price
Equalisation theory (FPE). Following an approach analogous to Engel (1993) we find that
deviations from FPE are more likely driven by the higher variability of wages between
countries than by the variability of di↵erent wages within countries. With regard to the
traditional analysis of the real exchange rate and the Balassa-Samuelson assumptions our
analysis points to a larger impact on the real exchange rate likely stemming from the
movements in the real exchange rate of tradables, and only to a lesser extent from the lack
of equalisation of wages within countries.
In the third chapter our results show that India’s economic and trade liberalisation,
starting in the early 1990s, had very di↵erential impacts on skill premia, both over time
and over skill levels. The most striking result is the large increase in wage inequality of
high-skilled versus low-skilled professions. Both the synthetic control group method and
the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DID) approach suggest that a significant part of this increase
in wage inequality can be attributed to India’s liberalisation.
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Preface
“Only in our dreams are we free. The rest of the time we need wages.”
Terry Pratchett
Real wages define living standards for a large share of the world’s population. Substantial
di↵erences in real wages within a society can act as an incentive to achieve higher levels of
education and skills – at extremes, however, large wage di↵erentials can also be a major
strain to the social fabric and to social and political stability. At an international level
di↵erences in wages can impact countries’ competitiveness, they are a major factor when
determining commercial strategies such as outsourcing and production sharing, and they
are the key driver of companies’ assessments of the potential of future consumer markets.
Wage di↵erentials will thus often be a driver of capital and investment flows. Additionally,
workers react to real wage incentives, and large di↵erentials between countries can be a
trigger for legal and illegal immigration. In political, social and economic terms, wages are
a lynchpin of any society.
Given their importance, wages have received extensive attention in economic theory,
from micro- and macro-economic perspectives, and in closed and open economy models. The
most prominent theories describing wage determination include the neoclassical model of
labour-leisure choice combined with marginal productivity theory, the theories of industry
wage premia, unionisation, e ciency wages and compensating wage di↵erentials, the
Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect, migration theory, trade theory and in particular the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework of trade with the Factor Price Equalisation theory (FPE) and Skill-Biased
Technological Change (SBTC), and theories of government policy including minimum
wages, social security, tari↵s, quotas and non-tari↵ barriers.
While most of these theories have been tested extensively using data for individual
countries, or comparisons for a small number of countries, a dearth of comparable wage
data across a large number of countries makes wider international comparisons scarce. In
particular, studies requiring comparable data for sectors, or for di↵erent levels of skills
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across a wide range of countries, face substantial data limitations. This study uses a dataset
that has not been substantially exploited in the past to analyse wages and skill premia in
an international context.
The wage data is drawn from the UBS Prices and Earnings survey, which was conducted
in 31 cities around the world in 1970, rising to 71 cities in 2009, in three year intervals.
The key strength of the UBS data is its remarkable consistency over the last 40 years,
as well as its unusual global comparability, as in each country the survey was conducted
with an identical questionnaire and comparable methods during the same time interval.
Appendix A provides detailed information on the UBS Prices and Earnings survey and
the wage data used in the following chapters. Each chapter of this dissertation highlights
Disparate Wages in a Globalized World from a di↵erent perspective.
In the first chapter the UBS wage data is used to analyse the convergence hypothesis
for purchasing power adjusted wages across the world for the period 1970 to 2009. We
derive the theoretical basis for wage convergence within the Solow-Swan model of economic
growth, but show that wage convergence can be viewed also within the contexts of trade
theory, and migration theory.
We find no clear statistical evidence of an absolute catch-up in wages for poorer countries
as measured by GDP per capita, but we find solid evidence of absolute convergence in two
senses: Cities with lower average initial real wages exhibit higher growth of average wages ;
and lower initial profession level real wages world wide (whether due to the country context
or the profession) also exhibit higher growth. Convergence in these senses is stronger in
the latter half of our observation period 1988-2009, but absolute convergence holds also
for the complete period 1970-2009. Evidence of absolute convergence is even stronger
when the sample is restricted to more homogenous groups of countries by subdividing the
sample into developed and emerging markets. Convergence is also stronger within more
homogenous skill groups: It is strongest within individual professions across the world,
somewhat less strong within professions clustered according to their skill levels, and least
strong when all professions are included.
We test for conditional convergence in the Solow-Swan sense by including variables that
control for the steady state in the extended Solow-Swan model. Not all of the included
variables are statistically significant, but including the initial wage level, the fertility rate
and an education measure as regressors provides a good model fit. The results provide some
support to the Solow-Swan model given the relatively high coe cients of determination
of around 30-70% achieved with these simple regressions, as compared to 20-30% for the
absolute convergence regressions. However, given the lack of evidence of any impact of
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investment in physical capital and the very limited evidence for the role of investment in
human capital, this evidence remains ambiguous. With regard to the speed of convergence,
the coe cients on the initial wage point to a convergence speed  w of 1.0% to 1.7% per
annum, somewhat faster than the unconditional rate of convergence for the full sample
and equivalent time period of about 1.0% per annum.
We aim to provide more granularity on the question of conditional convergence, by
investigating who the winners and losers of the convergence trends have been. Compared
to low-skilled professions, we find higher average wage growth for medium skilled, and
even higher wage growth for highly skilled professions. This finding can be interpreted
as evidence for skill-biased technological change that has resulted in a higher demand for
skilled labour relative to unskilled labour, thereby increasing wage rates for the skilled faster,
than for the unskilled. This result does not contradict the finding of convergence described
above, but rather gives insight into how convergence came about. Wage convergence across
the world was not based on lower skilled professions gaining on higher skilled professions.
Rather, the primary driver of international wage convergence was faster overall growing
wage levels in lower wage countries, as compared to higher wage countries.
Finally, we use principal component augmented regressions to analyse the impact of
a broader range of variables on real wage growth. The initial wage and the fertility rate
are confirmed as consistently having a large and statistically significant impact on wage
growth. Cities in Latin America experienced statistically significant lower levels of wage
growth and skill level dummy variables point to higher wage growth in professions with
higher skill levels. Additionally, the fraction of the population speaking English was found
to have a large, positive and statistically significant impact on wage growth.
Overall these results support the hypotheses of absolute and conditional convergence
in real wages, with the key driver being faster overall growing wage levels in lower wage
countries, as compared to higher wage countries. At the same time, the highest skilled
professions around the world have experienced the highest wage growth during 1970-2009,
while low skilled workers experienced the lowest wage growth, thus no convergence in this
sense is found between skill groups. This more di↵erentiated understanding of convergence
trends in real wages provides important food for thought in a world where inequality is
increasingly acting as a driver for social discord and unrest.
Thus, convergence in global wages – in the absolute and in the conditional sense
of Solow-Swan – is a strong and robust result. However, in spite of convergence, large
disparities in international wages persist. In the second chapter the UBS wage data is
employed to examine deviations from Factor Price Equalisation theory (FPE). FPE theory
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asserts that under certain conditions trade in goods can act as a substitute for factor
mobility, implying that wages will converge even without factor flows between countries.
However, empirical evidence is mixed and FPE theory seems at odds with large and
persistent divergences in international wages.
This chapter contributes to explaining the origins of deviations from FPE by drawing
a parallel to the analogous “price” problem - i.e. the origin of deviations from Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP). As PPP would imply a constant real exchange rate of one, fluctuations
in the real exchange rate reflect deviations from PPP theory. In 1993 Charles Engel set
an important empirical yardstick for models of the real exchange rate by decomposing
the expression for the real exchange rate and analysing the variability of the parts (i.e.
variability of relative consumer prices within and between countries). By identifying the
origin of volatility in the real exchange rate, Engel (1993) pinpoints the origin of the
deviations from PPP.
In the second chapter the equivalent relationship between the real exchange rate and
relative wages is investigated, by decomposing an adapted expression for the real exchange
rate, now based on factor prices (wages), instead of goods prices. In fact, the theory of
FPE can be viewed as the production side analog to PPP on the consumption side. As
FPE would imply a constant wage-based real exchange rate of one, we analogously to Engel
(1993) investigate whether deviations from FPE have historically been better explained
by the variability in the wages between countries, or by the variability of wages within
countries, thereby providing an empirical yardstick for models of factor prices.
We use a number of comparable wage indices calculated from the UBS Prices and
Earnings wage data and three di↵erent measures for variability (scale parameters), as well
as profession level wage data corrected for fixed e↵ects to measure variability in wages. Our
results show that historically the variability of identical wage indices between countries
has been higher than the variability of di↵erent wage indices within a country. This result
is analogous to Engel’s early result, and indicates that deviations from FPE are more
likely driven by the higher variability of wages between countries, than by the variability
of di↵erent wages within countries. Interestingly, there is no clear evidence of structural
di↵erences in the wage comparisons involving only developed markets and those involving
also wages in emerging markets.
With regards to the traditional analysis of the real exchange rate this analysis is
informative in that it shows that the Balassa-Samuelson assumptions of a constant real
exchange rate in the tradables sector, and of wage equalisation between the tradables and
non-tradables sectors have a di↵ering importance with regard to movements in the real
exchange rate. While the literature mostly confirms that these assumptions do not hold
xxii
empirically, our analysis points to a larger impact on the real exchange rate likely stemming
from the movements in the real exchange rate of tradables, and only to a lesser extent from
the lack of equalisation of wages within countries. Broadly speaking this analysis is in line
with the Balassa-Samuelson projections in that it finds more homogeneity of wages within
a country, than between countries. It emphasises that models of international factor prices
explaining deviations from FPE should encompass explanations for the large di↵erences
and variability in wages of equivalent workers in equivalent jobs across di↵erent countries,
and o↵er explanations of much smaller variability in di↵erences between professions’ wages
within a country.
In the third chapter, which is based on Boes and Weisser (2012), the UBS Prices
and Earnings data is used to provide empirical evidence of the medium- and long-term
consequences of India’s economic liberalisation from the early 1990s on skill premia. As
urban and rural areas are a↵ected very di↵erently by trade opening and liberalisation, we
focus on urban wage inequality and the city of Mumbai, an important trading hub, in this
chapter. We address the identification problem of the unobserved counterfactual outcome
by employing the synthetic control group methodology to construct wage trends for the
city of Mumbai under the counterfactual scenario of no reforms. We use a broad group of
35 other large cities, including many trading centres in emerging markets, to construct the
synthetic control.
We find that in the first phase after the 1991 liberalisation medium-skilled wages fell
relative to high- and low-skilled wages. Our synthetic control group shows that these losses
were stronger than would have been expected if no reforms had been implemented. This
implies a reduction in medium- to low-skilled wage inequality, but an increase in high- to
medium-skilled wage inequality.
From the late 1990s onwards, the growth of high-skilled wages outpaced the wages of
the other two skill groups, pointing to new forces of globalisation kicking in after the initial
reforms. We find some evidence that in a third phase, from the second half of the 2000s,
medium-skilled wages accelerated and by 2009 had compensated for the previous losses
relative to high-skilled wages. Versus the low-skilled, medium-skilled workers were even
able to overcompensate earlier losses relative to what would have been expected without
treatment.
Overall, our results in this final chapter allow for two main conclusions. First, India’s
economic and trade liberalisation, starting in the early 1990s, had very di↵erential impacts
on skill premia, both over time and over skill levels. The most striking result is the
large increase in wage inequality of high-skilled versus low-skilled professions. Second,
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the results from both the synthetic control group method and the di↵erence-in-di↵erences
(DID) approach suggest that a significant part of this increase in wage inequality can be
attributed to India’s liberalisation. While DID provides rather uninformative results, the
synthetic control group methodology suggests that this overall rise in inequality was not a
one-way process because we find some periods in which measures of wage inequality were
stable, or even falling.
Finally, our analysis points to a possible explanation of the diverging results in the
literature. While most studies distinguish only between skilled and unskilled workers, and
group together a large number of di↵erent sectors, our results suggest that di↵erent levels of
skill, such as in our case low-, medium- and high-skilled workers were likely impacted very
di↵erently. Therefore, a more disaggregated analysis seems likely to be more informative
than the general definitions often used in the literature to define the skill premia.
Chapter 1
A Contribution to the Empirics of
International Wage Convergence
1.1 Introduction
The goal of understanding why some countries flourish, while others linger in poverty has
long been a key motivational force for the economics profession. The hope of contributing
meaningful policy advice that will enable countries to improve their population’s well-being
might not yet have been Adam Smith’s explicit motive in 1776 for writing on the “nature
and causes of the wealth of nations”, but it has likely been a prominent factor for a
large share of economists since. The insight of the powerful e↵ect of compound interest –
that even small di↵erences in annual growth rates result in large di↵erences in countries’
well-being over time – has focused economists’ attention firmly on the determinants of
economic growth.
Today there is no single framework that unifies all the diverse perspectives under which
growth – and thus the improvements of countries’ well-being – have been analysed. Many
key elements in contemporary theory stem from the early classical economists: Adam Smith
himself contributed significantly to the understanding of the role of competitive behaviour
in fostering higher productivity, and growth. He also highlighted the role of human capital –
a mainstay in modern growth theories – through the refining of workers’ skills in the process
of labour specialisation and recognised that human capital and technological change are
closely related. Later economists explicitly modelled technological progress as a function
of innovation. Schumpeter (1942), for example, argued that competitive behaviour and the
profit motive could justify investments in human capital and that the innovations resulting
from R&D are the fundamental drivers for economic growth.
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David Ricardo (1817) was one of the first to describe two further key elements of
modern growth theory – capital accumulation and diminishing returns. Ricardo recognised
that more and improved machinery increased labour productivity and therefore a country’s
productive capacity. Ricardo was doubtful whether technical change could counteract the
diminishing marginal returns that he observed in agriculture – a feature of production
widely integrated in parts of today’s growth literature. However, while Ricardo attributed
diminishing returns to a decreasing quality of inputs, this characteristic is today attributed
rather to the increasing production factor’s reduced per unit endowment of the other fixed
production factors.
Thomas Malthus in 1798 was likely the first to formalise a view on another key element
a↵ecting well-being. Malthus believed that population growth, i.e. fertility and mortality,
would adjust up or down until all individuals reached a subsistence level of consumption.
While this very negative view has been disproved by the emergence of wealthy societies, the
persistence of extreme poverty in parts of the world has lead some economists nonetheless
to integrate Malthus’s views into contemporary thinking. For example, Galor and Weil
(2000) formulate a model based on Gary Becker’s (1960) quantity-quality-hypothesis in
which a “Malthusian regime” can exist in which skill is not productive enough to warrant
investments in children’s education leading to a poverty trap with high population growth.
However, in “demographic transition” low unskilled wages provide an incentive to invest in
children’s skills (quality) rather than their number (quantity), so that population growth
rates decline and average well-being starts to rise. Malthus’s ideas on population growth
also shaped later economic models in which population growth was sometimes seen as
endogenous, i.e. as being the consequence, rather than the cause of a specific socio-economic
environment.
While the classical economists provided much of the groundwork, the cornerstone of
today’s economic thinking on growth was laid in the neoclassical model developed by
Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956). Based on the work of Harrod (1939) and
Domar (1946), it incorporated capital accumulation, population growth and productivity
growth as exogenous inputs in a neoclassical production function with constant returns to
scale and diminishing returns to factor inputs. The tremendous success of this approach,
in particular its augmented version which further includes human capital accumulation (cf.
Mankiw et al., 1992), stems from its e↵ective merging of the most widely understood drivers
of economic growth to generate a very simple and intuitive general equilibrium model:
Per capita income in the long-run steady state will be higher for countries with higher
rates of savings in physical and human capital, and for lower rates of population growth.
However, once the steady state has been reached, the growth of per capita output depends
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only on the rate of technological progress. A fundamental criticism of the Solow-Swan
model is precisely this – both the level of steady state per capita income and per capita
income growth in the steady state depend wholly on exogenous variables, whose levels
the models cannot explain. Additionally, empirical patterns suggesting that the savings
rate on average rises as countries get richer, and that fertility tends to decline, stand in
contrast to the Solow-Swan model’s assumption of constant savings and population growth
rates (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 16). This unsatisfactory state gave rise to the
development of endogenous growth models from the mid-1980s, whose ambition was to
determine the long run growth rate based on factors that are determined within the model.
Nonetheless, the Solow-Swan model has established itself as the primary reference point in
growth economics and its success remains formidable, in part also due to its well-known
prediction of “conditional convergence”. This hypothesis implies that the further away a
country is from its steady state, the higher the growth rates of per capita income will be as
diminishing returns to capital slow growth as a country approaches its steady state. Thus,
conditional convergence implies that growth rates between structurally similar countries
can di↵er significantly based solely on di↵erences in the distance from a shared equilibrium
point, an important factor when interpreting countries’ relative growth performance. The
implication is that poorer countries would have a tendency to catch up to richer ones,
provided they share the same steady state. While many of the endogenous growth models
do not share the convergence characteristic, some prominent examples do, e.g. the model
of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans in which the savings rate is endogenously determined through
intertemporal consumer optimisation, as well as models of technology di↵usion in which
poorer countries can imitate the technological advances of wealthier countries.
While conditional convergence as measured by a country’s average per capita income
has mostly established itself as an empirical regularity in the literature, giving strong
support to the Solow-Swan model, convergence by no means provides economists with
an all-encompassing explanation in the understanding of economic well-being. The main
criticism of this approach is its highly aggregated nature. Comparing aggregate gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita between countries glosses over significant distributional
e↵ects: Is it capital or labour that is benefitting more from an average increase in income
per capita? Are highly skilled workers and low-skilled workers within a country a↵ected
similarly by convergence? Is income per capita the most appropriate means to measure
economic well-being? Williamson (1996, p. 300) goes as far as to ask, whether we even
know for sure whether convergence is a good thing. He asserts, “Convergence of what?
The new growth theory has shown very little interest in who gains and who loses from
convergence. The theory tends to be highly aggregative, and its empirical applications
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deal with coarse aggregates like gross domestic product per worker. What about wages
of unskilled laborers, wages of skilled artisans, salaries of skilled clerical workers, farm
rents accruing to landlords, and profits accruing to capitalists? What about returns to
sector-specific resources and capital?”
This chapter aims to address some of these issues by providing empirical evidence on
convergence over the past 40 years in a more disaggregated fashion. First, with the goal of
reaching a more distinct interpretation of economic well-being, we focus on the question of
convergence in purchasing power adjusted (real) wages, rather than in aggregate per capita
income, thereby removing from the equation the question of changes in capital versus
labour’s share of income. Second, we provide some disaggregation with regard to workers’
skill levels and professions to identify di↵ering impacts of convergence on societal groups
with the aim of better identifying the winners and losers of the great convergence debate.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the theoretical background
of the convergence argument in the Solow-Swan growth model and derives an equivalent
justification for convergence in wages. Section 1.3 describes other potential drivers of
wage convergence while section 1.4 reviews the empirical literature on growth and wage
convergence. The data used for the wage convergence analysis is described in section 1.5
(and in more detail in appendix A) and section 1.6 displays some key trends in international
wages based on this data. Section 1.7 describes the methodology employed and the empirical
results. Section 1.8 summarises the results and concludes.
1.2 Growth andWage Convergence in the Neoclassical Solow-SwanModel
Conditional convergence is a key implication of the Solow-Swan model, whose role as
a reference point and cornerstone in modern growth theory has been firmly established.
We briefly review the Solow-Swan model and the convergence hypothesis as a theoretical
background to the subsequent empirical analysis. As our interest is in understanding real
wage convergence as an indicator of a population’s well-being, thus going beyond the highly
aggregated measures of income such as GDP per capita, we derive an expression for wage
convergence in the Solow-Swan model for the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
1.2.1 Theoretical Background: Growth and Wages in the Standard Neo-
classical Solow-Swan Model
The Solow-Swan model assumes a neoclassical production function with constant returns to
scale and positive but diminishing returns to factor inputs. The constant rates of savings s,
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population growth n and technological progress g are taken as exogenous, while the factor
inputs capital and labour are paid their marginal products. We assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function
Y = K↵(AL)1 ↵ (1.1)
with aggregate income Y , physical capital K, A > 0 the level of labour augmenting
technology, L labour and capital’s constant share of income ↵, with 0 < ↵ < 1. AL denotes
the e↵ective units of labour and grows at the rate n+ g. As we are interested in per worker
e↵ects, we use the equivalent intensive form
y = f(k) = k↵ (1.2)
with capital per e↵ective unit of labour k⌘K/AL, and output per e↵ective unit of labour
y⌘Y/AL. Income is shared by workers and capital, which in a competitive economy are
paid their marginal products in the form of rents1 r and wages w:
r = @Y/@K = f 0(k) = ↵k↵ 1 > 0 (1.3)
w = @Y/@AL = f(k)  k · f 0(k) = (1  ↵)k↵ > 0 (1.4)
The evolution of the capital stock per e↵ective worker over time k˙ is the fundamental
di↵erential equation of the Solow-Swan model. While savings increase the capital stock
per e↵ective worker, capital depreciation at the rate  , population growth at the rate n
and technological progress at the rate g diminish k in each period:
k˙ = s · f(k)  (n+ g +  ) · k (1.5)
= s · k↵   (n+ g +  ) · k (1.6)
k˙/k = s · k(↵ 1)   (n+ g +  ) (1.7)
A steady state is reached, when k and y grow at constant rates. Due to the diminishing
returns assumed in the neoclassical production function, this can only hold if k˙ = 0, i.e.
when the growth rates of k and y are zero, while K and Y grow at the rate of n+ g. From
equation (1.5) it follows that the steady state level of k is determined by
s · f(k⇤) = (n+ g +  ) · k⇤ (1.8)
1Note that depreciation   on capital lowers the net rate of return on a unit of capital to r    .
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For the Cobb-Douglas production function capital per e↵ective worker in the steady state
therefore equals
k⇤ =
✓
s
n+ g +  
◆1/(1 ↵)
(1.9)
While k < k⇤ the e↵ect of savings in increasing the amount of capital per e↵ective worker
is larger than the e↵ect of population growth, technological progress and depreciation in
reducing capital per e↵ective worker, (n+ g+  ) · k < s · f(k). Thus, the growth rate of k is
positive: k˙/k > 0. However, as k rises the diminishing returns of the production function
mean that capital’s average product is declining, thus slowing the e↵ect of savings such
that the growth rate of capital per e↵ective labour k˙/k declines along the path towards
the steady state:
@(k˙/k)/@k = s · [f 0(k)  f(k)/k]/k (1.10)
= (↵  1) · s · ka 2 < 0 (1.11)
As income y is directly related to k, it is straightforward to derive conditional convergence
for y as k rises along the transition path:
y˙/y = [f 0(k) · k˙]/f(k) (1.12)
= ↵ · (k˙/k) = ↵ · [s · k↵ 1   (n+ g +  )] (1.13)
@(y˙/y)/@k = ↵(↵  1) · s · ka 2 < 0 (1.14)
Thus, the growth rate of output y˙/y mimics k˙/k, and declines as k rises along the path
towards the steady state for 0 < k < k⇤: For two structurally similar countries which
have the same levels for the parameters n, s, g and  , and that produce with the same
production function (i.e. they share the same steady state), growth rates of income will
be higher for the country with the lower level of capital per unit of e↵ective labour k, i.e.
for the poorer country. The resulting catch-up process shown above for the Cobb-Douglas
production function more generally holds for a broad range of neoclassical production
functions, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 39↵). The implication of “conditional
convergence” (referred to as “conditional” because it requires the assumption that the
countries share the same steady state, so convergence is conditional on the structural
similarity of these countries) forms the basis for the large empirical literature analysing
cross-country growth rates, which is reviewed in section 1.4.
What are the implications for wages? The pace of wage growth @(w˙/w)/@k depends on
the sign of the third derivative f 000(·) of the production function. As the third derivative’s
1.2 Growth and Wage Convergence in the Neoclassical Solow-Swan Model 7
sign cannot be generally determined for neoclassical production functions, we again use the
explicit Cobb-Douglas form. As e↵ective labour receives a fixed share of income (1  ↵)
for the Cobb-Douglas production function, wages as defined in equation (1.4) should grow
in line with income along the transition towards the steady state. Using equations (1.4)
and (1.6)
w˙/w = [ k · k˙ · f 00(k)]/[f(k)  k · f 0(k)] (1.15)
= ↵ · [s · k↵ 1   (n+ g +  )] (1.16)
@(w˙/w)/@k = ↵(↵  1) · s · ka 2 < 0 (1.17)
Thus the pace of wage growth declines in step with the decline in the pace of income
growth as the economy approaches the steady state.2,3
The importance of labour augmenting technological progress in the Solow-Swan model is
evident. Without it income per capita stagnates once a country has reached its steady state.
It is important to note that while technological innovations are often perceived as being
the key driver of productivity, in the Solow-Swan model context other factors can equally
be interpreted as impacting the technology parameter A: Weak government institutions
that fail to protect citizens, fragile property rights and a failure to establish the rule of
law can be detrimental to productivity growth. Corruption, a lack of stability, excessive
taxes and other market distortions can result in an ine cient allocation of resources with
an economic e↵ect equivalent to that of slower technological progress resulting in a lower
steady state level of per capital income in the Solow-Swan model.
Finally, we recall the speed of convergence  k, which measures by how much propor-
tionally the growth rate is reduced as capital per e↵ective worker rises:4
 k ⌘  @(k˙/k)@log(k) (1.20)
From equation (1.7) we rewrite the growth rate of capital k˙/k as a function of log (k) and
2The slowing of wage growth as k rises can also be shown by looking at the derivatives of wages with
respect to k:
@w/@k = ↵(1  ↵) · ka 1 > 0 (1.18)
@2w/@k2 =  ↵(1  ↵)2 · ka 2 < 0 (1.19)
3Note that the wages in equation (1.4) refer to the wages of the e↵ective units of labour AL.
4This definition of the speed of convergence  k, which uses logk in the denominator, is common in the
literature, see, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 56↵). In contrast to the formulation with
just k in the denominator, this definition emphasises on the proportionality of the change in growth rate.
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subsequently determine the speed of convergence by taking the derivative with respect to
log (k):
k˙/k = s · e (1 ↵)·log (k)   (n+ g +  ) (1.21)
(1.22)
 k ⌘   @(k˙/k)@log(k) = (1  ↵) · s · k
 (1 ↵) (1.23)
For k close to k⇤ around the steady state s · k (1 ↵) ⇡ (n+ g +  ), so that the speed of
convergence close to the steady state can be approximated by
 k ⇡ (1  ↵) · (n+ g +  ) (1.24)
The speeds of convergence  y =
@(y˙/y)
@log(y) for income y and  w =
@(w˙/w)
@log(w) for wages w are
calculated by expressing equations (1.13) and (1.16) with respect to log(y) and log(w),
using k = y1/↵ and k = ( w1 ↵)
1/↵:
y˙/y = ↵ · (k˙/k) = ↵ · s · e (1 ↵)(1/↵)·log (y)   (n+ g +  ) (1.25)
w˙/w = ↵ · (k˙/k) = ↵ · s · e (1 ↵)(1/↵)·[log (w) log(1 ↵)]   (n+ g +  ) (1.26)
Taking the derivates with respect to log(y) and log(w), respectively, gives  y =  w =  k.
1.2.2 Theoretical Background: Growth and Wages in the Augmented
Neoclassical Solow-Swan Model
In their seminal 1992 paper Mankiw, Romer and Weil tested “whether the Solow growth
model is consistent with the international variation in the standard of living”. Mankiw
et al.’s (1992) innovation was twofold: First, they focused attention on the fact that the
Solow-Swan model does not imply absolute convergence, i.e. poorer countries growing
faster than rich ones, but rather that it implies convergence conditional on the countries
having the same steady states. Second, they introduced an augmented Solow model with
human capital as a further productive factor. The augmented model is structurally similar
to the Solow-Swan model presented in the last section. Replacing the production function
in equation (1.1), Mankiw et al. (1992) set
Y = K↵H (AL)1 ↵   (1.27)
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with H the stock of human capital, and ↵+  < 1 implying diminishing returns to physical
and human capital. With h = H/AL, sk the share of income invested in physical capital and
sh the share of income invested in human capital, the equation of motion (1.5) is replaced
by the new di↵erential equations describing per e↵ective unit of labour accumulation of
physical and human capital:
k˙ = sk · f(k)  (n+ g +  ) · k (1.28)
h˙ = sh · f(k)  (n+ g +  ) · h (1.29)
whereby physical and human capital depreciate at the same rate  . Therefore, in the steady
state
k⇤ =
✓
sk1   · sh 
n+ g +  
◆1/(1 ↵  )
(1.30)
h⇤ =
✓
sk↵ · sh1 ↵
n+ g +  
◆1/(1 ↵  )
(1.31)
To generate an equation that can be empirically tested, Mankiw et al. (1992) substitute
the steady state conditions (1.30) and (1.31) into the production function (1.27) to get an
expression that shows the relationship in the neighbourhood of the steady state between
income per capita, a term comprising technology lnA, the growth rate of technological
progress g, the logarithm of population growth, technological progress and depreciation,
and the logs of the savings ratios for physical and human capital:5
ln

Y
L
 
= lnA  ↵+  
1  ↵    · ln (n+ g +  )
+
↵
1  ↵    · ln sk +
 
1  ↵    · ln sh
(1.32)
For each country A = A(0) · egt, where A(0) is interpreted as representing not only the
starting level of technology, but also environmental factors such as resource endowments,
the quality of public institutions, property rights and the rule of law, climate, and so on. All
countries share the same technology growth rate g, which is assumed to reflect the overall
“advancement of knowledge” (Mankiw et al., 1992, p. 410). A(0) is unobserved and thus
decomposed into a constant across all countries a and a country-specific shock ✏ which enters
the error term. Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that the regressors are independent of ✏, i.e.
5Mankiw et al. (1992) also propose an alternative formulation in which the level of human capital h⇤ rather
than its growth rate is included as a regressor.
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exogenous. Clearly, if the regressors are in fact endogenous, then OLS estimates are likely
to be inconsistent. This is a key point of criticism of Mankiw et al.’s (1992) formulation,
as A(0) in ✏ is likely to be correlated to the rates of savings in physical and human capital,
thereby biasing the OLS coe cient estimates and R2 upwards. However, Mankiw et al.
(1992) state that finding suitable instrumental variables would be “a formidable task”, and
thus use OLS for estimation.6
This augmented model in which the regression coe cients are functions of factor shares
forms the basis for much of the empirical estimation of cross-country growth regressions
over the past 20 years. With their estimation Mankiw et al. (1992) are able to explain 3/4
of variation in cross-country data and their estimated coe cients are around the levels
suggested by the factor shares, which they estimate to be around 1/3 for physical capital’s
share of income ↵ and 1/3 to 1/2 for human capital’s share of income  . In spite of
subsequent challenges to the Mankiw et al. (1992) methodology – and in particular the
critique of omitted variable bias and reverse causality – this analysis firmly cemented the
role of population growth, physical and human capital and technological progress as key
elements in economic growth theory and empirics.
We formulate an equivalent relationship for wages. In contrast to the approach in
section 1.2.1, we di↵erentiate with respect only to L, not to the e↵ective units of labour
AL, thereby following the approach selected by Mankiw et al. (1992). Labour is paid its
marginal product, such that
w =
@Y
@L
= (1  ↵   ) · A · (k↵ · h ) (1.33)
Substituting conditions (1.30) and (1.31) for k and h and takings logs gives
ln (w) = ln (1  ↵   ) + lnA  ↵+  
1  ↵    · ln (n+ g +  )
+
↵
1  ↵    · ln sk +
 
1  ↵    · ln sh
(1.34)
6In their extensive review of a wide range of hurdles in econometrics encountered in empirical growth
studies, Durlauf et al. (2005, p. 637↵) discuss instrumental variable use in detail, and report: “In our view,
the belief that it is easy to identify valid instrumental variables in the growth context is deeply mistaken.
We regard many applications of instrumental variable procedures in the empirical growth literature to
be undermined by the failure to address properly the question of whether these instruments are valid,
i.e. whether they may plausibly be argued to be uncorrelated with the error term in a growth regression.
When an instrument is invalid, instrumental variables estimates will of course be inconsistent. Not enough
is currently known about the consequences of “small” departures from validity, but it is certainly possible
to envisage circumstances under which ordinary least squares would be preferable to instrumental variables
on, say, a mean square error criterion.” Their critical assessment of the alternative approach thus provides
some pragmatic support to Mankiw et al.’s (1992) use of OLS.
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The equation for wages di↵ers from equation (1.32) for income only in the intercept,
which is expected to be lower due to ln (1  ↵   ) < 0. Thus, in the steady state we
would expect the wage rate to be in a parallel situation to income per capita as regards
its relationship to population growth, physical and human capital accumulation and
technological progress. To generate a testable expression for the wage rate w outside of
the steady state, we follow an analog approach to that used by Mankiw et al. (1992) for
income per e↵ective worker.
Note that along the transition path the log wage in period t can be portrayed as a
linear combination of the logs of the initial wage w(0) and the steady state wage w⇤ with
 w the speed of convergence:
ln(w(t)) = (1  e  wt) ln(w⇤) + e  wt lnw(0) (1.35)
Substituting for ln(w⇤) from equation (1.34), subtracting lnw(0) from both sides and
dividing by t gives the expression for the growth rate of wages:
1
t
· ln
✓
w(t)
w(0)
◆
=
(1  e  wt)
t
·

ln (1  ↵   ) + lnA  lnw(0)
  ↵+  
1  ↵    · ln (n+ g +  )
+
↵
1  ↵    · ln sk +
 
1  ↵    · ln sh
  (1.36)
Thus, wage growth on the transition path towards the steady state is a function of the
determinants of the steady state n, g,  , sk and sh, the initial wage rate w(0) and A,
which incorporates the starting level and exogenous rate of technological progress, but also
environmental factors which impact productivity, as described earlier.
In the neighbourhood of the steady state the speed of convergence  k can now be
calculated for the augmented model, analog to the calculation for equation (1.24) as:
 k ⇡ (1  ↵   ) · (n+ g +  ) (1.37)
This implies a slightly slower speed of convergence than in the Solow-Swan model without
human capital. In fact, with the inclusion of human capital and using the customary
parameter values ↵ =   = 1/3 and n+ g +   = 0.06, the speed of convergence close to the
steady state in this model would be  k = 0.02, which is close to the convergence rates for
income that have been observed empirically.7 This would imply a slow convergence process
7Cf. Mankiw et al. (1992, p. 423) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 60).
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in which a country could halve the distance to its steady state only in about 35 years.
1.3 Other Frameworks for International Wages
Theories of economic growth are not the only frameworks that suggest how international
wages might evolve. Of the two major alternative frameworks, one is based on migration
theory, while the second is based on trade theory.
1.3.1 Wages in the Context of Migration
The idea that migration and di↵erences in real wages are fundamentally related lies at
the core of Sjaastad’s (1962) migration theory in which migration takes place if a person’s
present value of returns to migration exceed the present value of its costs. As real wages
determine economic utility to a large extent, migrants are expected to leave low-wage
regions and head towards high-wage regions, in line with Borts and Stein’s (1964) depiction
of rural-to-urban migration. The long-run equilibrium implies wage convergence: The
falling supply of labour would raise wages in low-wage areas over time, while the additional
workforce would result in downward pressure on wages in high-wage regions.
Later wage theories incorporate broader concepts of utility, to include weather, rents,
beauty and pleasantness of the environment, convenience of the location and other ameni-
ties, see, for instance, Graves and Linneman (1979), Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982,
1988). Roback describes a spatial equilibrium in which households’ utility and corporate
profitability are equalised over di↵erent regions, i.e. a particularly poor natural environ-
ment (e.g. poor weather, isolated location, pollution) would be o↵set by lower rents, and a
willingness of companies to pay higher wages to the extent that they benefit financially
from this domicile. In this context the implication of wage convergence disappears – on the
contrary, di↵erential wages can be a component of utility compensation between regions
in equilibrium. However, the potential equilibria are manifold and the expectations with
regard to wage convergence or divergence are ambiguous:8 If, for example, rents adapt
in the long run to perfectly absorb the utility (or disutility) of household and company
amenities, then wages can again be expected to converge in this framework.
Clearly, any impact of migration on international wages depends on the extent of
migration. Strong support for migration as a driver for international wage convergence
comes from economic historians such as Je↵rey G. Williamson. For example, the period
1870 to 1914 is referred to as an “age of mass migration”, during which, “in the absence of
8See Graves (2013).
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quotas, (...) the numbers who elected to move were enormous” (Taylor and Williamson,
1997). Notwithstanding the di culty in estimating a counterfactual of wage development
for the case if no migration had taken place, Taylor and Williamson (1997) provide estimates
from a partial equilibrium analysis that point to migration accounting “for very large shares
of the convergence in GDP per worker and real wages”. Williamson (1996) summarises
evidence for the significant role of mass migration for convergence, among others, for
Ireland, Sweden, the UK and the US in the pre-1914 period. While Williamson (1996)
generally points to the de-globalisation and autarky ambitions in the war and interwar
periods as a key reason for the cessation of convergence during that period, Taylor and
Williamson (1997) specifically point to the introduction of migration quotas and other
barriers as potential causes.
The stark limitations on legal migration that have been put in place during the past
decades stand in contrast to the increased illegal migration in some parts that have been
aided by transportation’s lower cost and increased availability. Nonetheless, a reduced
impact today for migration on international wage trends relative to the pre-1914 era seems
plausible. Trade volumes, on the other hand, have tended to increase in most parts of the
world – the next section discusses wages in the context of international trade and limited
labour mobility.
1.3.2 Wages in the Context of Trade
With hurdles to international labour mobility that can be substantial, the wage arbitrage
e↵ects through migration described in the above section cannot be expected to fully unfold
in the current international context. The Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade finds that regional
di↵erences in factor endowments combined with precisely these limitations to the mobility
of production factors can, in fact, be a driver for trade. Further, under certain conditions
trade in goods can act as a substitute for factor mobility, implying that factor prices will
converge even without factor mobility between countries. This occurs because as countries
engage in trade they increase exports of goods that intensively use the factors with which
they are highly endowed, and import more goods intensive in factors with which they are
only poorly endowed. As algebraically described by Stolper and Samuelson (1941), in each
country this increases the relative demand for the more abundant (and cheaper) factor,
while demand for the scarcer (and more expensive) factor falls, putting pressure on its
price. In this way trade in goods can induce via a shift in factor demand an adjustment
of factor prices. Further, under specific conditions an invertible mapping exists between
the vector of goods prices and the vector of factor prices, through which goods prices
uniquely set factor prices across regions. This result, termed the Factor Price Equalisation
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(FPE) theorem (cf. Samuelson, 1948, and Lerner, 1952), has become a key component
in international trade theory and reflects intuitive expectations of how trade could a↵ect
wages.
Nonetheless, tremendous divergences in international wages persist. From a theoretical
perspective the restrictive conditions of the original FPE theorem9 within the context of
the 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model are an important first constraint that might explain these
divergences. However, extensions of Heckscher-Ohlin to more generalised contexts including
more goods, factors, non-traded goods and market imperfections10 and in particular
specifications of general equilibrium models where FPE does not necessarily hold suggest
that FPE will nearly hold between trading partners.11 This Near FPE applies across a
wide range of production functions (see Thompson, 1990, and Thompson, 1997).
Thus, FPE might rather be viewed as a longer term tendency (see Hicks, 1959, p.
267), much like Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which does not hold in the short term
but is considered a valuable guide for longer term trends. Reflecting this, Samuelson
(1971) rightly directed the discussion towards Factor Price Convergence (FPC): The critical
question is whether factor prices converge over time as trade barriers and transportation
costs fall – if so, the mechanism at the core of the FPE theorem must be at work.12
International wage convergence therefore follows from the Heckscher-Ohlin framework
of trade and the related FPE and FPC theories.
1.4 Overview of Empirical Studies: Growth, Wages and Convergence
1.4.1 Overview of Empirical Studies: Growth and Convergence
In the appendix of their extensive review on growth econometrics, Durlauf et al. (2005) list
145 explanatory variables used in growth regressions since the early 1990s, and cite over
80 empirical studies of cross-country growth analysis. In this section we summarise this
vast empirical growth literature, present a concise review of the most common empirical
approaches and put these in the context of the theoretical models discussed in the previous
sections. While this section reviews the empirical literature on growth and convergence,
the next section reviews the empirical literature on wages and convergence.
9Cf. section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion.
10See among others Ethier (1974), Chang (1979), Takayama (1982) and Thompson (1987).
11Rassekh and Thompson (1993, p. 6).
12The Specific Factors model with homothetic demand (see, for instance, Samuelson, 1971) in which FPC
occurs with free trade is frequently considered the shorter term version of FPE in the Heckscher-Ohlin
context. See also Thompson (1994) for an alternate formulation of the Specific Factors model; here Near
FPE is a robust result.
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Empirical studies into growth and convergence can be classed into two broad categories:
The first group is based on the fundamental growth determinants that make up the
Solow-Swan model: physical and human capital, population growth, depreciation, and
technological progress. These studies aim to confirm or disprove the theoretical models, to
provide numeric estimates for model parameters, and to improve the quality of the early
empirical results by 1) better matching the Solow-variables with empirical equivalents,
e.g. improved choice of measures to reflect human capital or technological progress, 2)
using superior data methods, e.g. controlling for outliers, 3) improving regression fit, e.g.
using variables in levels versus di↵erences, and 4) using more sophisticated econometric
techniques, e.g. instrumental variables and semiparametric methods.
An important example in this context is the modelling of human capital in cross-country
growth regressions. In response to Mankiw et al.’s (1992) augmented Solow-Swan model,
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) refute the role of human capital accumulation, finding that
log di↵erences in human capital over time have no statistically significant e↵ect on growth
in their regressions spanning 1965 to 1985. However, they find that the stock of human
capital is positively related with growth. But Temple (1999) finds that Benhabib and
Spiegel’s (1994) result for human capital accumulation is due to outliers in the data, and
when these are removed the coe cient on human capital accumulation becomes positive
and significant. Krueger and Lindahl (2001), on the other hand, find the stock of human
capital not to be statistically significant for growth when the sample is restricted to OECD
countries. Thus, the stock of human capital might only be relevant during the catch-up
process, not for comparisons of countries at similar levels of per capita income. Aghion and
Howitt (1998) make a similar distinction of two frameworks of modelling of human capital
in the endogenous growth literature, which equally influenced the empirical approaches:
The Lucas approach, based on Lucas (1988), argued that di↵erences in growth rates across
countries are primarily due to di↵erences in the rates of human capital accumulation, much
in line with neoclassical growth theory. In contrast, the Nelson-Phelps approach (1966)
sees the primary role of human capital not in an increase in labour’s productivity, but
rather in the ability of workers to adapt: to disruptions, to structural changes and to the
introduction of new technologies. Thus, in their model human capital does not feature
at all in the production function, but rather in the function governing the evolution of
technology. Thus, the question of whether human capital should be included in levels or
first di↵erences, or whether it should be included in the standard production function
model at all has been a key element of discussion in the literature on cross-country growth
determinants.13
13See Engelbrecht (2001) for a discussion on the Lucas versus Nelson-Phelps comparison.
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The second group reflects the view that while the Solow-Swan variables are clearly
important to growth, they are only part of the explanation. This group thus extends the
Solow-Swan framework by adding additional control variables. The resulting regressions are
sometimes called “Barro regressions”, due to Robert J. Barro’s extensive application of this
structure of regression for identifying drivers of economic growth. These additional variables
can be seen as either additional measures to ensure that one is controlling su ciently for
structural equivalence, i.e. the same steady state. Or, alternatively, the additional variables
can be founded on alternative theoretical models, in particular models of endogenous
growth that started with Romer (1987, 1990), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991). Most
empirical studies nonetheless include the Solow-Swan variables as a baseline.
Disappointingly for a field that has received so much attention over the past quarter of
a century, only a limited consensus has emerged on which of the 150+ variables that have
been investigated can be considered robust and statistically significant determinants of
economic growth. Among the better-established variables one might venture to mention
are those identified by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 12): Initial per capita
GDP, male upper-level schooling, life expectancy at age one (reciprocal), total fertility rate,
government consumption ratio, rule of law, democracy, democracy squared, openness ratio,
changes in the terms of trade, investment ratio, inflation rate, and period dummies. A
fundamental di culty in this respect is that economic growth analysis su↵ers from “theory
open-endedness” (Brock and Durlauf, 2001), i.e. that any number of growth theories can
be mutually compatible, existing side by side without creating logical inconsistencies, thus
resulting in a high number of potential explanatory variables.
Probably the largest hurdle to the identification of empirically salient drivers among
the proposed regressors, and to growth econometrics more generally, is the limited number
of countries in the world. With more explanatory variables having been proposed than
countries exist for which suitable data is available, the robust choice of control variables
is statistically challenging. Durlauf et al. (2005) recall that researchers thus “typically
emphasize a single model (or a small set of models) and then carry out inference as if that
model had generated the data. Standard inference procedures based on a single model
and which are conditional on the truth of that model can grossly overstate the precision
of inferences about a given phenomenon. Such procedures ignore the uncertainty that
surrounds the validity of the model.” Many di↵erent techniques have been employed in the
attempt to improve identification, including Bayesian, pseudo-Bayesian and frequentist
model averaging estimators, general-to-specific modelling, principal components augmented
regressions and adaptive lasso sequences, but “genuine progress” seems hard to achieve
(Durlauf et al., 2005).
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The small sample size in cross country growth regressions is also a hurdle when address-
ing measurement error and outliers, and when allowing for parameter heterogeneity, e.g.
with interaction terms, nonlinearities or semiparametric methods. Additionally, regressor
endogeneity seems plausible in many cross-country growth regressions. In the context of
theory open-endedness Brock and Durlauf (2001) point out that for an instrument to be
classified as valid, a positive argument is needed that the proposed instrument cannot be a
growth determinant (e.g. in a mutually compatible theory), and that it cannot be correlated
with an omitted regressor. Given these high hurdles, Durlauf et al. (2005) challenge the
validity of instruments proposed in previous empirical studies.14 Finally, the observation
that empirical results are rather sensitive to changes in the start and end years is not
comforting. Business cycles can easily distort the measurement of long term economic
growth, depending on the start and end points of measurement, resulting in potential
inconsistencies for results spanning di↵erent time periods.
While the identification of robust and statistically significant growth determinants
is still unfinished work, initial income per capita – the regressor capturing conditional
convergence – has firmly secured its place in cross country growth regressions. In fact,
there has been remarkable consistency in finding statistically significant coe cients with
negative signs indicating convergence after controlling for di↵erences in the steady states.
Empirical convergence rates have mostly been found to be between one and three percent,
clustering around two percent (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Durlauf et al., 2005).
These results are in the order of magnitude that is compatible with Mankiw et al.’s (1992)
augmented Solow-Swan model in which the convergence rates are related to the exogenous
model parameters. Conditional convergence – as basic property of the Solow-Swan model –
is thus widely accepted to have considerable explanatory power for economic growth across
countries and regions.
1.4.2 Overview of Empirical Studies: Wages and Convergence
Most empirical studies on wage di↵erentials focus on di↵erentials within a country: between
rural and urban regions, between the genders or races within a country, between the skilled
and the unskilled. For studies involving more than one country the comparability and
availability of data becomes a significant bottleneck. Thus, studies comparing wages of
di↵erent countries mostly focus on few specific countries in a specific context, such as wage
convergence of EU candidate countries relative to member states (see, for instance, Egger,
2006), or wage convergence between Mexico and the US after NAFTA (see, for instance,
14See Durlauf et al. (2005) for an in-depth discussion on the challenges in growth econometrics.
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Hanson, 2003). The lack of datasets of comparable international wage data for a wide
range of countries have made tests of international wage convergence scarce. The following
three studies are rare examples of empirical interest in international wage convergence.
The economic historian Je↵rey G. Williamson (1995) introduces a dataset of purchasing-
power-parity-adjusted real wage rates for unskilled labour from the mid-nineteenth century
for 15 countries that participated in the early international commodity markets. In a
number of studies based on this dataset and extended versions of it, he and co-authors
confirm wage convergence (and factor price convergence more broadly) for the periods
during which strong globalization trends dominated: 1870-1913, which is labelled a “regime
of dramatic convergence” (Williamson, 1995), and 1946-1988. During the World Wars
and interwar years 1914-1945 real wage convergence ceased, with 1934-1945 even being
characterised by divergence as real wages in the United States surged relative to the other
regions.15 Williamson (1996) puts forward that two major forces of globalisation, migration
and commodity price convergence, are the key drivers of wage convergence during these
periods. The small sample size limits the significance of regression analysis and is not the
focus of the study. Nonetheless, it is informative that in an unconditional convergence
equation Williamson (1996) reports a “rate of real wage convergence between 1870 and
1890 of 1.2 percent per annum, and about 1 percent per annum over the 1870 to 1913
period as a whole.”
In a study by OECD economists focusing on the factor content of trade, Stone et al.
(2011) report finding “no conclusive statistical evidence of convergence in real wages” using
data for the period 1984 to 2002. They use Freeman and Oostendorp’s (2000) updated
Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) database and regress the percentage change
in wages on the logarithm of initial GDP per capita (not initial real wage), as well as
adding a measure for the level of a country’s initial openness, random e↵ects by country
and fixed e↵ects by occupation and separately by sector. Their regression results show that
estimated coe cients were not systematically significant, and the signs on the coe cients
changed frequently for the di↵erent specifications.
Morris (2009) finds evidence for convergence of compensation costs measured in US
dollars (market exchange rate) for a selected group of countries, after these have been
segmented into “convergence clubs”, but not prior to this segmentation and not for all
clubs. The analysis is based on the log t test described in Phillips and Sul (2007) using
hourly manufacturing compensation costs from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
over the period 1975-2006. Compensation data prior to the mid-1990s is missing for five of
15See, among others, Williamson (1995), Williamson (1996), O’Rourke et al. (1996) and Taylor and
Williamson (1997).
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the included emerging markets. Evidence for PPP-adjusted compensation costs provided
somewhat weaker support to the convergence hypothesis than when using market exchange
rates.
Empirical evidence on the question of wage convergence thus remains sparse, and the
conclusions unclear in large part due to limited data availability. We use the wage data
from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys to contribute to filling this gap. These data,
described in section 1.5 below and in more detail in appendix A, have significant advantages
as compared to data used in the above-mentioned studies as the former are based on an
identical survey of profession-level wage data around the world.
1.5 Data Description: UBS Prices and Earnings Survey
The UBS Prices and Earnings surveys of international prices and wages have been con-
ducted every three years since 1970, producing a dataset, which displays high consistency
over time and good global comparability, as in each country the survey was conducted
contemporaneously with an identical questionnaire and comparable methods.16 The survey
collected earnings data from professions in the manufacturing and services sector from 31
cities around the world in 1970, growing to 71 cities in 2009. Of the 35 cities that appeared
in every, or nearly every survey, 17 are in Europe, six in Latin America, five in North
America, four in Asia, one in Africa, one in the Middle East and one in Australia.17
Professions surveyed were selected based on two criteria. First, they had to constitute
a representative cross-section of the workforce in the manufacturing and service sectors.18
Second, the professions needed to be common in most metropolitan centres around the
world and it had to be possible to define and consistently capture the data globally. We
use the survey measure “gross annual income”19 which we adjust for purchasing power
using the consumption-based PPP conversion rates from the Heston et al. (2012) Penn
World Tables, version 7.1.
Except for the expansion in the number of cities and professions surveyed, the ques-
tionnaire on earnings has remained largely unchanged since 1970. In each survey year UBS
recruited local surveyors – mostly three to four independent surveyors per city could be
16See table A.1 in the appendix for information on the survey periods.
17See table A.3 in the appendix for information on which cities were included in the surveys.
18For most years data on twelve professions are available.
19This measure is defined in the survey as “Gross annual income (sum of hourly, weekly or monthly
earnings) taking into account family status and tax allowances including all fringe benefits such as profit
participation, bonuses, vacation money, additional monthly salaries as bonus payments, allowances for
children etc. but excluding overtime compensation.”
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found. The surveyors received detailed instructions on how to proceed with the survey,
including the time frame during which the survey was to be conducted. With regard to the
labour market information, surveyors were instructed to request data from representative
companies of the specific sectors. The survey data is therefore not micro-level data, but
should rather be interpreted as representative agent data for each profession in each city.
The data for each survey item was then averaged across surveyors. Three examples of
descriptions of the professions as in the survey are shown below:
– Skilled industrial worker: Skilled mechanic (“worker”) with vocational training and
about 10 years experience with a large company in the metal working industry; about
35 years old, married, two children.
– Female sales assistant: Female sales assistant (“Saleswoman”) employed in a women’s
clothing section (“ladies wear”) of a large department store; sales training plus some
years of sales experience; about 20 to 25 years old, single.
– Bus driver: Employed by the municipal transportation system (also “public”, or
“municipal transport operator”), about 10 years driving experience; about 35 years
old, married, two children.
As the UBS Prices and Earnings survey does not provide country estimates, but only
provides data for selected large cities, rural occupations, in particular in agriculture, are not
included and any di↵erential development between wages in rural and urban environments
are not reflected in the data.20
Each profession is assigned a skill level by the author (not the survey) based on the
following breakdown:
Skill level 1: Obligatory / statutory schooling only; largely unskilled labour; very limited
training.
Skill level 2: Obligatory / statutory schooling plus full apprenticeship or extensive practical
training, or completed high school and some practical training.
Skill level 3: Completed high school and university or college education.
Skill level 1 professions therefore include bus drivers, factory and textile workers,
saleswomen, and construction workers. Skill level 2 professions include secretaries, auto
mechanics, bank tellers or credit clerks, cooks and skilled industrial workers. Finally, skill
20Many databases used for country comparisons must also make do with data primarily from urban areas –
less a✏uent regions and rural areas are frequently poorly represented (see, for instance, O’Connor, 2008,
p. 3, and Van Ark and Monnikhof, 2000, p. 6↵).
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level 3 professions include primary school teachers, electrical engineers and department
managers in industry.
These data have a number of useful characteristics, that are lacking in the wage data
used in the studies described in section 1.4.2. In contrast to data which stems from
many di↵erent country-specific sources (such as data from industry surveys, trade unions,
censuses, government institutions etc.) as is the case for the OWW wage data and the
BLS compensation cost data in which the wage measure can vary substantially, the UBS
Prices and Earnings data is comparable not only across countries, but also over time.
The consistent definition of professional wages in the UBS survey and the attribution of
skill levels make significantly more di↵erentiated analyses possible. This is an advantage
as compared to databases that have only data for specific groups, e.g. “manufacturing”
workers for the BLS data and “unskilled” workers in the case of Je↵rey G. Williamson’s
(1995) data. The BLS data reflect compensation costs and not wages directly, making them
less suitable for standard-of-living comparisons. Clearly, the Williamson (1995) data, which
spans both the 19th and 20 centuries, is based to a large extent on historical documents,
implying that consistency over time and comparability across countries is likely somewhat
poorer. The lack of consistent sources over time and space is a significant weakness of the
OWW database.21
The key strength of the UBS Prices and Earnings wage data is thus the consistent
definition of workers and professions across all cities and over time, enabling the attribution
of broadly comparable skill levels across all data. The econometric analysis can thus use not
only the common dimensions of time, location (region), and wage level, but also those of
profession and skill level. These dimensions are important given the changes in skill premia
observed in several countries over the past years, which would suggest that analysing only
particular skill groups might not provide a very complete picture.
In terms of limitations, the data do not reflect di↵erences in the structure of labour
markets, as household survey data would. This wage data therefore cannot be assumed to
represent all professions within a city, but only certain professions, which exist in all cities.
For our current application this limitation does not seem serious as the professions for
which data is provided represent a good cross section in both manufacturing and services,
and di↵ering skill levels.
21Note that the technical document to the OWW database (Oostendorp, 2005) reports that a significant
share of the values are imputed due to low response rates - on average countries reported wages only
for 8.5 out of 21 possible years, and did not necessarily report data for all occupations even when they
did report. Also, countries report wages di↵erently, e.g. based on di↵erent sources such as employer
surveys, household surveys, collective bargaining contracts and legislated pay schedules, or reporting
minimum, maximum or prevailing wages. Oostendorp (2005) concludes that “the vast majority of the
Inquiry statistics are non-comparable”.
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1.6 International Wage Trends since 1970
In this section we document international wage trends for the period 1970 to 2009 based
on the UBS Prices and Earnings dataset. For the following charts we calculate a wage
index for each city in which each profession is equally weighted. Thus, the charts reveal no
distinctions by profession or skill level, but represent the average for the surveyed professions
in manufacturing and services in each city. Cities for which no consumption-based PPP
conversion rate is available in the Penn World Tables 7.1 are excluded.
Figure 1.1 plots the average annualised wage growth rate between 1970 and 2009
relative to the log 1970 wage. Only cities whose data both for 1970 and 2009 are available
are included. The negative slope of the regression line suggest that this sample does not
reject the hypothesis of absolute convergence in international wages for 1970-2009, as cities
with lower initial real wages tended to have higher growth rates in average wages. This is
somewhat in contrast to Morris (2009), who finds no indication of absolute convergence in
manufacturing compensation costs for 1975-2006 in BLS data. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) also find no evidence of absolute convergence in the more common convergence
measure of GDP per capita for 1960-2000.
The clear outlier to the bottom of the chart is Mexico City, which experienced excep-
tionally weak real wage growth during this period. This is in line with Morris (2009), who
also finds Mexico to be a distinct outlier in terms of its extremely weak real wage growth.
The other three cities that experienced very weak wage growth during this period are Rio
de Janeiro, Johannesburg and Sao Paulo, while the city that experienced the strongest
wage growth is Hong Kong, in the upper left of the chart.
Instead of a linear regression we now fit a smoothed polynomial function to the data
to identify potential trends when allowing for more variation in the slope, see figure 1.2.
This display suggests the existence of at least two “clubs”: A low to middle real wage club
in which absolute convergence seems to prevail, and a high real wage club in which those
with the highest initial wages grow faster. This high real wage club includes New York,
Zurich, Chicago, Geneva, Amsterdam and Stockholm.
To verify whether the tentative evidence for absolute convergence is robust for a
variation in start and end dates, we select nine sub-periods of di↵erent lengths and check
the slopes on the linear trends: for all periods the slope is found to be negative, although for
1970-1988 and 1970-1991 the slope is not very steep. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show examples of
these results – here the total period is divided in half, resulting in the two periods 1970-1988
and 1988-2009: While the prior period shows limited evidence of absolute convergence, the
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Figure 1.1: 1970-2009 average annualised wage growth rate relative to the log 1970 wage,
and linear trend
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Figure 1.2: 1970-2009 average annualised wage growth rate relative to the log 1970 wage,
and polynomial fit
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latter period displays a steeper negative slope.22 The two distinctly negative outliers for
1970-1988 in figure 1.3 are Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro, while the extreme positive
outlier in 1988-2009 in figure 1.4 is Cairo, whose measured growth rate is likely distorted
due to the massive currency devaluation that took place in 1988-1991, which is likely
not reflected in the survey data as the survey took place from April to May 1988. The
exclusion of these outliers does not, however, change the overall interpretation with regard
to convergence.
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Figure 1.3: 1970-1988 average annualised wage growth rate relative to the log 1970 wage
Two further interpretations seem interesting when comparing these sub-periods: First,
the diversity of growth rates is substantially higher for the earlier period 1970-1988. Second,
the average level of growth rates is substantially lower for the later period 1988-2009. This
points to a real wage growth slowdown. Figure 1.5 plots the average growth rates for
1970-1988 versus those for 1988-2009 and confirms a significant real wage growth slowdown
22Note that more cities could be included in the comparison for the second period, as data for more cities
was available for 1988-2009 than for 1970-1988. City name labels have been removed in figures 1.3 and
1.4 for visual clarity.
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Figure 1.4: 1988-2009 average annualised wage growth rate relative to the log 1988 wage
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between the earlier and later periods for the large majority of cities. The exceptions are
the cities above the 45-degree line: Buenos Aires, Lisbon, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
This is in line with Durlauf et al. (2005) who records a significant slowdown in GDP per
capita growth for the 1960-1980 versus 1980-2000 period in a similar chart.
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Figure 1.5: 1970-1988 wage growth rates versus 1988-2009 wage growth rates
Figure 1.5 includes only cities for which data is available from 1970. In contrast, figure
1.6 shows the kernel density distributions for three sub-periods, 1970-1985, 1985-2000 and
2000-2009, including all cities for which data are available for any sub-period. The leftward
shift of the density distributions points to a decline in real wage growth rates from period
to period.
While growth rates have declined, workers are nonetheless better o↵ than in 1970. We
use the average of real wages of the two American cities for which data is available in 1970,
New York and Chicago, as a benchmark and compare all other cities’ 1970 and 2009 real
wages to this. The resulting kernel density distributions are shown in figure 1.7: For 1970
the distribution is single-peaked and nearly all cities have lower real wages than the 1970
US average. By 2009, the distribution has moved substantially to the right, with most
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Figure 1.6: Densities of growth rates over di↵erent periods
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cities now showing up real wages above the average US 1970 level. The distribution is also
much more spread out in 2009 and displays the “Twin Peaks” often found in comparable
GDP per capita data, see e.g. Durlauf et al. (2005). Note, that we have included all cities
for which data in 2009 is available, thus the two distributions do not reflect the same base
population. If we incorporate only the cities which are also included in the 1970 density,
the left hand peak of the 2009 distribution flattens o↵, indicating that mostly lower-income
cities have been added to the dataset since 1970.
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Figure 1.7: Densities of 1970 and 2009 real wages relative to 1970 US real wages
The two main inferences from the UBS Prices and Earnings wage data so far are that
the hypothesis of absolute convergence is not rejected in a graphical sense in this data,
and that real wage growth rates have slowed for most cities. Do the higher growth rates
of cities with lower initial wages mean that they have been able to catch up to wealthier
countries, or has the slowing of the group as a whole meant that the cities have mostly
maintained their ranks relative to the rest of the group? Figure 1.8 takes the average of
real wage growth in the American cities as the benchmark, and compares 1970 real wages
for each city to the 1970 US average, and 2009 real wages for each city to the 2009 US
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average.23 Cities below the 45-degree line were better positioned relative to the US in 1970
than in 2009 and thus have lost ground relative to the US, while the reverse is true for
cities above the 45-degree line. Approximately as many cities are above as below the line.
However, the clearest gains relative to US growth were made by cities with the lowest
relative wages in 1970, which is visually reinforced by the slight tilt of the blue regression
line relative to the 45-degree line.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
PPP−adjusted wage relative to USA in 1970
PP
P−
ad
jus
te
d 
wa
ge
 re
lat
ive
 to
 U
SA
 in
 2
00
9
Figure 1.8: Change in the position of cities relative to the US average from 1970 to 2009
In many senses the wage data from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys reflect what
might be expected given past analyses for GDP per capita growth data over the same
period: Wage growth rates have di↵ered sharply between cities, but there is a clear trend
of slowing real wage growth over the past 40 years, as has been seen for real GDP per
capita. The density distribution of real wages has shifted clearly to the right, pointing to
significant gains for workers, but it has also become two-peaked, meaning wage growth
of the poorer countries was not su cient over this time period to make up for the initial
23Cf. Durlauf et al. (2005) for a similar comparison using GDP per capita. City name labels have been
excluded for visual clarity.
1.7 Econometric Model Specification and Estimation 31
di↵erence in levels. One aspect in which these data di↵er from much of the GDP per capita
data is that in a graphical sense they do not reject the hypothesis of absolute convergence
in real wages. In the next section we analyse the question of absolute and conditional
convergence from a statistical perspective.
1.7 Econometric Model Specification and Estimation
From the neoclassical model we reduce equation (1.36) to the form
1
t
· ln
✓
w(t)
w(0)
◆
= a+ b · lnw(0) + c0 · x+ d0 · z + ✏ (1.38)
where the logarithm of the growth rate of wages is a function of the logarithm of
the initial wage rate lnw(0), a vector x of the variables that determine the steady state
in the Solow-Swan model, and a vector z of other variables. Within the Solow-Swan
model z may be interpreted as including not only the starting level of technology, but
also environmental factors such as resource endowments, the quality of public institutions,
climate, etc., equivalent to the interpretation of A(0) by Mankiw et al. (1992): In this
context these variables can be interpreted as additional measures to ensure that one
is controlling su ciently for the steady state when testing for conditional convergence.
Separately, in the context of endogenous growth models, these additional variables would
generally be interpreted as stand-alone drivers of growth. In the following sections we
take a negative coe cient b on the initial wage regressor lnw(0) to signify convergence in
wages. This is an analog approach to the analyses of growth convergence, where a negative
coe cient on the initial level of GDP per capita signals growth convergence.
1.7.1 Absolute Convergence in Mean Wages
In a first simple step, we verify the hypothesis of absolute convergence for average city
wages for the period 1970-2009, including the 29 cities for which growth of the mean
wage for 1970-2009 could be calculated from the data. The results of the OLS regression
are shown in column (1) of table 1.1, with the standard errors shown in brackets. The
convergence coe cient b on the log mean wage in the starting year 1970 is negative and
significant at the 5% level, indicating absolute convergence in mean wages across cities.
As the graphical representations in the previous section indicated that wage growth
developed di↵erently over the course of the nearly 40 years under observation, we test the
absolute convergence hypothesis for the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009. The OLS
regression results from separately testing these periods are shown in column (2) of table
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1.1 for the balanced panel, i.e. when including only the 28 cities for which both growth
rates 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 can be calculated.24 Column (3) shows the results for the
unbalanced panel, i.e. when including in the 1970-1988 regression all 29 cities for which
1970-1988 data is available,25 and in the 1988-2009 regression all 46 cities for which this
data is available. For both sub-periods the regression coe cients b on the initial mean
wage are negative, however, absolute convergence seems stronger for 1988 to 2009, as for
this period the absolute value of the coe cient on the initial wage is larger, the R2 is
higher and the regression is significant at the 0.1% level, as compared to the 5% level for
the total period 1970-2009, and no statistical significance for the 1970-1988 period.
Table 1.1: Average city wage growth regressed on initial average wages (absolute convergence)
for 1970-2009, and the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR
1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988
Total period 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009
Estimated Estimated
separately separately
(balanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced)
(unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (restricted) (restricted)
Intercept 1 0.161 (0.047)** 0.129 (0.110) 0.125 (0.109) 0.134 (0.109) 0.149 (0.106) 0.181 (0.026)*** 0.221 (0.016)***
Ln average wage 1970 -0.014 (0.006)* -0.008 (0.013) -0.008 (0.013) -0.009 (0.013) -0.011 (0.012) -0.014 (0.003)*** -0.019 (0.002)***
Intercept 2 0.174 (0.030)*** 0.204 (0.018)*** 0.185 (0.030)*** 0.214 (0.017)*** 0.164 (0.029)*** 0.209 (0.017)***
Ln average wage 1988 -0.015 (0.003)*** -0.018 (0.002)*** -0.016 (0.003)*** -0.019 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.003)*** -0.019 (0.002)***
Multiple R2 0.19 0.02/0.49 0.01/0.44 0.02/0.49 0.01/0.44 0.01/0.49 -0.02/0.44
Adjusted R2 0.16 -0.02/0.47 -0.02/0.43 -0.02/0.47 -0.03/0.43 -0.03/0.47 -0.05/0.43
Num. obs. 29 28/28 29/46 28/28 29/46 28/28 29/46
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, or for the total period 1970-2009. In the
“unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available in one of the periods were added to benefit from the larger sample size. The term “restricted” indicates that the
convergence coe cients b on the initial wage were restricted to be equal in both periods, while the intercepts for the two periods were allowed to vary. The standard errors are shown in
brackets. In the lower section of the table where two numbers are shown separated by a slash, the first number refers to 1970-1988, while the second number refers to 1988-2009.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
We can use the panel structure of the data to improve the e ciency of the parameter
estimates and to test whether the coe cients on the initial wage for the two periods are
statistically di↵erent from one another. For this we set the two sub-periods as the cross
section i 2 (1970-1988; 1988-2009), while the cities c represent the second panel dimension.
ln (cagr wi,c) = ai + bi · lnw(0)i,c + ✏ (1.39)
For each period i the logarithm of the compound annual growth rate of the average wage
in each city ln (cagr wi,c) is regressed on the logarithm of the initial average wage lnw(0)i,c.
In the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) methodology the Feasible Generalised Least
Squares (FGLS) estimator uses the correlation within the panel to improve the e ciency
24Compared to the 1970-2009 period, Rome was omitted as it was not included in the 1988 survey.
25Du¨sseldorf, for which data is available in 1970 and 1988, but not in 2009, is added.
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of the OLS estimates. We aim to identify di↵erences between the sub-periods, and we can
plausibly assume that the regressions between cities within each period are in some way
correlated. However, we cannot exclude that they are also correlated across periods.
The results of the SUR regressions are shown in column (4) of table 1.1 for the balanced
panel and in column (5) for the unbalanced panel. In both cases and for both periods the
convergence coe cient b increased slightly compared to the equivalent OLS regressions.
It is still higher for the 1988-2009 period as compared to the earlier period. However,
when we test the hypothesis of identical convergence coe cients for the two periods,
bi=1970 1988 = bi=1988 2009, it is not rejected at any reasonable level of significance by
Theil’s F-Test, nor by the Chi-squared statistic or F-statistic of a Wald test. Thus, we
restrict the convergence coe cient b to be identical across both periods (while allowing the
intercept to vary), and repeat the SUR estimation. The results for the balanced panel are
shown in column (6) of table 1.1 while the results of the unbalanced panel are shown in
column (7). All coe cients are significant at the 0.1% level.
The di↵erent estimates in table 1.1 overall confirm the hypothesis of absolute conver-
gence in mean city wages. We subsequently deduce the speed of convergence that these
estimates imply. From equation (1.36) it follows that the coe cient b =   (1 e  wt)t , so
the approximate speed of convergence in the neighbourhood of the steady state can be
computed as  w =   ln(1+t·b)t , giving a speed of convergence of 0.8% to 1.5% per annum for
1970-2009 as a whole and for 1988-2009, but only of about 0.4% to 0.5% for 1970-1988
when estimated separately.
Thus far we have employed only the city mean wage data - next we turn to the richer
profession-level wage data in the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys. We structure the
following regression analysis in four parts: First, we again test for absolute convergence
(section 1.7.2). Second, we test for conditional convergence (section 1.7.3) in two senses: 1)
within more homogenous groups by separately testing cities in emerging and developed
markets for absolute convergence, and 2) in the sense of the Solow-Swan model by adding
regressors that control for the steady state (see the interpretation of x in equation (1.38)).
We also make use of the skill attributions to provide insight into the question of how
di↵erent skill and professional groups have been a↵ected by the international wage trends
implied by conditional convergence. Finally, we use principal components augmented
regressions to explain the impact of additional explanatory variables that go beyond the
Solow-Swan model (see z in equation (1.38)), in line with the Barro-type equations of
growth regressions (section 1.7.4).
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1.7.2 Absolute Convergence in Profession-Level Wages
Absolute Convergence in Profession-Level Wages and Comparison of Sub-
periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009
Table 1.2 reports the results when regressing wage growth on initial wages using profession-
level wage data for the periods 1970-2009, 1970-1988 and 1988-2009. The OLS results
are shown in columns (1) to (3). For the SUR regressions in columns (4) to (7) we use
the equivalent panel structure to that used for the mean wage regressions in the previous
section:
ln (cagr wi,pc) = ai + bi · lnw(0)i,pc + ✏ (1.40)
Thus, for each period i 2 (1970-1988; 1988-2009), which again represents the cross
section, the logarithm of the compound annual growth rate of the wage of each profession
in each city ln (cagr wi,pc) is regressed on the logarithm of the initial wage lnw(0)i,pc of
that profession in that city (pc).
Table 1.2: Profession-level wage growth regressed on initial profession-level wages (absolute
convergence) for 1970-2009, and the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR
1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988
Total period 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009
Estimated Estimated
separately separately
(balanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced)
(unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (restricted) (restricted)
Intercept 1 0.157 (0.018)*** 0.183(0.042)*** 0.179 (0.041)*** 0.181 (0.042)*** 0.178 (0.042)*** 0.188 (0.017)*** 0.180 (0.006)***
Ln wage 1970 -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.005)** -0.014 (0.005)** -0.014 (0.005)** -0.014 (0.005)** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.001)***
Intercept 2 0.159 (0.020)*** 0.158 (0.009)*** 0.168 (0.020)*** 0.159 (0.007)*** 0.168 (0.019)*** 0.159 (0.007)***
Ln wage 1988 -0.014 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.001)***
Multiple R2 0.22 0.06/0.24 0.06/0.29 0.06/0.24 0.06/0.29 0.06/0.24 0.06/0.29
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.05/0.24 0.05/0.29 0.05/0.24 0.05/0.29 0.05/0.24 0.05/0.29
Num. obs. 144 136/136 141/539 136/136 141/539 136/136 141/539
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, or for the total period 1970-2009. In the
“unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available in one of the periods were added to benefit from the larger sample size. The term “restricted” indicates that the
convergence coe cients b on the initial wage were restricted to be equal in both periods, while the intercepts for the two periods were allowed to vary. The standard errors are shown in
brackets. In the lower section of the table where two numbers are shown separated by a slash, the first number refers to 1970-1988, while the second number refers to 1988-2009.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
As in the previous section, the convergence coe cients b are again all negative, but
they are more similar across time periods, all close to  0.014. Statistical significance is
high for all specifications; at its lowest it is still at the 1% level. Explanatory power is,
as in the mean wage regressions of the previous section, again lower for the 1970-1988
period. The hypothesis of identical convergence coe cients bi=1970 1988 = bi=1988 2009
in the two periods is again not rejected at any reasonable level of significance by Theil’s
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F-Test, nor by the Chi-squared statistic or F-statistic of a Wald test. Thus, we again
restrict the convergence coe cient b to be identical across both periods (while allowing the
intercept to vary), and repeat the SUR estimation, with the results shown in column (6)
for the balanced panel and column (7) for the unbalanced panel of table 1.2. Again, all the
coe cients of the restricted equations are significant at the 0.1% level.
Overall these results confirm the hypothesis of absolute convergence in profession-level
wages, with a convergence speed of 0.8%-1.0% per annum. Interestingly, the results overall
are relatively similar to those shown for the more aggregated mean wage data in table 1.1.
This was not necessarily to be expected, as the convergence measured using mean wages is
structurally di↵erent from that measured when using profession-level data: The former
measures only convergence between cities with lower and higher average initial wages, while
the latter measures convergence of lower-paid jobs relative to higher paid jobs, across the
world. This is independent of whether the level of wages in a job is due to the city, or the
profession.
Absolute Convergence in Profession-Level Wages based on GDP per Capita
A specification that one might consider more comparable to the mean wage specification
of section 1.7.1 is one in which profession-level wage growth rates are regressed on the
countries’ initial PPP-adjusted GDP per capita. Thus, the initial wage is replaced by
the initial level of GDP per capita as the initial condition. This specification is not the
kind of convergence we derived for wages in the Solow-Swan model, nor is it the type of
convergence that follows from the migration or trade frameworks. Nonetheless, as initial
GDP per capita is the common variable used as the initial condition when analysing
economic growth convergence, we investigate this relationship also. Table 1.3 shows some
selected specifications of such equations.26
Column (1) in table 1.3 shows the OLS estimation over the total period 1970-2009,
while column (2) shows the equivalent for the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009. We
additionally ran a number of regressions controlling for several fixed e↵ects (city, country,
regions, skill levels and professions) and combinations of these, testing these specifications
both on the total period and the two sub-periods. None of the tested specifications showed
strong evidence for absolute convergence, as convergence coe cients were found to be
positive in some periods, or to be statistically insignificant. The remaining columns (3)
to (6) show two examples of this type of specification: One with only city fixed e↵ects
(in columns (3) for the total period, and column (4) for the sub-periods), whose results
26The source of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita data is the Penn World Tables 7.1.
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Table 1.3: Profession-level wage growth regressed on initial real GDP per capita for 1970-2009,
and the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS + OLS + OLS + OLS +
Fixed e↵ects Fixed e↵ects Fixed e↵ects Fixed e↵ects
(City) (City) (Skills, Regions) (Skills, Regions)
1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-2009 1970-1988
1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009
Total period Estimated Total period Estimated Total period Estimated
separately separately separately
(balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced)
Intercept 1 -0.015 (0.017) -0.113 (0.032)*** -0.065 (0.108) -0.212 (0.205) 0.064 (0.026)* 0.081 (0.048).
Ln GDP/capita 1970 0.006 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.003)*** 0.010 (0.011) 0.028 (0.020) -0.005 (0.003) -0.004 (0.006)
factor(South-East Asia)1 1 0.037 (0.006)*** 0.057 (0.011)***
factor(Europe)1 1 0.025 (0.006)*** 0.032 (0.011)**
factor(Latin America)1 1 0.006 (0.005) -0.012 (0.009)
factor(Skills)Level2 1 0.002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.004)
factor(Skills)Level3 1 0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.005)
Intercept 2 0.085 (0.009)*** -0.016 (0.282) 0.084 (0.013)***
Ln GDP/capita 2 -0.006 (0.001)*** 0.003 (0.027) -0.006 (0.001)***
factor(South-East Asia)1 2 -0.001 (0.003)
factor(Europe)1 2 -0.002 (0.003)
factor(Latin America)1 2 -0.005 (0.003)
factor(Skills)Level2 2 0.002 (0.002)
factor(Skills)Level3 2 -0.002 (0.002)
Multiple R2 0.08 0.18/0.06 0.76 0.79/0.48 0.35 0.46/0.07
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.17/0.06 0.70 0.74/0.43 0.33 0.44/0.06
Num. obs. 144 141/539 144 141/539 144 141/539
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, or for
the total period 1970-2009. In the “unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available in one of the periods were added to benefit
from the larger sample size. The standard errors are shown in brackets. In the lower section of the table where two numbers are shown separated by a
slash, the first number refers to 1970-1988, while the second number refers to 1988-2009. The coe cients on the city dummy variables in columns (3)
and (4) are omitted in this table for brevity, but the complete columns (3) and (4) can be found in table B.1 in the appendix.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
do not point to convergence, and one with region dummies for South-East Asia, Europe,
Latin America and the professions’ skill levels (in columns (5) and (6)), whose convergence
coe cients are negative, but rather small, with statistical significance only for 1988-2009.27
Overall, the regressions in which profession-level wage growth rates are regressed on the
countries’ initial PPP-adjusted GDP per capita do not point to absolute convergence, with
regressor estimates changing sign for di↵erent periods, and di↵erent specifications. This is
in contrast to the results of the mean wage specification of section 1.7.1 and implies that
initial GDP per capita and initial mean wages are not substitutable in these regressions.
However, this result is in line with Stone et al. (2011) who also regressed wage growth on
initial GDP per capita and found no systematic evidence of convergence.
Summarising the results for absolute convergence in profession-level data so far, we
find no statistical evidence of catch-up in wages for poorer countries as measured by
27The coe cients on the city dummy variables in columns (3) and (4) are omitted in this table for brevity.
These are reproduced in table B.1 in the appendix.
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GDP per capita, but we find solid evidence of absolute convergence in two senses: Cities
with lower average initial wages exhibit higher growth in average wages; and lower initial
profession-level wages world wide (whether due to the country context or the profession)
also exhibit higher growth.
Absolute Convergence in Profession-Level Wages for Skill Levels and Profes-
sions
Having established solid evidence for absolute convergence when average city wages and
profession-level wages are regressed on initial wages, we further investigate the characteris-
tics of convergence within skill levels and professions.
First, we simultaneously estimate equations for each skill level in a SUR model in which
we take the skill levels s as the cross section, and the cities c as the second panel dimension:
ln (cagr ws,c) = as + bs · lnw(0)s,c + ✏ (1.41)
As the number of professions and cities surveyed in 1970 is lower than in later years,
we again analyse the data for the whole period 1970-2009 (see column (1) in table 1.4),
but also divide the data into the two sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, providing a
richer dataset (see columns (3) and (4) in table 1.4). Note that the data is now pooled in
the sense that the model does not distinguish between the two periods when we regress
the compound annual growth rate of profession-level wages on initial wages for each skill
level. Columns (3) and (4) in table 1.4 show the results for the balanced and unbalanced
panels of the subdivided data.28
Again, we find solid evidence of absolute convergence, this time within the separate
skill levels of professions with convergence coe cients systematically having a negative
sign, and high statistical significance. This means that across cities the lowest wages within
each skill group have been catching up to the higher wages within the same skill group.
However, the implied convergence speeds di↵er, depending on the specification, and no skill
level has a systematically faster or slower convergence speed. The hypothesis of identical
convergence coe cients bs=skill level 1 = bs=skill level 2 = bs=skill level 3 across skill levels is
not rejected when using the data over the total period 1970-2009, but is rejected at the
5% level or better for the sub-period data in columns (3) and (4) by Theil’s F-Test, the
Chi-squared statistic and the F-statistic of a Wald test. Thus, we restrict the convergence
coe cient bs to be identical across skill levels only for the total period 1970-2009 (while
28The balanced dataset has been set up so that it includes only cities for which data for each skill level is
available, and also, that only professions were included for which data in both periods are available.
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Table 1.4: Absolute convergence in profession-level wages for skill levels 1, 2 and 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUR SUR SUR SUR
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-1988
1988-2009 1988-2009
(unbalanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced)
(unrestricted) (restricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
Skill level 1 - Intercept 0.183 (0.020)*** 0.166 (0.013)*** 0.126 (0.040)** 0.263 (0.025)***
Skill level 1 - Ln initial wage -0.017 (0.002)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.011 (0.004)* -0.026 (0.003)***
Skill level 2 - Intercept 0.156 (0.020)*** 0.167 (0.013)*** 0.161 (0.042)*** 0.200 (0.038)***
Skill level 2 - Ln initial wage -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.004)** -0.019 (0.004)***
Skill level 3 - Intercept 0.171 (0.021)*** 0.171 (0.013)*** 0.249 (0.028)*** 0.184 (0.021)***
Skill level 3 - Ln initial wage -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.023 (0.003)*** -0.016 (0.002)***
Multiple R2 0.06/0.38/0.08 0.09/ 0.40/0.08 -0.11/0.16/0.38 0.35/0.15/0.37
Adjusted R2 0.02/0.36/0.04 0.05/ 0.37/0.04 -0.16/0.12/0.36 0.34/0.13/0.36
Num. obs. 28/29/29 28/29/29 27/27/27 47/47/46
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for all skill levels, and only professions were
included, for which data in both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 were available. In the “unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data
was only available for some of the skill levels or one of the periods were added to benefit from the larger sample size. The term “restricted”
indicates that the convergence coe cients b on the initial wage were restricted to be equal in all skill groups, while the intercepts for the skill
groups were allowed to vary. The standard errors are shown in brackets. In the lower section of the table where three numbers are shown
separated by a slash, the first number refers to skill level 1, the second to skill level 2, and the third to skill level 3.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
allowing the intercept to vary), and repeat the SUR estimation, with the results shown
in column (2) of table 1.4. Again, the convergence coe cient is negative; it points to a
convergence speed of 1% per annum, and all the coe cients of the restricted equations are
significant at the 0.1% level.
Next, we use the panel structure in which the professions p represent the cross section
and the cities c represent the second panel dimension:
ln (cagr wp,c) = ap + bp · lnw(0)p,c + ✏ (1.42)
Again we analyse the data for the whole period 1970-2009 (see column (1) in table 1.5),
but also divide the data into the two sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 (see columns
(3) and (4) in table 1.5). Again, the data is pooled in the sense that the model does not
distinguish between the two sub-periods when we regress the compound annual growth
rate of profession-level wages on initial wages for each profession.29
Again, we find solid evidence of absolute convergence, this time within the professions
with convergence coe cients systematically having a negative sign, and high statistical
29The balanced dataset has been set up so that it includes only cities for which data for each profession is
available, and also, that only professions were included for which data in both periods are available.
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Table 1.5: Absolute convergence in profession-level wages for the di↵erent professions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUR SUR SUR SUR
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-1988
1988-2009 1988-2009
(unbalanced) (unbalanced) (balanced) (unbalanced)
(unrestricted) (restricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
Auto.Mechanics - Intercept 0.206 (0.021)*** 0.188 (0.012)*** 0.180 (0.037)*** 0.231 (0.020)***
Auto.Mechanics - Ln initial wage -0.020 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.001)*** -0.016 (0.004)*** -0.022 (0.002)***
Bank.Tellers.or.Credit.Clerks - Intercept 0.240 (0.023)*** 0.196 (0.012)*** 0.288 (0.034)*** 0.329 (0.027)***
Bank.Tellers.or.Credit.Clerks - Ln initial wage -0.023 (0.003)*** -0.018 (0.001)*** -0.026 (0.004)*** -0.030 (0.003)***
Bus.Drivers - Intercept 0.183 (0.019)*** 0.189 (0.012)*** 0.179 (0.037)*** 0.247 (0.021)***
Bus.Drivers - Ln initial wage -0.017 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.001)*** -0.016 (0.004)*** -0.023 (0.002)***
Construction.Workers - Intercept 0.216 (0.018)***
Construction.Workers - Ln initial wage -0.021 (0.002)***
Cooks - Intercept 0.424 (0.024)***
Cooks - Ln initial wage -0.040 (0.002)***
Department.Managers - Intercept 0.452 (0.022)***
Department.Managers - Ln initial wage -0.041 (0.002)***
Electrical.Engineers - Intercept 0.348 (0.029)***
Electrical.Engineers - Ln initial wage -0.032 (0.003)***
Factory.or.Textile.Workers - Intercept 0.217 (0.022)***
Factory.or.Textile.Workers - Ln initial wage -0.021 (0.002)***
Industrial.Workers - Intercept 0.370 (0.026)***
Industrial.Workers - Ln initial wage -0.035 (0.003)***
Primary.School.Teachers - Intercept 0.184 (0.019)*** 0.194 (0.012)*** 0.265 (0.028)*** 0.208 (0.019)***
Primary.School.Teachers - Ln initial wage -0.016 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.001)*** -0.024 (0.003)*** -0.019 (0.002)***
Saleswomen - Intercept 0.304 (0.017)***
Saleswomen - Ln initial wage -0.030 (0.002)***
Secretaries - Intercept 0.217 (0.021)*** 0.191 (0.012)*** 0.173 (0.042)*** 0.279 (0.025)***
Secretaries - Ln initial wage -0.021 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.004)** -0.027 (0.003)***
Multiple R2 0.23/0.36/0.06/0.06/0.55 0.25/0.38/0.04/0.03/0.52 0.10/0.52/-0.34/0.35/0.13 See note 1
Adjusted R2 0.20/0.33/0.02/0.02/0.53 0.22/ 0.35/0.00/0.00/0.50 0.07/0.50/-0.39/0.32/0.10 See note 2
Num. obs. 29/29/28/29/29 29/29/28/29/29 27/27/27/27/27 See note 3
Note 1: 0.31/0.18/0.06/-0.27/0.66/0.58/0.21/-0.13/0.34/0.31/0.23/0.00
Note 2: 0.30/0.16/0.04/-0.30/0.65/0.57/0.20/-0.16/0.33/0.29/0.21/-0.03
Note 3: 46/47/47/45/45/45/45/43/44/46/45/46
Additional notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for all professions, and only professions were included, for
which data in both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 were available. In the “unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available for some of the
professions or one of the periods were added to benefit from the larger sample size. The term “restricted” indicates that the convergence coe cients b on the initial wage
were restricted to be equal in all professions, while the intercepts for the professions were allowed to vary. The standard errors are shown in brackets. In the lower section of
the table where numbers are shown separated by a slash, the numbers refer to the professions in alphabetical order, as included in that specific regression.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
significance. This means that across cities but within each profession the lowest wages have
been catching up to the higher wages within the same profession. The unbalanced panel
(see column (4) in table 1.5), which takes into account both sub-periods 1970-1988 and
1988-2009, and includes more professions, points to slightly higher speeds of convergence
than the equivalent balanced panel and the regressions using only data for the whole
1970-2009 period.
The hypothesis of identical convergence coe cients bp across professions is again not
rejected when using the data over the total period 1970-2009, but is rejected at the 5%
level or better for the sub-period data in columns (3) and (4) by Theil’s F-Test, the
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Chi-squared statistic and the F-statistic of a Wald test. Thus, we restrict the convergence
coe cient bp to be identical across professions only for the total period 1970-2009 (while
allowing the intercept to vary), and repeat the SUR estimation, with the results shown in
column (2) of table 1.5. Again, the convergence coe cient in this restricted regression is
negative and all estimates are significant at the 0.1% level. This specification points to a
convergence speed within professions of about 1.4% per annum, which is slightly faster than
the convergence speed within skill groups of 1% per annum. This again is slightly faster
than the convergence speed of 0.8%-1.0% found at the beginning of section 1.7.2 where
all professions are grouped together. This is a plausible result as convergence forces are
likely to be strongest within relatively homogenous groups such as individual professions,
less strong in the somewhat less homogenous skill levels, and weakest when including all
professions.
1.7.3 Conditional Convergence in Profession-Level Wages
Convergence in Emerging / Developed Markets for Profession-Level Wages
In this section we use a very simple form of conditioning, we divide the wage data into
two distinct groups: wages from emerging markets and wages from developed markets.
We subsequently test for absolute convergence within these distinct and somewhat more
homogenous groups. The results from the OLS regressions are shown in table 1.6 with
column (1) repeating the equivalent results for all data from table 1.2, and column (2) and
(3) providing the new estimates for developed and emerging markets separately.
The results point to convergence within both groups, but convergence seems stronger
within the emerging markets, where the absolute value of the coe cient on the initial wage
has risen significantly relative to the full sample of countries, and the adjusted R-squared
too is now higher at 0.64. However, also for developed markets explanatory power is higher
now at 0.33 as compared to 0.22 for the equivalent regression in the full sample. Both
regressions are significant at the 0.1% level. Overall, this simple type of conditioning points
to potentially somewhat stronger convergence within the more homogenous groups of cities.
It must be noted, however, that the sample size for emerging markets over the time period
1970-2009 is rather small and is potentially not representative of trends in all emerging
markets over this period.
Solow-Swan Conditional Convergence in Profession-Level Wages
We test for conditional convergence in the Solow-Swan sense, by introducing the vector x
of variables that define the steady state in the Solow-Swan model. To check the robustness
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Table 1.6: Absolute convergence in developed markets and emerging markets
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-2009
(balanced) (balanced) (balanced)
All cities Developed markets Emerging markets
Intercept 0.157 (0.018)*** 0.158 (0.015)*** 0.272 (0.032)***
Ln wage 1970 -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.029 (0.004)***
Multiple R2 0.22 0.34 0.64
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.33 0.63
Num. obs. 144 110 34
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data
was available for the total period 1970-2009. The standard errors are shown in brackets.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
of the results, two separate datasets are used. The first dataset “SDM” is drawn from
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), and includes data mainly from the 1960s and 1970s in a cross
section. Initially we include the average population growth rate for each country for
1960-1990 and the average fertility rate in the 1960s as proxies for population growth.
Public spending on education as a share of GDP in the 1960s, levels of higher education
in 1960, as well as life expectancy in 1960 in each country are investigated as proxies for
savings in human capital. Savings in physical capital are proxied by public investment
as a share of GDP30 and the investment share of GDP per capita, with the last variable
stemming from the Penn World Tables 7.1. However, only the log initial wage level and
the fertility rate are statistically significant. We therefore keep these regressors and verify
if the model fit can be improved by adding further regressors in a stepwise process. We
find that adding only the higher education variable (H60) provides for a good model fit, as
shown in column (1) of table 1.7. The fertility rate is significant at the 0.1% level, while
higher education is significant at the 5% level. The absolute value of the coe cient on
the initial wage has increased to 0.02, pointing to a convergence speed  w of 1.7% per
annum, significantly faster than the unconditional rate of convergence for the full sample
and equivalent time period.
The second dataset we use is a panel dataset comprising variables from the World
30The level of public investments as a share of GDP for Switzerland, which is missing in the
original SDM dataset, was calculated for 1970 from the tables U.17, U.24, U.27 and Q.2 of
the Research Center for Social and Economic History of the University of Zurich, provided at
http://www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/nls/overview.php.
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Table 1.7: Profession-level wage growth regressed on initial profession-level wages and
additional variables that define the Solow-Swan steady state (conditional convergence) for
1970-2009, and the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS SUR
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-1988 1970-1988 1970-1988
Total period Total period 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009
Estimated Estimated
separately jointly
(balanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced)
(unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
SDM data WDI/ PWT data WDI/ PWT data WDI/ PWT data WDI/ PWT data
Intercept 1 0.235 (0.013)*** 0.220 (0.000)*** 0.323 (0.000)*** 0.285 (0.000)*** 0.339 (0.000)***
Ln wage 1970 / initial -0.020 (0.002)*** -0.018 (0.000)*** -0.025 (0.000)*** -0.025 (0.000)*** -0.026 (0.000)***
Fertility rate 1970 / initial -0.024 (0.002)*** -0.007 (0.000)*** -0.016 (0.000)*** -0.009 (0.000)*** -0.017 (0.000)***
Education expend 1970 / initial / H60 0.024 (0.010)* 0.000 (0.999) -0.001 (0.345) 0.001 (0.009)** -0.001 (0.315)
Intercept 2 0.209 (0.000)*** 0.203 (0.000)***
Ln wage 1988 -0.018 (0.000)*** -0.018 (0.000)***
Fertility rate 1988 -0.005 (0.000)*** -0.005 (0.000)***
Education expend 1988 0.001 (0.071). 0.001 (0.015)*
Multiple R2 0.68 0.67 0.54/0.33 0.44 0.53/0.33
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.66 0.53/0.32 0.44 0.52/0.32
Num. obs. 144 139 131/515 646 131/515
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, or for the total period
1970-2009. In the “unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available in one of the periods were added to benefit from the larger sample size. The
term “restricted” indicates that the regressor coe cients b were restricted to be equal in both periods, while the intercepts for the two periods were allowed to vary. The
standard errors are shown in brackets. In the lower section of the table where two numbers are shown separated by a slash, the first number refers to 1970-1988, while
the second number refers to 1988-2009.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
Development Indicators (WDI) dataset of the World Bank, and from the Penn World
Tables 7.1 (PWT).
As proxies for population growth we initially test the fertility rate (WDI), birth rate per
thousand persons (WDI), and the leading 3-year average population growth rate (PWT).
For investment in human capital we initially include education expenditure as a percent
of GNI (WDI) and life expectancy at birth (WDI), while the investment share of GDP
(PWT) is included as a proxy for investment in physical capital. The results are similar to
those when using the SDM dataset, in that again the negative coe cient on the initial
wage level is highly significant in all tested specifications, but the other variables show
less consistent statistical relationships, with some coe cients changing sign depending on
the specification, or with coe cients exhibiting very low statistical significance. We also
test the relationships across di↵erent time periods. One of the most robust relationships is
shown in columns (2) to (5) of table 1.7, where the inclusion of only the fertility rate31 and
education expenditures as Solow variables results in a good model fit. This equation is
31A similar result is achieved when the fertility rate is replaced by the birth rate.
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structurally similar to the equation in column (1) based on the SDM dataset, except that
higher education (H60) has been replaced by education expenditure. Column (3) shows the
results when this equation is tested separately for the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009,
while column (4) shows the results when the two sub-periods are tested simultaneously
with OLS, using the values of the additional variables from their respective initial years.
Column (5) provides the estimates for the coe cients estimated with a SUR model with a
structure equivalent to equation (1.42), where the time periods represent the cross section.
The test of simultaneous equality of the coe cients in the two periods separately on the
initial wage, on the fertility rate and on education expenditures is rejected at the 0.01%
level by Theil’s F-Test, the Chi-squared statistic and the F-statistic of a Wald test, which
points to a potential non-constant structure of conditional convergence in real wages over
time.
Overall these results provide some support to the Solow-Swan model given the relatively
high coe cients of determination of around 30-70% achieved with these simple regressions,
as compared to 20-30% for the absolute convergence regressions. However, given the lack
of evidence of any impact of investment in physical capital and the very limited evidence
for the role of investment in human capital this evidence remains ambiguous. With regard
to the speed of convergence, the coe cients on the initial wage point to a convergence
speed  w of 1.0% to 1.6% per annum, somewhat faster than the unconditional rate of
convergence for the full sample and equivalent time period, but slightly slower than for the
conditional convergence equation when using the SDM dataset.
Next, we again test for conditional convergence in the Solow-Swan sense, but now
control for fixed e↵ects, including regions, countries, cities, and skill levels. Due to the
large number of dummy coe cients that need to be estimated, we use the 1970-1988
and 1988-2009 periods jointly, with the values of the additional variables drawn from the
respective initial years. We find that controlling for fixed e↵ects does not result in the
coe cients on the variables that define the steady state in the Solow-Swan model being
more in-line with what the Solow-Swan theory would predict. For instance, using country
fixed e↵ects and including educational expenditure and the fertility rate as regressors (in
addition to the logarithm of the initial wage) we find that the coe cient on education
expenditures has a negative sign and is significant at the 0.1% level, whereas the fertility
rate has a positive sign and is not statistically significant, in contrast to the theory and
the results in table 1.7.32 When additionally including life expectancy at birth and the
investment share of GDP, the coe cients on all Solow control variables turn negative and
are highly significant, in contrast to the theory which would predict only the fertility rate to
32See table B.2 in the appendix for the detailed results.
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have a negative sign.33 Replacing the country fixed e↵ects with regional dummy variables,
but now controlling also for skill levels with the lowest skill level as the baseline, we see
that the coe cients on the skill dummies are positive and highly significant, pointing to
stronger wage growth among more highly skilled professions (see table 1.8). In terms of
regions the coe cient on the Latin America dummy is clearly most negative and highly
significant, while South-East Asia dummy is also negative and significant at the 0.1% level.
However, again the signs of two of the coe cients on the variables that control for the
steady state in the Solow-Swan model are not in line with the theory; the investment share
of GDP and education expenditures have negative signs and very small coe cient estimates
(and are not statistically significant). In contrast, life expectancy at birth and the fertility
rate are significant and in line with conditional convergence in the Solow-Swan model.
Interestingly, controlling for skills and regions in this way results in a high convergence
coe cient, pointing to a convergence speed  w of 2.1%.
Table 1.8: Wage regression estimates jointly for the periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 on
profession-level data, including the fertility rate, education expenditure, life expectancy at
birth and investment share of GDP as steady state control variables, and skill and region fixed
e↵ects (WDI / PWT data)
Solow-Swan conditional convergence
with four steady state control variables and skill and region fixed e↵ects
Intercept 0.290 (0.022)⇤⇤⇤
Ln initial wage  0.031 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Education expenditure  0.000 (0.001)
Fertility rate  0.007 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Life expectancy at birth 0.001 (0.000)⇤
Investment share of GDP  0.000 (0.000)
factor(South-East Asia)1  0.009 (0.003)⇤⇤
factor(Europe)1 0.002 (0.003)
factor(Latin America)1  0.018 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Skills)Level2 0.013 (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Skills)Level3 0.022 (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
Multiple R2 0.564
Adjusted R2 0.557
Num. obs. 646
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
33See table B.3 in the appendix for the detailed results.
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Winners and Losers of Convergence The positive coe cient estimates for the
skill level dummies when unskilled professions (skill level 1) represent the baseline as in
table 1.8, point to higher average wage growth for medium skilled and even higher wage
growth for highly skilled professions. This provides some evidence as to the winners and
losers of convergence, in response to Williamson’s (1996, p. 300) questions on “who gains
and who loses from convergence”.
Williamson (1996, p. 300) asks, “(w)hat about wages of unskilled laborers, wages of
skilled artisans, salaries of skilled clerical workers, farm rents accruing to landlords, and
profits accruing to capitalists?” For more granular evidence on the winners and losers of
convergence, we replace the skill dummies by profession dummies, comparing whether
individual professions have experienced di↵erent average growth rates, with car mechanics
representing the baseline. We show the results for 1988-2009 as in this later period a
larger number of data points is available for each profession, see table 1.9. While average
growth in wages was practically identical for car mechanics and bus drivers, it was lower
for saleswomen and lowest for construction workers and female factory / textile workers.
It was clearly highest for department managers and electrical engineers (the two highest
skilled professions in our sample), with the group showing the next highest wage increases
consisting of bank tellers / credit clerks, cooks and skilled industrial workers. Primary
school teachers and secretaries experienced average wage increases that were somewhat
higher than the baseline. Overall these results also support the thesis, that the highest
skilled professions around the world experienced the highest wage growth in this period,
and that low skilled workers experienced the lowest wage growth. Eight out of eleven of
the non-baseline professions had coe cients that were statistically significant at least at
the 5% level.34
This finding can be interpreted as evidence for skill-biased technical change that has
resulted in a higher demand for skilled labour relative to unskilled labour, thereby increasing
wages rates for the skilled faster, than for the unskilled.
Conditional Convergence over a 3-year Horizon So far, the focus has been on
longer term wage growth. We now turn to the question, to what extent shorter term
changes in wages can be explained within the context of conditional convergence in the
Solow-Swan framework. For this we regress the 3-year wage growth rates across all survey
years jointly on the logarithm of initial wages, as well as the additional variables that
control for the steady state, drawn from the respective initial years.35 The results for five
34The panel data from the World Bank WDI and PWT 7.1 datasets is employed in this regression. Very
similar results are achieved when using the SDM dataset.
35The panel data from the World Bank WDI and PWT 7.1 datasets is again employed.
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Table 1.9: Wage regression estimates for 1988-2009 on profession-level data, including the
fertility rate, education expenditure, life expectancy at birth and investment share of GDP
as steady state control variables, and professions (car mechanics = baseline) and region fixed
e↵ects (WDI / PWT data)
Solow-Swan conditional convergence with four
steady state control variables and profession and region fixed e↵ects
Intercept 0.306 (0.022)⇤⇤⇤
Ln initial wage  0.031 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Education expenditure 0.001 (0.001)
Fertility rate  0.010 (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
Life expectancy at birth 0.001 (0.000)⇤⇤
Investment share of GDP  0.000 (0.000)⇤
factor(South-East Asia)1  0.012 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Europe)1  0.010 (0.003)⇤⇤
factor(Latin America)1  0.018 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Bank.Tellers.or.Credit.Clerks 0.018 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Bus.Drivers 0.001 (0.003)
factor(Profession)Construction.Workers  0.007 (0.003)⇤
factor(Profession)Cooks 0.018 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Department.Managers 0.034 (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Electrical.Engineers 0.022 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Factory.or.Textile.Workers  0.007 (0.003)⇤
factor(Profession)Industrial.Workers 0.016 (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Primary.School.Teachers 0.010 (0.003)⇤⇤
factor(Profession)Saleswomen  0.004 (0.003)
factor(Profession)Secretaries 0.003 (0.003)
Multiple R2 0.559
Adjusted R2 0.542
Num. obs. 514
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
di↵erent specifications are shown in table 1.10.
The most noticeable change as compared to the analyses when using wage growth
data over the complete 1970-2009 period or the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 is
that the convergence coe cient on the logarithm of the initial wage for the 3-year periods
is systematically higher, resulting also in a higher speed of convergence  w of between
2.0% to 4.6% for the specifications in table 1.10. The impact of life expectancy at birth
and the investment share of GDP is very small (see columns (2) to (5)), and the impact
of education expenditure is not much higher. The fertility rate again shows the clearest
impact on wage growth and is highly statistically significant. In the SUR regressions, using
the periods as the cross section in column (3) and the skill levels as the cross section in
column (4), the signs of the coe cients are mostly in line with the Solow-Swan conditional
convergence theory, but the statistical significance of the coe cients is limited for the
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Table 1.10: Profession-level 3-year wage growth regressed on initial profession-level wages
and additional variables that define the Solow-Swan steady state (conditional convergence)
between 1970 and 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS SUR SUR OLS +
Periods Skill levels Fixed e↵ects
1: 1970-1988 1, 2 and 3 (regions and skills)
2: 1988-2009
3-year 3-year 3-year 3-year 3-year
growth rates growth rates growth rates growth rates growth rates
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-2009
Estimated Estimated Estimated
jointly jointly jointly
(unbalanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced)
Intercept 1 0.573 (0.000)*** 0.574 (0.000)*** 0.996 (0.000)*** 0.809 (0.002)** 0.630 (0.000)***
Ln initial wage 1 -0.052 (0.000)*** -0.051 (0.000)*** -0.043 (0.000)*** -0.090 (0.002)** -0.067 (0.000)***
Education expend initial 1 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.000)*** 0.013 (0.000)*** 0.020 (0.099). 0.002 (0.086).
Fertility rate initial 1 -0.024 (0.000)*** -0.025 (0.000)*** -0.061 (0.000)*** -0.046 (0.022)* -0.021 (0.000)***
Life expectancy at birth initial 1 -0.000 (0.486) -0.006 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.815) 0.001 (0.076).
Investment share of GDP initial 1 0.000 (0.024)* -0.000 (0.528) 0.001 (0.701) 0.001 (0.007)**
Intercept 2 0.491 (0.000)*** 0.699 (0.010)**
Ln initial wage 2 -0.049 (0.000)*** -0.050 (0.020)*
Education expend initial 2 0.006 (0.007)** 0.013 (0.211)
Fertility rate initial 2 -0.027 (0.000)*** -0.034 (0.069).
Life expectancy at birth initial 2 0.000 (0.951) -0.002 (0.395)
Investment share of GDP initial 2 0.001 (0.003)** -0.000 (0.834)
Intercept 3 0.522 (0.024)*
Ln initial wage 3 -0.061 (0.002)**
Education expend initial 3 0.000 (0.960)
Fertility rate initial 3 -0.039 (0.025)*
Life expectancy at birth initial 3 0.002 (0.504)
Investment share of GDP initial 3 0.003 (0.113)
factor(South-East Asia)1 -0.014 (0.009)**
factor(Europe)1 0.012 (0.007)**
factor(Latin America)1 -0.019 (0.000)***
factor(Skills)Level2 0.026 (0.000)***
factor(Skills)Level3 0.054 (0.000)***
Multiple R2 0.12 0.12 0.12/0.14 0.13/ 0.05/ 0.22 0.15
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.11/0.13 0.06/ -0.02 /0.16 0.15
Num. obs. 6588 6588 528/990 74/74/74 6286
Notes: The term “unbalanced” indicates that all cities were included for which the respective 3-year growth rates are available. This also means that for
di↵erent 3-year intervals di↵erent numbers of cities were included. The standard errors are shown in brackets. In the lower section of the table where numbers
are shown separated by a slash, the numbers refer to the two sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 in column (3), and to the skill levels 1, 2 and 3 in column
(4).
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
regressions across the skill levels. When including fixed e↵ects as shown in column (5), the
results from table 1.8 are confirmed: Wage growth was all the stronger the higher the skill
levels of the professions, and Latin America as a region and to a lesser extent South-East
Asia had slower wage growth.
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1.7.4 Conditional Convergence in Profession-Level Wages with Addi-
tional Explanatory Variables
We now include a vector z of additional variables: In the context of the Solow model
they might be considered as additional controls for the steady state. In the context of
endogenous growth models these variables would usually be considered as stand-alone
drivers of economic growth. The statistical rational for adding these variables is to avoid
omitted variable bias, which could result in the estimated coe cients and the explanatory
power appearing to be larger than they are. The focus of this section is wider than that of
the previous sections that aimed mainly at testing for absolute or conditional convergence.
Rather, this section also aims to investigate the determinants of wage growth more broadly.
Clearly, the procedure selected for assessing the e↵ect of a range of di↵erent factors
on wage growth will have a substantial impact on the results, with di↵erent procedures
resulting in potentially very di↵erent results. As mentioned previously, a variety of
techniques have been employed in an attempt to improve identification in regressions of
GDP per capita, including Bayesian, pseudo-Bayesian and frequentist model averaging
estimators, general-to-specific modelling, principal components augmented regressions and
adaptive lasso sequences. However, none has established itself as a benchmark and results
di↵er quite substantially between di↵erent approaches, pointing to the underlying di culty
of theory open-endedness. We choose to use principal components augmented regressions
(PCAR, cf. Hlouskova and Wagner, 2010) due to this procedure’s e ciency in tackling
two important problems: First, the uncertainty about the relevance of the variables is
addressed by calculating conditional individual e↵ects. Second, degrees of freedom can be
used very e ciently by including only those principal components that capture the lion’s
share of all factors’ variance (cf. Hlouskova and Wagner, 2010).
As dependent variables we use profession-level wage growth rates over the total 1970-
2009 period (see table 1.11), and separately, over 3-year intervals (see table 1.12). The
independent variables included had to be available for a wide range of countries since 1970
in three year intervals, or they had to be largely time-independent and thus assumed to be
constant over the 1970-2009 period. As independent variables we include from the SDM
dataset dummy variables for former colonies, former British and Spanish colonies, and
regional dummies for South-East Asia, Europe, Latin-America and Sub-Saharan Africa;
socio-economic variables including an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, an index of
religious intensity, the fraction of a country’s population living in the geographical tropics,
and the fraction speaking English; geographical information such as whether a country is
landlocked, the absolute latitude, the distance to the closest of the trading hubs Rotterdam,
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Table 1.11: Principal components augmented regressions: Profession-level wage growth for
1970-2009 regressed on each independent variable while controlling for the principal components
(PCs) with eigenvalues larger than one derived from all other independent variables included
in the model
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
with with with
initial wage regressor initial wage initial wage regressor
but without PCs included in PCs and PCs
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-2009
Ln initial wage -0.013 (0.002)*** NA -0.020 (0.003)***
Birth rate per thousand population -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
Fertility rate -0.007 (0.000)*** -0.016 (0.002)*** -0.008 (0.002)***
Life expectancy at birth 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000)
Old age dependency ratio 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000)
Youth age dependency ratio -0.000 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
Education expenditure in % of GNI 0.001 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)* -0.002 (0.001)*
Investment as a share of GDP 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)*
Consumption as a share of GDP -0.001 (0.000)*** 0.002 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)
Government consumption as a share of GDP 0.001 (0.000)* -0.002 (0.001)* -0.000 (0.000)
Openness 0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Trade in percent of GDP 0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Size of PPP GDP 0.000 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Consumer price inflation, annual in % -0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Absolute latitude 0.000 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)* -0.000 (0.000)
Distance from New York, Rotterdam or Tokyo -0.000 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)*
Land area in km2 -0.000 (0.000)* -0.000 (0.000)* -0.000 (0.000)
Fraction of land near navigable water 0.012 (0.003)*** -0.016 (0.004)*** 0.000 (0.003)
Fraction of population living in tropics -0.041 (0.005)*** 0.012 (0.012) 0.022 (0.009)*
Fraction of country in tropical climate zone -0.045 (0.007)*** 0.011 (0.016) 0.049 (0.011)***
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.003 (0.006) 0.006 (0.014) -0.016 (0.009).
Fraction of the population speaking English 0.009 (0.003)** 0.020 (0.004)*** 0.008 (0.004)*
Religious intensity -0.010 (0.005)* 0.001 (0.008) -0.011 (0.006).
Skill level 2 (dummy) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.001)*
Skill level 3 (dummy) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.002)* 0.006 (0.002)**
Emerging market (dummy) -0.018 (0.002)*** 0.016 (0.007)* -0.003 (0.006)
Former colony (dummy) -0.009 (0.002)*** 0.001 (0.005) -0.004 (0.004)
Former British colony (dummy) 0.004 (0.002). 0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)
Former Spanish colony (dummy) -0.018 (0.003)*** -0.008 (0.007) 0.005 (0.005)
South-East Asia (dummy) 0.012 (0.004)** -0.008 (0.004)* 0.009 (0.003)**
Europe (dummy) 0.015 (0.002)*** -0.008 (0.005). -0.003 (0.004)
Latin-America (dummy) -0.022 (0.002)*** -0.045 (0.021)* -0.070 (0.016)***
Sub-Saharan Africa (dummy) -0.014 (0.005)** 0.023 (0.007)** -0.006 (0.005)
Landlocked (dummy) 0.008 (0.003)** 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.002)
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
New York or Tokyo,36 the fraction of a country’s surface area within 100km of navigable
36This distance was missing for Luxembourg in the SDM dataset and was added manually.
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water,37 the fraction of the surface area in a tropical climate zone, and the land area in
square kilometres. From the WDI dataset we include the birth rate (per thousand of the
population), the fertility rate, life expectancy at birth, the old/youth age dependency
ratios, education expenditure in percent of GNI,38 consumer price inflation,39 and trade in
percent of GDP.40 From the PWT 7.1 dataset we include the consumption and investment
shares of GDP, government consumption as a share of GDP, the size of PPP-adjusted
GDP, and a measure for economic openness reflecting the extent of external trade relations.
Finally, we include dummy variables for skill levels and for emerging markets. With this
choice of independent variables and after some additional data points were added from
other sources (see the relevant footnotes) we can include all 144 wage growth data points
used previously for the total period 1979-2009. However, of the 7001 profession-level 3-year
growth rates available from the data, the panel of additional variables is complete only for
5728 cases. This is related to the fact that in later years of the UBS Prices and Earnings
survey many new cities for which good regressor data is not available were added to the
survey, e.g. cities in Central and Eastern Europe, and in CIS countries.
We follow the methodology of Hlouskova and Wagner (2010) and calculate individual
conditional e↵ects by regressing wage growth on each independent variable separately, while
controlling for the principal components (with eigenvalues larger than one) derived from all
other independent variables included in the model. As proposed by Hlouskova and Wagner
(2010), we determine principal components separately for the quantitative and dummy
variables to account for their di↵ering characteristics while determining the principal
components. In all cases the principal components are computed using the correlation
matrix, which takes account of the di↵erent scalings of the quantitative variables. In table
1.11 for the total period growth rates and table 1.12 for the 3-year growth rates column
(1) shows the coe cient results of the simple OLS regression of the wage growth variable
on each individual regressor, while controlling only for the logarithm of the initial wage.
In column (2) we control for the principal components with eigenvalues larger than one
calculated from all regressors (including the logarithm of the initial wage). In column (3)
the logarithm of the initial wage is taken as a stand-alone regressor, while the principal
37The fraction of a country’s surface area within 100km of navigable water was missing from the SDM
dataset for Luxembourg and Manama and were added manually.
38Education expenditure for 1970 in South Africa was missing from the WDI dataset. We approximate this
number using the education expenditure figure for 1960-1965 from the SDM database.
39Consumer price inflation data was missing in the WDI dataset for some cities including Hong Kong,
London, and Brazil for some years. For these countries a number of inflation data points could be added
using information from the countries’ central banks and statistical o ces.
40Trade as a percent of GDP for Switzerland, which is missing in the original SDM dataset, was calculated
for individual years from the tables Q.2 and L.3 of the Research Center for Social and Economic History
of the University of Zurich, provided at http://www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/nls/overview.php.
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components are calculated from all other regressors.
Table 1.12: Principal components augmented regressions: Profession-level wage growth for
3-year intervals between 1970 and 2009 regressed on each independent variable while controlling
for the principal components (PCs) with eigenvalues larger than one derived from all other
independent variables included in the model
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
with with with
initial wage regressor initial wage initial wage regressor
but without PCs included in PCs and PCs
1970-2009 1970-2009 1970-2009
Ln initial wage -0.031 (0.002)*** NA -0.062 (0.003)***
Birth rate per thousand population -0.003 (0.000)*** -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.000 (0.000).
Fertility rate -0.024 (0.002)*** -0.040 (0.004)*** -0.006 (0.003).
Life expectancy at birth 0.003 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Old age dependency ratio 0.003 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Youth age dependency ratio -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)
Education expenditure in % of GNI 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.002)** -0.001 (0.002)
Investment as a share of GDP 0.001 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Consumption as a share of GDP -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)
Government consumption as a share of GDP 0.000 (0.000) -0.007 (0.001)*** -0.001 (0.001)
Openness 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)* -0.000 (0.000)
Trade in percent of GDP 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)
Size of PPP GDP 0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Consumer price inflation, annual in % 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000)**
Absolute latitude 0.000 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)** 0.001 (0.000)**
Distance from New York, Rotterdam or Tokyo -0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)***
Land area in km2 0.000 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000). -0.000 (0.000)
Fraction of land near navigable water 0.008 (0.004)* 0.010 (0.006) 0.014 (0.006)*
Fraction of population living in tropics -0.066 (0.007)*** 0.019 (0.011). 0.011 (0.009)
Fraction of country in tropical climate zone -0.054 (0.006)*** 0.030 (0.015)* 0.025 (0.014).
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.038 (0.006)*** 0.024 (0.011)* 0.023 (0.011)*
Fraction of the population speaking English 0.025 (0.004)*** 0.054 (0.008)*** 0.026 (0.008)**
Religious intensity -0.005 (0.006) -0.016 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012)
Skill level 2 (dummy) 0.012 (0.003)*** 0.001 (0.003) 0.027 (0.003)***
Skill level 3 (dummy) 0.026 (0.004)*** 0.002 (0.003) 0.059 (0.004)***
Emerging market (dummy) -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.018 (0.006)** 0.004 (0.006)
Former colony (dummy) -0.020 (0.003)*** -0.005 (0.005) -0.028 (0.005)***
Former British colony (dummy) 0.001 (0.003) 0.020 (0.005)*** -0.014 (0.005)**
Former Spanish colony (dummy) -0.026 (0.004)*** 0.051 (0.008)*** 0.029 (0.008)***
South-East Asia (dummy) -0.006 (0.003). -0.004 (0.006) -0.014 (0.005)**
Europe (dummy) 0.033 (0.003)*** 0.021 (0.007)** -0.019 (0.006)**
Latin-America (dummy) -0.032 (0.004)*** -0.056 (0.011)*** -0.033 (0.011)**
Sub-Saharan Africa (dummy) -0.033 (0.007)*** 0.011 (0.009) 0.042 (0.009)***
Landlocked (dummy) 0.012 (0.004)** 0.003 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004).
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
Regarding the independent variables that were included in the Solow-type OLS, SUR
and fixed e↵ect regressions in the previous sections, the principal components augmented
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regression results in tables 1.11 and 1.12 confirm the statistical significance, consistency of
the signs of the coe cient estimates and the large size of the e↵ect of the logarithm of the
initial wage (negative sign), the fertility rate (negative sign), and the Latin-America dummy
(negative sign). The coe cients on the skill level dummy variables are consistently positive
and also statistically significant, but the size of the e↵ects is smaller. Of the new additional
variables one stands out as having coe cients that are statistically significant, large in size
and that have consistent signs: The coe cient on the fraction of the population speaking
English points to a large positive and statistically significant impact on wage growth. Once
principal components are accounted for, the sign on coe cient estimates of the fraction
of the population living in the tropics and the fraction of land in tropical climate zones
turns positive and the coe cients become quite large, whereas they were negative and
large when including only the initial wage and these specific regressors (column (1)). For
more than half of the regressors, however, the e↵ects are small.
The most noticeable di↵erence in the analysis over the total period 1970-2009 versus the
analysis over the 3-year periods is again the markedly larger absolute size of the coe cient
on the initial wage. For the 3-year growth rates the coe cient on the initial wage implies a
speed of convergence  w of close to 3% per annum, whereas for the total period it is 1.7%.
Overall this analysis provides a strong alternative confirmation of conditional convergence
of profession-level wages, both over the 3-year periods and over the total 1970-2009 period.
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1.8 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the convergence hypothesis for purchasing power adjusted
wages across the world using wage data from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys for 1970
to 2009. This data is advantageous as compared to other data sources, due to its consistent
definition of profession-level wages across cities, and over time, allowing for more detailed
analyses (in particular with regard to skill levels) than in past studies. We derive the
theoretical basis for wage convergence within the Solow-Swan model of economic growth,
but show that wage convergence can be viewed also within the contexts of trade theory,
and migration theory.
Absolute convergence We find no clear statistical evidence of an absolute catch-
up in wages for poorer countries as measured by GDP per capita, but we find solid
evidence of absolute convergence in two senses: Cities with lower average initial real
wages exhibit higher growth in average wages ; and lower initial profession-level real wages
world wide (whether due to the country context or the profession) also exhibit higher
growth. Convergence in these senses is stronger in the latter half of our observation
period 1988-2009, but absolute convergence holds also for the complete period 1970-2009.
Evidence of absolute convergence is even stronger when the sample is restricted to more
homogenous groups of countries by subdividing the sample into developed and emerging
markets. Convergence is also stronger within more homogenous skill groups: It is strongest
within individual professions across the world, somewhat less strong within professions
clustered according to their skill levels, and least strong when all professions are included.
Conditional convergence We test for conditional convergence in the Solow-Swan
sense by including variables that control for the steady state in the extended Solow-Swan
model. Not all of the variables included are statistically significant, but using the initial
wage level, the fertility rate and an education measure as regressors provides a good model
fit. The results provide some support to the Solow-Swan model given the relatively high
coe cients of determination of around 30-70% achieved with these simple regressions, as
compared to 20-30% for the absolute convergence regressions. However, given the lack of
evidence of any impact of investment in physical capital and the very limited evidence for
the role of investment in human capital this evidence remains ambiguous. With regard
to the speed of convergence, the coe cients on the initial wage point to a convergence
speed  w of 1.0% to 1.7% per annum, somewhat faster than the unconditional rate of
convergence for the full sample and equivalent time period of about 1.0% per annum.
Winners and losersWe aim to provide more granularity on the question of conditional
convergence, by investigating who the winners and losers of the convergence trends have
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been. Compared to low-skilled professions, we find higher average wage growth for medium-
skilled, and even higher wage growth for highly-skilled professions. This finding can be
interpreted as evidence for skill-biased technological change that has resulted in a higher
demand for skilled labour relative to unskilled labour, thereby increasing wage rates for
the skilled faster, than for the unskilled. This result does not contradict the finding of
convergence described above, but rather gives insight into how convergence came about.
Wage convergence across the world was not based on lower skilled professions gaining on
higher skilled professions. Rather, the primary driver of international wage convergence
was faster overall growing wage levels in lower wage countries compared to higher wage
countries.
Wage growth determinants Finally, we use principal components augmented re-
gressions to analyse the impact of a broader range of variables on real wage growth. The
initial wage and the fertility rate are confirmed as consistently having a large and statisti-
cally significant impact on wage growth. Cities in Latin America experienced statistically
significant lower levels of wage growth and skill level dummy variables point to higher wage
growth in professions with higher skill levels. Additionally, the fraction of the population
speaking English was found to have a large positive and statistically significant impact on
wage growth.
Conclusion Overall these results support the hypotheses of absolute and conditional
convergence in real wages, with faster overall growing wage levels in lower wage countries,
as compared to higher wage countries being the key driver. At the same time, the highest
skilled professions around the world have experienced the highest wage growth during 1970-
2009, while low skilled workers experienced the lowest wage growth, thus no convergence
in this sense is found between skill groups. This more di↵erentiated understanding of
convergence trends in real wages provides important insights into the potential for the
side-by-side existence of convergence and rising regional wage inequality, in a world in
which the latter is increasingly acting as a driver for social discord and unrest.
Chapter 2
Factor Price Equalisation and
Relative Wages:
An Empirical Investigation
2.1 Introduction
In the first chapter, convergence in global wages – in the absolute and in the conditional
sense of Solow-Swan – is a strong and robust result. However, in spite of this convergence,
large disparities in international wages persist. This conflicts with the theory of Factor
Price Equalisation (FPE), which goes beyond convergence, asserting that under certain
conditions trade in goods can act as a substitute for factor mobility, implying that wages
will equalise across di↵erent regions even without factor flows between countries.1 The
theory of Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) can therefore be viewed as the production side
analog to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) on the consumption side. However, while PPP
relies on consumers engaging in trade until no more arbitrage opportunities exist, FPE must
manage without arbitrage functioning between its factor markets, as this would require
capital and labour to move freely between countries. While globalisation has accelerated
both migration and FDI flows, hurdles, in particular to the mobility of labour, remain high.
This chapter contributes to empirically explaining the origin of deviations from FPE
by drawing a parallel to the analogous “price” problem – i.e. the origin of deviations from
PPP. As PPP would imply a constant real exchange rate of one, fluctuations in the real
exchange rate reflect deviations from PPP theory. In 1993 Charles Engel set an important
1See Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933).
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empirical yardstick for models of the real exchange rate by decomposing the expression for
the real exchange rate and analyzing the variability of the parts (i.e. variability of relative
consumer prices within and between countries). By identifying the origin of volatility in
the real exchange rate, Engel (1993) pinpoints the origin of deviations from PPP. His
descriptive analysis thus provides a guideline for theories attempting to explain deviations
from PPP – they should take account of where empiric volatility comes from in the real
exchange rate.
We investigate the equivalent relationship between the real exchange rate and relative
wages by decomposing an adapted expression for the real exchange rate, now based on
factor prices (wages), instead of goods prices. By replacing goods prices by wages, we in
essence create a real exchange rate for the production side of the economy. FPE would
imply that this new measure of the real exchange rate based on wages should equal one.
Thus, analogously to Engel’s (1993) approach we investigate whether movements in the
real exchange rate based on wages have historically been better explained by the variability
in the wages between countries, or by the variability of wages within countries.
While the decomposition of the real exchange rate based on prices that Engel uses has
been widely discussed in the literature for many years, the relationship between wages
and the real exchange rate has come into the spotlight only more recently. For example,
Jinjarak and Naknoi (2010) propose a model in which the real exchange rate is driven by
the variation in relative wages and the seller’s markup. Mishra and Spilimbergo (2009)
calculate the elasticity of wages and the real exchange rate for di↵erent levels of integration
between labor markets. Bacsafra (2005) investigates whether departures from PPP can be
attributed to wages and Nucci and Pozzolo (2009) find a statistically significant relationship
between currency variations and wages in Italy. This chapter aims to contribute to further
these debates by pinpointing the origin of deviations from FPE. As in Engel’s case for
PPP, this provides an empirical yardstick for theories explaining divergences from FPE.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of FPE
theory. The approach selected in this chapter to explain deviations from FPE is motivated
in section 2.3 by drawing the analogy to Engel’s (1993) work. Section 2.4 describes the
data employed, while section 2.5 expounds the chosen methodology. In section 2.6 the
results for the selected wage subindices and profession-level wages are presented, while
section 2.7 summarises the conclusions.
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2.2 Factor Price Equalisation: Theory and Evidence
Classical trade theory argues that in e cient markets where there are no barriers to trade
or transportation costs, the prices of traded goods in di↵erent countries will equalise. This
is often referred to as the law of one price for identical goods, or purchasing power parity
(PPP) when referring to a broader basket of goods. The same is inferred for productive
factors, i.e. if capital and labour can move freely between countries their relative and
absolute prices (rents, wages) should equalise. However, perfect mobility of capital and
labour is a far more awkward assumption than free trade – in particular, hurdles to the
mobility of labour remain high.
The Heckscher-Ohlin trade model finds that di↵erences in factor endowments combined
with limits to the mobility of production factors can, in fact, be a driver for trade. Further,
under certain conditions trade in goods can act as a substitute for factor mobility, implying
that factor prices will converge even without factor mobility between countries. This
occurs because as countries engage in trade they increase exports of goods that intensively
use the factors with which they are highly endowed, and import more goods intensive in
factors with which they are only poorly endowed. As algebraically described by Stolper
and Samuelson (1941), in each country this increases the relative demand for the more
abundant (and cheaper) factor, while demand for the scarcer (and more expensive) factor
falls, putting pressure on its price. In this way trade in goods can induce via a shift in factor
demand an adjustment of factor prices. Further, under specific conditions an invertible
mapping exists between the vector of goods prices and the vector of factor prices, through
which goods prices uniquely set factor prices. While this result, termed the Factor Price
Equalisation (FPE) theorem (see Samuelson, 1948, and Lerner, 1952), has become a key
component in international trade theory and reflects intuitive expectations of how trade
could a↵ect wages, tremendous divergences in international wages persist.
From a theoretical perspective the restrictive conditions of the original FPE theorem2
within the context of the 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model are an important first constraint
that might explain these divergences. However, extensions of Heckscher-Ohlin to more
2Conditions include no barriers to trade, no transportation costs, perfect competition and full employment,
factors mobile within a country but immobile across national borders, no complete specialisation, production
functions exhibit constant returns to scale and di↵er among industries, identical technology between
trading countries, and no factor intensity reversal. The condition that factor endowments should not
be too di↵erent, i.e. in the same “cone (or lens) of diversification” was later extended to a “multi-cone”
version in which FPE occurs among countries within the same cone, see, for instance, Deardor↵ (2001). As
Rassekh and Thompson (1993) note: “The critical condition for FPE is deceptively simple: the number
of factors must not be greater than the number of international markets (exogenous prices) (...). If the
number of factors is greater than the number of exogenous prices, FPE does not follow since di↵erent
vectors w of factor prices support the competitive equilibrium.”
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generalised contexts including more goods, factors, non-traded goods and market imper-
fections3 and in particular specifications of general equilibrium models where FPE does
not necessarily hold suggest that FPE will nearly hold between trading partners.4 This
Near FPE applies across a wide range of production functions (see Thompson, 1990, and
Thompson, 1997).
Similar to what is frequently suggested for PPP, Hicks (1959, p. 267) suggests that
FPE might be viewed as a longer term tendency: Just as PPP does not systematically hold
in the short term, it is nonetheless considered a valuable guide in the longer run. Thus,
while FPE is not expected to hold in the short term in its original absolute formulation
Samuelson (1971) rightly directed the discussion towards Factor Price Convergence (FPC):
If factor prices converge over time as trade barriers and transportation costs fall, then the
mechanisms at the core of FPE theory could be at work.5
Evidence from economic historians suggests that in periods during which competing
goods were traded,6 trade barriers were reduced and trade volumes expanded, factor prices
tended to converge. In fact, O’Rourke et al. (1996) find substantial support for FPC in
the late nineteenth century, a period of strong globalisation, which they call a “dramatic
historical episode of factor price convergence”. It was with this background that Eli
Heckscher in 1919 formulated the Heckscher-Ohlin framework of international trade. In
Heckscher and Ohlin’s words, “trade increase[d] the price of land in Australia and lower[ed]
it in Europe, while tending to keep wages down in Australia and up in Europe” (Heckscher,
1919, p. 91f). During parts of the first half of the 20th century trade and globalisation
went into reverse, due to the wars, but also due to the fateful economic nationalism of the
1930s. While the second half of the 20th century was again characterized by increased
globalisation and falling trade barriers in the context of the General Agreement on Tari↵s
and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, the empirical evidence for FPE during this period
remains somewhat ambiguous.7 While evidence for FPC or FPE is found by, among others,
Tovias (1982), Gremmen (1985), Dollar and Wol↵ (1988), Mokhtari and Rassekh (1989),
3See among others Ethier (1974), Chang (1979), Takayama (1982), and Thompson (1987).
4Rassekh and Thompson (1993, p. 6).
5The Specific Factors model with homothetic demand (see, for instance, Samuelson, 1971) in which FPC
occurs with free trade is frequently considered the shorter term version of FPE in the Heckscher-Ohlin
context. See also Thompson (1994) for an alternate formulation of the Specific Factors model; here Near
FPE is a robust result.
6O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) find that before the 19th century mostly goods exclusive to certain
regions, i.e. non-competing goods such as spices, silk, sugar, gold and silver, were traded. Clearly, this
type of trade did not induce goods price equalisation nor FPE.
7O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) suggest that the more rapid technological changes and higher skill
di↵erentiation between countries over the past decades might have weakened the power of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model.
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O’Rourke and Williamson (1992), Rassekh and Thompson (1993) and Madsen (1996),
additionally to the evidence for convergence in wages presented in the first chapter, a
comparable list of studies can be cited that find that FPE does not hold, with Davis and
Mishra (2007) among the more recent critics. While FPE theory remains controversial and
empirical evidence is ambiguous, it continues to be recognized as an important long-run
framework within international trade theory. As such, we aim to identify the origin of
deviations from FPE by drawing a parallel to the analogous price problem in the next
section.
2.3 FPE Analogy to PPP, and Engel’s 1993 Model
Engel (1993) published what he called a “striking empirical regularity” (Engel, 1993, p. 35):
his analysis found a far higher variability of consumer prices of the same goods in di↵erent
countries, than the variability between di↵erent goods within a country. This was important
as it provided an empirical yardstick for models explaining the deviations from constant
real exchange rates that would be expected under purchasing power parity. As recalled by
Engel (1993, p. 36f) most models of the real exchange rate rely on representations for the
real exchange rate similar in structure to the two examples below. Let the CPI-based real
exchange rate be defined as
RERCPI =
P
S · P ⇤ (2.1)
with P and P ⇤ the Consumer Price Index in the home and foreign country and S the
exchange rate (units of local currency per unit of foreign currency). As a first example with
two goods which are consumed and traded in both countries, but have di↵erent weights a
and b in the respective CPI’s, the real exchange rate can be written as (with lower case
letters referring to natural logs)
p  s  p⇤ = a(p1   s  p⇤1) + (1  a)(p2   s  p⇤2) + (b  a)(p⇤2   p⇤1) (2.2)
with
p = a · p1 + (1  a)p2 and p⇤ = b · p1⇤ + (1  b)p⇤2. (2.3)
Models explaining the variability of the real exchange rate based on the price di↵erences
of comparable goods in di↵erent countries would expect to see significant variability in the
first two terms on the right hand side of equation (2.2). In contrast, models based on the
variability of prices of di↵erent goods in individual countries would expect more variability
in the last term on the right hand side of equation (2.2).
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Similarly, in the second example, with two countries both consuming a traded and a
non-traded good, the real exchange rate is
p  s  p⇤ = (pT   s  p⇤T ) + (1  a)(pN   pT )  (1  b)(p⇤N   p⇤T ) (2.4)
with
p = a · pT + (1  a)pN and p⇤ = b · p⇤T + (1  b)p⇤N . (2.5)
Thus, the success of a model will again depend on the question of whether it focuses on
explaining the variability of the real exchange rate through the nominal exchange rate and
the price di↵erences between countries of traded goods (first term on the right hand side of
equation (2.4)) or on the variability of relative prices of traded and non-traded goods in the
individual countries (second and third term on the right hand side of equation (2.4)). While
Engel (1993) and Engel (1999) find evidence in favor of non-constant real exchange rates
being mainly due to higher variability in relative prices between countries, with variability
within countries found to be smaller, more di↵erentiated results are found by other authors.
Mendoza (2000) finds support for Engel’s result only for periods in which the Mexican-US
exchange rate was not actively managed. Chari et al. (2002) mostly confirm Engel’s results.
In contrast, Burstein et al. (2005) find evidence that the relative prices of traded and
non-traded goods contribute significantly to real exchange rate variability when using an
adapted measure for traded goods.
While this question has not been conclusively answered, the interest of this current
chapter is to provide similar guidance to Engel (1993) now with regards to the real exchange
rate based on wages:
RERWAGE INDEX =
W
S · W ⇤ (2.6)
with W and W ⇤ the wage indices in the home and foreign country and S the exchange
rate (units of local currency per unit of foreign currency). Just as PPP holding would
imply that the real exchange rate should be constant and equal to one, FPE would imply
that the above wage-based real exchange rate should equal one. Analogously to Engel’s
(1993) result of V (pij) < V (pii⇤) for prices (i.e. the variability V of prices p for di↵erent
goods i, j within a country is lower then the variability V of prices p of identical goods i, i⇤
in di↵erent countries) we investigate the relationship of the intra-country variability V (wij)
and inter-country variability V (wii⇤) for wages. In line with the distinction in equations
(2.2) and (2.4) between goods prices p1 and p2, and between traded and non-traded goods
prices pT and pN , for which Engel employs both individual good’s prices and consumer
price subindices in his calculations, this chapter analyses both the variability between
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wages of specific professions, as well as variability in three pairs of wage subindices wi and
wj :
Industrial versus service sector wages
Wage indices for these two sectors are calculated and their intra-country and inter-
country variability is analysed, much in line with the traditional interpretation
of traded versus non-traded goods being from the industrial and service sectors,
respectively.
Wages in competitive versus uncompetitive professions
While mapping the industrial sector to traded goods and the services sector to
non-traded goods is common in the literature, in terms of wages a clearer distinction
might be made regarding competitive and uncompetitive wages. Many professions
in the industrial sector will be exposed to international competition while most in
the service sector will hardly be a↵ected by international competition – but not
all. For example, in the service sector the wages of call centre agents tend to be
highly competitive internationally, while in the industrial sector a car mechanic
might well not be exposed to international competition. Therefore, wage indices are
constructed for competitive and uncompetitive professions, and their intra-country
and inter-country variability is compared.
Wages for skilled versus unskilled professions
The intra-country and inter-country variability of relative wages between indices of
skilled and unskilled professions is analysed.
Finally, the availability of profession-level wage data allows us to extend the analysis
beyond the subindex level. Using profession-level panel data we control for fixed e↵ects for
individual professions, cities and years, before computing the variability of inter-country
and intra-country relative wages. In contrast to Engel (1993) who analyses short- to
medium-term variability, the focus of this study is on the longer-term variability of relative
wages, as wages are likely to be significantly more sticky than prices, and as short-term
deviations from constant real exchange rates can more likely be explained by factors such
as investor flows and risk sentiment than by general equilibrium concepts.
This analysis is also informative with regards to the explanations of movements in the
real exchange rates based on prices. For example, when testing for the Balassa-Samuelson
e↵ect on real exchange rates, researchers usually express the real exchange rate as a function
dependent on the terms (pT   s  p⇤T ), (wT   wN ) and (w⇤T   w⇤N ), as well as dependent
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on the di↵erentials in productivity between the sectors and on the shares of production
factors in the tradables and non-tradables sectors (see, for instance, Wagner, 2005, p. 4).
Assuming competitive markets the real exchange rate in the tradables sector (pT   s  p⇤T )
can be expressed as (wT   s w⇤T )  (mplT  mpl⇤T ) with mpl representing the logarithm of
the marginal product of labour in the tradables and non-tradables sectors. Many empirical
studies find that the Balassa-Samuelson assumptions of a constant real exchange rate in
the tradables sector, and of wage equalisation between the tradables and non-tradables
sectors do not hold. However, they do not usually examine which assumption has the more
severe impact on the real exchange rate. This chapter therefore provides an indication as
to whether the di↵erential of wages between countries (wT   s  w⇤T ) or the di↵erential of
wages within countries (wT   wN ) and (w⇤T   w⇤N ), are mostly responsible for movements
in the real exchange rate in the context of the Balassa-Samuelson model.
2.4 Data Description
2.4.1 UBS Prices and Earnings Survey
For our comparison of intra- and inter-country variability of wages we employ wage data
stemming from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys. This data is described shortly
in section 1.5 and in detail in appendix A. The characteristic of these wage data that
make them appropriate for this analysis is their high global comparability and consistency
over time. We use the survey measure “gross annual income” in constructing our wage
indices.8,9
2.4.2 Data Strengths and Limitations
The key strength of these data is the identical definition of workers and professions across
all cities, enabling the construction of consistent and comparable wage indices.10 This is
8This measure is defined in the survey as “Gross annual income (sum of hourly, weekly or monthly earnings)
taking into account family status and tax allowances including all fringe benefits such as profit participation,
bonuses, vacation money, additional monthly salaries as bonus payments, allowances for children etc., but
excluding overtime compensation.”
9The data are provided in USD as converted from local currency using the average market exchange rate
during the period of the survey.
10Note that the UBS Prices and Earnings survey does not provide country estimates, but only provides
data for selected large cities. This ensures that the context of the professions is always comparable, e.g. it
is not the case that the wage of a bus driver in a rural environment is compared to that of bus drivers
in urban environments – the “large city” context is always the same for all data points. While many
analyses compare countries rather than cities, for our purposes city data seems fully acceptable, as we are
interested more in variability than in absolute levels.
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essential as the FPE theorem implies only an equalisation of prices of equivalent production
factors, i.e. of wages of workers with equivalent characteristics in equivalent jobs.11 The
condition for FPE that there should be no complete specialisation and thus that the
same factors should be employed in both economies, is well reflected in this data, as only
professions that exist in all large cities were included. The characteristic of data consistency
and comparability is a significant advantage compared to using nearly any alternative wage
data source that has a comparably long history: most wage data is compiled from a variety
of di↵erent sources including each country’s statistical o ces, tax o ces, labour unions
etc. Wage indices constructed in this way, e.g. for the services or industrial sectors, will
often reflect di↵ering compositions of professions between countries, as not all professions
exist in all countries – this frequently reduces the comparability of wage indices across
countries. Also, with the UBS Prices and Earnings data we can determine the composition
of the wage indices ourselves based on the wages of the professions surveyed, so we have
transparency and flexibility in how we construct the wage subindices.12 A second strength
is the availability of wage data since the 1970s for selected emerging markets, which is of
particular interest given recent sharp wage rises in some emerging markets, as these data
are rarely available from alternative data sources.
In terms of limitations, the data do not reflect di↵erences in the structure of labour
markets, as household survey data would. This wage data therefore cannot be assumed
to represent all professions within a city, but only certain professions, which exist in all
cities. For our current application this limitation is not serious as we wish to compare only
comparable production factors, i.e. workers with equivalent characteristics. A more serious
limitation is the low data frequency. Due to the low frequency, these data will clearly not
capture the short- or medium-term variability in intra- or inter country relative wages.
This is a significant disadvantage and an annual or bi-annual frequency would have been
preferred. However, as wages are likely to be more sticky than goods prices, a focus on
the longer term variability of relative wages seems acceptable, compared to Engel’s (1993)
focus on short- to medium-term variations in relative prices. The low frequency of the UBS
Prices and Earnings data does, however, pose additional challenges in the measurement of
the variability, as is discussed in section 2.5.
11While this comparability in the definition of the professions and the jobs is a strength of the data, a
fuller model would nonetheless aim to correct for productivity di↵erentials. Lacking suitable productivity
estimates on a subindex- and on profession-level for the time span under consideration, we refrain from
attempting a productivity correction.
12As the wage subindices for industry and services, competitive and uncompetitive professions, and skilled
and unskilled wages should be equivalent for all cities in this analysis, each city’s index can clearly not
reflect the structure of its labour market. Instead, our subindices are constructed as equally weighted
means of the wages for the professions included in the specific subindex.
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2.4.3 Alternative Data Sources
A dearth of good wage data at the industry or occupational level for a broad range of
countries has significantly limited empirical research in this field. Alternative data sources,
in particular Freeman and Oostendorp’s Occupational Wages around the World (OWW)
database were considered, but found to be less suitable for this application. While the
frequency of the OWW database is higher than that of the UBS Prices and Earnings
database and OWW covers more professions, the technical document to the OWW database
(Oostendorp, 2005) reports that this data is cleaned and undergoes country-specific data
type correction and standardisation procedures. A significant share of the values are
imputed due to low response rates, they are based on di↵erent sources and are largely
non-comparable (Oostendorp, 2005). While the standardisation procedures employed make
this data useful and interesting in other applications, it is not considered suitable for this
application due to the lack of comparability and the potential loss of variability during the
standardisation procedures employed.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Engel’s Methodology for Prices
As in Engel’s case it is not necessary for our purpose to develop a model based on economic
theory to describe the relative wage processes (see Engel, 1993, p. 39). However, our
analysis is di↵erent to Engel’s in that we focus on longer-term variability: For one, wages
are likely to be significantly more sticky than prices, and we consider short-term deviations
from constant real exchange rates more likely to be explained by factors such as investor
flows and risk sentiment. Furthermore, short- or medium-term variability is not captured
in our data. Due to the low frequency of the data we cannot follow Engel’s methodology of
approximating the representation of the time series as an infinite-order autoregression based
on Wold’s Theorem (see Engel, 1993, p. 39) by estimating a 12th-order autoregression and
then calculating the variance of the forecast error. However, Engel (1993) himself notes
several di culties in using this approach. Firstly, the tests on stationarity of the time
series, necessary for the approximation by an AR(12), are inconclusive. Second, the F-test
on equality of variances is known to be sensitive to the assumption that the underlying
populations are normally distributed, and requires independence within and between the
groups for which the variances are compared. As neither normality nor independence can
be easily assumed, Engel does not attempt a formal statistical test, but indicates that
if the conditions necessary for this modeling and test were fulfilled, the “null would be
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rejected in the vast majority of (...) case by case tests” (Engel, 1993, p. 41). We would add
that Engel does also not address the problem of multiple comparisons or multiple testing.
2.5.2 Measuring Variability in Wages
Clearly, using an AR(12) as in Engel’s case is unsuitable here due to the small sample
size. In fact, no single method for measuring the variability of wages captures the di↵erent
components of variability comprehensively in our view. We therefore employ several
di↵erent approaches to examine the origin of the variability of the real exchange rate based
on wages. In each case we compare the variability of relative wages within a country,
denoted V (wij) with wij = wi wj (wi and wj can be the wages of two di↵erent professions,
or of two di↵erent wage indices, e.g. skilled and unskilled wages), to the variability of
an identical wage (either identical profession or identical wage index) between di↵erent
countries, denoted V (wii⇤) with wii⇤ = wi   s  wi⇤ following Engel’s (1993) approach.13
Variance of Residuals from Regression Models
A very simple first approach is to estimate the variance of the residuals from a linear
trend in the di↵erence series wij and wii⇤, or from a regression model based on fractional
polynomials. However, the standard regression conditions cannot be assumed to be met.
Alternatively, in following with Engel’s time series forecasting, a one-step forecast based
on a constant could provide forecast errors for which the variances could be calculated
and the F-test applied, if one were willing to assume that the conditions for the F-test (in
particular normality, which cannot be tested reliably in small samples) were met. However,
the variance (applied to the regression residuals in the first case and the forecast errors
in the second case) is known not to be particularly stable for sample sizes smaller than
25 (see, for instance, Sachs and Hedderich, 2009, p. 184), and the power of such an F-test
is very low. As an example, even if the ratio of variances of the residuals V (wii⇤)/V (wij)
equals two, for sample size 14 and ↵ = 0.05, the power would be only 32% in the one-sided
test (see Lenth, 2006-9). In this chapter we will therefore investigate the variance of the
residuals from a regression with a time trend in the di↵erence series wij and wii⇤, but
refrain from applying the F-test. This we do for the three sets of wage indices described in
section 2.3 – industrial versus service sector, competitive versus uncompetitive, and skilled
versus unskilled.
To control for city-specific, profession-specific or year-specific fixed e↵ects we also
compute variability based on wages at the level of individual professions (instead of
13Lower-case letters refer to natural logs.
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subindices). For this we control for fixed e↵ects in our wage data for individual professions,
cities and years, before computing the variance of the di↵erence terms of inter-country and
intra-country residuals. We test various specifications including fixed e↵ects, time trends
and terms for city-year interaction. As this comparison is based on wages at the level of
individual professions, unlike the other comparisons which are based on wage indices, the
results are reported separately in section 2.6.2.
Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) from the Median
For the analysis based on wage subindices we also employ the scale parameter MAD
(Median Absolute Deviation from the median) which is considered to be a good scale
parameter for small sample sizes, and in samples with asymmetric distributions or potential
outliers (cf. Sachs and Hedderich, 2009, p. 68).
The MAD scale parameter is impacted by a trend in the time series. The wage
indices we employ trend upwards for most cities over time, as measured in nominal USD.
The exceptions are countries which experience sharp and persistent currency volatility,
and in particular depreciation versus the USD, such as Venezuela starting from its 1983
devaluation, or Mexico following its 1982 default on external debt leading to capital flight
and devaluation, going into the early 1990s. Di↵erencing two similarly trending wage
indices as in our case (wij = wi   wj and wii⇤ = wi   s  wi⇤) reduces the impact of these
trends, but does not eliminate them. We choose not to de-trend the series before applying
MAD, so as to include a parameter that will reflect di↵erences in trend in the variability
measure.
Qaadj as Proposed by Gelper et al. (2009)
As a third measure of variability for wage subindices we employ the scale parameter Qaadj
for univariate time series, which measures the median deviation from local linearity – in
contrast to the global linearity which we use when calculating the variance of the errors
from the regression model as described above (section 2.5.2). Qaadj is not a↵ected by a
linear trend in the data, and is robust as regards outliers (Gelper et al., 2009, p. 2). These
characteristics stem from the use of vertical heights of triangles that are formed using
consecutive data points – a necessary assumption is that each three consecutive data points
can be approximated by a linear trend. Qaadj is an explorative method in the sense that it
does not require an explicit modeling or regression fit of the underlying time series, nor of
the variability process, which suits our application.14
14It is also suitable for online applications enabling instant updating, however, this characteristic is not
required for our purposes. Instead, we calculate Qaadj only for the total time series.
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When deriving influence functions and asymptotic variance of the estimators for a
simple time series model with a level component and a random noise component Gelper et
al. (2009, p. 4) assume independence of the noise components. However, their simulation
experiments confirm that the relative performance of the estimators is maintained also for
dependent errors. For the parameter a we select a = 0.5 which provides a good trade-o↵
between robustness and e ciency, see Gelper et al. (2009, p. 17). The measure is e cient
both in the limit and at a finite sample level and has good small sample properties as
already for 20 observations Gelper et al. (2009) find that the asymptotic behaviour is
closely approximated for the Qaadj parameter.
2.5.3 Hypothesis Testing
Engel (1993) refrained from carrying out a formal statistical test as conditions for the
test could not be shown to be met. Neither is the current setup with wages (instead of
prices) suited to hypothesis testing, with the most significant hurdles being the di culty
in testing the normality of the underlying distributions in small sample sizes, and the
lack of independence between the intra- and inter-country di↵erences. Additionally, the
multiple testing setup means that it must be expected that the null hypothesis can be
falsely rejected in a certain number of cases. Recognizing these limitations we focus on
the descriptive results of the question whether V (wii⇤) is larger or smaller than V (wij) in
section 2.6 as Engel did, and only shortly provide the results of the tests described below,
whose validity would only be given if it were assumed that all necessary conditions are met.
Dixon and Mood’s Statistical Sign Test The statistical sign test of Dixon and
Mood (1946) evaluates the relative frequency of one scale parameter being larger than the
other, and vice versa. The null hypothesis of the statistical sign test is that the di↵erences
of paired observations (here paired scale parameters) are on average not di↵erent from zero.
Stated di↵erently, the null hypothesis is that the distribution of the signs of the di↵erences
has zero median. The test statistic is
z = (|n  2h|  1)/pn (2.7)
with n the number of comparisons and h the (absolute) frequency of the less common
sign. For sample sizes above 40 the asymptotic e ciency of the test starts to fall. When
approximating the binomial distribution with the standard normal distribution the test
statistic for the one-sided test with null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) must be larger than
1.6449 to reject the null hypothesis for ↵ = 0.05, where h is the number of times that
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V (wii⇤) < V (wij).
For the wage subindex data we apply this test for the three scale parameters: the
variance of the regression residuals, MAD and Qaadj . Importantly, however, the assumption
of independence between the paired observations is not given in this context.
Levene Test in the Version of Brown-Forsythe The second approach is the
Levene test (Levene, 1960) for homogeneity of variances in the version of Brown-Forsythe
as implemented in the R-package lawstat.15 This test is based on the ANOVA statistic
which is applied to the median absolute deviation (MAD) which, as mentioned above,
is considered to be a good scale parameter for small sample sizes, and in samples with
potential outliers (see Sachs and Hedderich, 2009, p. 68). In the Brown-Forsythe version
(mean replaced by median compared to the original Levene test) the test proves robust
when used for non-normal data and still retains good statistical power. The test can be
used from sample sizes as small as 10, so that the low frequency of the UBS Prices and
Earnings data does not pose additional problems.
Fligner-Killeen Test The Fligner-Killeen test for homogeneity of variances as im-
plemented in the R-package stats16 is known from simulation studies as particularly robust
with regards departures from normal distributions (see Conover, Johnson and Johnson,
1981). As implemented in the R-package stats the test uses median centering.
2.5.4 Methodology: Additional Remarks
For 34 cities suitable data is available.17 Athens is omitted in spite of having been included
in each survey as for some years important wage data is missing, resulting in 34 ⇤ 33 = 1122
comparisons being calculated. In the US, Switzerland, Brazil and Canada data for two
or three cities is available. As we here wish to focus on pairwise comparisons between
countries with di↵erent currencies, pairs of cities within one country are removed (12 pairs).
While for a large part of the period 1970 to 2009 nominal exchange rates for most
currency pairs were allowed to float, the clear regional exception is Europe. After the end
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates on August 15, 1971, many European
nations decided to limit currency volatility first through the European “currency snake”,
later within the framework of the European Monetary System and finally by adopting the
euro. Therefore, we also exclude pairwise comparisons which involve two euro countries.
15Sourced from R Core Team (2011-2013).
16Sourced from R Core Team (2011-2013).
17See table A.3 in the appendix for details on the inclusion of cities in the surveys over time.
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As the Danish krone has been closely linked to the euro, it is treated equivalently to euro
countries. Omitting these 110 pairs within or closely linked to the Eurozone, leaves 1000
city pairs for which we report results.
We first analyse the more aggregated level of wage subindices, running comparisons
for intra- and inter-country wage variability for the following pairs of wage subindices and
their reverse constellations:
1. Industrial versus service sector
2. Competitive versus uncompetitive professions
3. Skilled versus unskilled professions
We verify the results for the case that the composition of the wage indices is held
exactly identical from 1970 to 2009, i.e. only professions are included in the wage indices
for which data is available for all survey years. The advantage is that the indices are more
consistent over time; the disadvantage is that the indices in this case are based only on a
few professions and potential outliers might have a stronger impact. Additionally we run
the calculations on the dataset including data only from 1976 onwards due to the distorting
e↵ects high exchange rate volatility in the early 1970s could have had. For this case we
again maintain consistent index compositions over time, including only those professions
in the wage indices for which data is available in all survey years from 1976 to 2009.
Finally, we provide results based on the variability on wages of individual professions
(as compared to the above wage subindices), after having corrected for fixed e↵ects, time
trends and city-year interaction. The results are presented in the next section.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Results for Wage Subindices
Descriptive Results
We compare the variability of the di↵erence between log wages of an identical wage index
between two cities (“inter-country”), denoted V (wii⇤), with the variability of the di↵erence
of di↵ering wage indices within the cities (“intra-country”), denoted V (wij). An overview
of the results of the analysis of the wage subindices is shown in table 2.1. The results
indicate that for all three measures of variability (the variance of the residuals from the
linear time trend regression, the median absolute deviation from the median (MAD), and
Gelper et al.’s Qaadj) in the vast majority of comparisons V (wij) < V (wii⇤).
18 Viewed
18An example of more detailed results indicating actual variability measures is given in table C.1 in the
appendix.
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over all wage subindices and all variability measures, V (wii⇤) < V (wij) in only 12.0%
of comparisons. Comparing the di↵erent variability measures across all wage subindices,
V (wii⇤) > V (wij) in 93.3%, 87.7% and 82.9% of comparisons for the MAD, Qaadj and
residual variance measures, respectively.
Table 2.1: Summary of results for variability comparisons for all pairs of cities for which
suitable data are available. For each of the three pairs of wage indices and their reverse
constellations the variability is calculated for each of the three variability measures. All wage
data for the relevant cities from the surveys from 1970 to 2009 are included.
Wage variability # of # of V (wij) < V (wii⇤) % of V (wij) < V (wii⇤)
compared comparisons ResVar MAD Qadj ResVar MAD Qadj
All wage comparisons 6000 4974 5598 5262 82.9% 93.3% 87.7%
Inter-country indus-
try, vs services
1000 886 948 933 88.6% 94.8% 93.3%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
1000 812 939 901 81.2% 93.9% 90.1%
Inter-country compet-
itive, vs uncompeti-
tive
1000 829 911 914 82.9% 91.1% 91.4%
Inter-country uncom-
petitive, vs competi-
tive
1000 724 914 890 72.4% 91.4% 89.0%
Inter-country skilled,
vs unskilled
1000 860 934 770 86.0% 93.4% 77.0%
Inter-country un-
skilled, vs skilled
1000 863 950 856 86.3% 95.0% 85.6%
The tables C.2 and C.3 in the appendix show the equivalent results when omitting
professions not included in all survey years, and when using only the data from 1976,
again holding the composition of the wage indices constant, respectively. The previous
results are confirmed, in fact, viewed over all wage subindices and all variability measures,
V (wii⇤) < V (wij) in only 8.8% and 9.2% of comparisons, respectively, versus 12.0%
when using all wage data. Comparing the di↵erent variability measures across all wage
subindices when holding the composition of the wage indices constant from 1970 (from 1976),
V (wii⇤) > V (wij) in 94.5% (94.8%), 91.6% (91.8%) and 87.6% (85.8%) of comparisons for
the residual variance measures, MAD and Qaadj measures, respectively.
Looking more broadly at the distribution of the ratios of V (wii⇤)/V (wij), the histograms
shown in figures C.1 to C.6 in the appendix show that – viewed over all wage subindices and
all variability measures and now again including data from all professions – V (wii⇤)/V (wij)
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takes on values between 1 and 2 in 30.3% of comparisons. In nearly 60% of cases the
inter-country variability is more than double as high as the intra-country variability, i.e.
V (wii⇤)/V (wij) > 2. Comparing the di↵erent variability measures over all wage subindices,
the ratio V (wii⇤)/V (wij) takes on values between 1 and 2 in 28.1%, 35,0% and 27.8% of
comparisons, for MAD, Qaadj and the residual variance measure, respectively. Therefore,
the MAD parameter produces the highest percentage of cases in which the inter-country
variability is more than double as high as the intra-country variability, at 65.2%, with
equivalent values of 52.8% for Qaadj and 55.1% for the variance of the residual.
When holding the composition of the wage indices constant from 1970 (from 1976),
V (wii⇤)/V (wij) takes on values between 1 and 2 in 26.8% (27.3%) and V (wii⇤)/V (wij) > 2
in 64.4% (63.4%) of comparisons – viewed over all wage subindices and all variability
measures. Comparing the di↵erent variability measures over all wage subindices, the
ratio V (wii⇤)/V (wij) takes on values between 1 and 2 in 31.6% (33.6%), 32.7% (30.8%)
and 16.2% (17.4%) of comparisons, for MAD, Qaadj and the residual variance measure,
respectively. The equivalent values for V (wii⇤)/V (wij) larger than 2 are 60.0% (58.2%),
54.9% (55.1%) and 78.3% (77.0%). In these cases the residual variance measure produces
the highest share of comparisons in which the inter-country variability is more than double
as high as the intra-country variability.
These descriptive results point in the same direction for FPE as Engel’s (1993) results
pointed to for PPP: For all three measures of variability the vast majority of comparisons
indicate that the variability of identical wage indices between di↵erent countries is higher
than the variability of wage indices for di↵erent sectors within one country.
Hypothesis Testing
While recognizing the caveats discussed in section 2.5.3 with regard to hypothesis testing
in the current context, we provide some results below.
Results: Dixon and Mood’s Statistical Sign Test This test is performed for
each city with all of its valid inter-country pairs for each of the three selected variability
measures (the variance of the residuals from the linear regression, the median absolute
deviation from the median (MAD), and Gelper et al.’s Qaadj). For each variability measure
tables C.4 to C.21 in the appendix show the detailed results for the three pairs of wage
indices selected (industry versus services, competitive versus uncompetitive and skilled
versus unskilled, and their reverse constellations), using the data from all professions and
all years. Table 2.2 provides a summary.
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Table 2.2: Summary of results of Dixon and Mood statistical sign test for each city with all
of its valid inter-country pairs, using data from all professions.
Dixon & Mood test H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05 H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05/34
H0: V (wij) > V (wii⇤) (no multiple correction) (Bonferroni correction)
% of cities % of cities
Variability measures ResVar MAD Qadj ResVar MAD Qadj
All wage comparisons 169204=83%
197
204=97%
181
204=89%
141
204=69%
185
204=91%
167
204=82%
Inter-country industry,
vs services
32
34=94%
33
34=97%
33
34=97%
28
34=82%
32
34=94%
32
34=94%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
27
34=79%
34
34=100%
31
34=91%
20
34=59%
31
34=91%
28
34=82%
Inter-country competi-
tive, vs uncompetitive
28
34=82%
30
34=88%
31
34=91%
24
34=71%
27
34=79%
29
34=85%
Inter-country uncom-
petitive, vs competitive
21
34=62%
32
34=94%
31
34=91%
16
34=47%
29
34=85%
27
34=79%
Inter-country skilled,
vs unskilled
30
34=88%
34
34=100%
25
34=73%
26
34=76%
32
34=94%
23
34=68%
Inter-country unskilled,
vs skilled
31
34=91%
34
34=100%
30
34=88%
27
34=79%
34
34=100%
28
34=82%
Using the standard normal approximation for the binomial distribution the one-sided
statistical sign test of the null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) over all wage comparisons is
rejected at the 5% level if the test statistic is larger than 1.64. This is the case for 83%
of cities when using the variance of the residual as scale parameter, 97% for MAD and
89% for Qaadj . Adjusting for the multiple testing problem using the Bonferroni correction
method, ↵ = 0.05 is replaced by ↵ = 0.05/34 = 0.00147. Therefore, again using the
standard normal approximation for the binomial distribution, the null hypothesis for the
one-sided test is rejected if the test statistic is larger than 2.97. The equivalent numbers
after Bonferroni correction due to multiple testing are 69%, 91% and 82%. The fact that
H0 is rejected more frequently for the MAD parameter (the only one of the three scale
parameters that also measures the variability caused by linear trends in the data) indicates
that linear trends in wages are likely more similar between sectors within a city than
between identical sectors between cities in di↵erent countries, therefore further reinforcing
the higher variability between cities already measured by the other scale parameters. In
contrast, the lowest share of rejections is measured when using the variance of the residual as
the scale parameter, and in particular when comparing wages in uncompetitive professions
between cities versus the variability of the indices of competitive versus uncompetitive
wages within a city. These low rejection levels (62%, and 47% with Bonferroni correction)
might at first seem surprising, as one would expect uncompetitive wages to nonetheless
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follow competitive wage trends within a city, as professions in uncompetitive sectors would
else become unattractive. However, it is likely that the high proportion of public sector
professions in the uncompetitive wage index (e.g. bus drivers, school teachers), result in
unusually low volatility, therefore these results do not undermine the broader picture of
high levels of rejection of the null hypothesis.
The cities for which the null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) is rejected least often are
Paris, Madrid and Bogota. The null hypothesis is always rejected for Buenos Aires, London,
Mexico City, Tokyo and Toronto. Interestingly, there seems to be no systematic di↵erence
in levels of rejection between cities in developed and emerging countries. While these test
results look convincing at first sight they cannot be assumed to be statistically valid due
to a lack of independence of the individual comparisons, as previously noted.
When holding the composition of the wage indices constant from 1970 these results are
confirmed. The one-sided statistical sign test of the null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) over
all wage comparisons is rejected at the 5% level (rejected at the 5% level after Bonferroni
correction) for 96% (93%), 95% (87%) and 89% (85%) of cities for the variance of the
residual, MAD and Qaadj , respectively.
19 When using the data from 1976 onwards and
holding the composition of the wage index constant similar results are achieved: The null
hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) over all wage comparisons is rejected at the 5% level (rejected
at the 5% level after Bonferroni correction) for 97% (94%), 94% (89%) and 85% (79%) of
cities for the variance of the residual, MAD and Qaadj , respectively.
20
These results again point in the same direction as Engel’s (1993) results: For all three
measures of variability the clear majority of comparisons reject the null hypothesis of
V (wii⇤) < V (wij).
Results: Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances The Levene test as im-
plemented in the R-package lawstat in the version of Brown-Forsythe is performed on each
valid pair of cities. The results are reported in tables C.54 to C.59 in the appendix. The
results do not confirm the descriptive results of section 2.6.1 nor the Dixon and Mood
test results of section 2.6.1, but also do not contradict them: the one-sided test of the
null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) is rejected for 3187 out of the 6000 comparisons (1000
city pairs and three pairs of wage indices and their reverse constellations), i.e. 53% at the
5% level. However, adjusting for multiple testing using the Bonferroni method (i.e. ↵ is
adjusted to 0.05/1000=0.00005 as in this case it is more appropriate to test each of the
19Table C.22 in the appendix provides a summary of the results, while tables C.23 to C.34 provide detailed
results.
20Table C.35 in the appendix provides a summary of the results, while tables C.36 to C.53 provide detailed
results.
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1000 pairs of cities individually, and not as in the Dixon and Mood test in 34 groups)
results in only 82 rejections of the null hypothesis for the 6000 comparisons. Using less
conservative multiple correction methods such as Simes-Hochberg does not change this
result significantly. When limiting the data to the professions available since the first survey
in 1970 the results are similar: the one-sided test of the null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij)
is rejected for 2638 out of the 4000 comparisons (competitive/uncompetitive wage indices
not used due to limited data on competitive professions in the first surveys), i.e. for 66%
at the 5% level, and for only 146 comparisons or 3.6% after Bonferroni correction. When
using the data from 1976 onwards and holding the composition of the wage indices constant
the one-sided test of the null hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) is rejected for 3690 out of the
6000 comparisons, i.e. for 61.5% at the 5% level, and for only 95 comparisons or 1.6% after
Bonferroni correction.
Clearly, the Levene test for homogeneity of variances does not confirm nor contradict
the findings of the Dixon and Mood statistical sign test and of the descriptive analysis that
V (wii⇤) > V (wij).
Results: Fligner-Killeen Test We additionally use the Fligner-Killeen test for
homogeneity of variances as implemented in the R-package stats due to its robustness
with regards departures from normal distributions, which is likely to be problematic in the
current context. However, here too the results are inconclusive and broadly similar to those
of the Levene test (see tables C.60 to C.65 in the appendix). The one-sided test of the null
hypothesis V (wii⇤) < V (wij) is rejected for 3269 out of the 6000 comparisons, i.e. 54% at
the 5% level. Adjusting for multiple testing using the Bonferroni method results in only 15
rejections of the null hypothesis for the 6000 comparisons. 64% (59%) of comparisons reject
the null when data is limited to the professions included in all surveys (data is limited to
1976-2009 with unchanged composition of indices), falling to 1.5% (1.0%) after Bonferroni
correction.
Therefore, as with the Levene test, the Fligner-Killeen test does not confirm nor
contradict previous results.
2.6.2 Results for Profession-Level Wage Data (no wage subindices)
We make use of the profession-level wage data available to extend the analysis beyond the
subindex level. Using profession-level panel data allows us to control for fixed e↵ects for
individual professions, cities and years, before computing the variability of inter-country
and intra-country relative wages. We test various specifications including fixed e↵ects, time
trends and terms for city-year interaction. Tables C.66 and C.67 in the appendix show
2.7 Conclusion 75
the results for the specifications including city, year and profession fixed e↵ects, and these
same fixed e↵ects adding city-year interaction terms, respectively.21 Overall, the results
when controlling for di↵erent fixed e↵ects, for a time trend and for city-time interaction
terms remain very similar. These results confirm the findings in section 2.6.1, and are even
more clear-cut: The variability of the di↵erence in wages of identical professions between
di↵erent countries V (wii⇤) is on average higher than the variability of wages in di↵erent
professions within one country V (wij) on average for all cities for all equation specifications
that correct for one or more fixed e↵ects (city, profession and/or year). This is also the
case when time trends are additionally controlled for. Only in the specifications controlling
additionally for city-year interactions does this not quite hold: The mean inter-country
variability is not larger than mean intra-country variability for two out of 34 cities (Bogota
and Hong Kong).
Looking at the distribution of ratios of inter-country to intra-country variability we see
that when controlling for city, year and profession fixed e↵ects only for one fifth (21%) of
cities is this ratio between one and two – i.e. in 79% of cases V (wii⇤) is more than twice as
large as V (wij). When controlling additionally for city-year interaction terms the ratio was
larger than two in 59% of cities, between one and two in 35%, and below one in only 6% of
cities. Results for the selected specifications are shown as histograms in figures C.7 and
C.8 in the appendix. Due to the stated limitations on hypothesis testing, we do not report
a formal test as was done for the calculations based on wage subindices in the previous
sections. Nonetheless, the profession-level data corrected for fixed e↵ects, time trends and
city-year interactions clearly confirm the results in section 2.6.1 using wage subindices.
2.7 Conclusion
FPE theory implies that under certain conditions trade in goods can act as a substitute
for factor mobility, implying that wages will converge even without factor flows between
countries. However, empirical evidence is mixed and FPE theory seems at odds with large
and persistent divergences in international wages. This chapter contributes to explaining
deviations from FPE by drawing a parallel to the analogous “price” problem and Engel’s
(1993) decomposition of the real exchange rate. By decomposing an adapted expression
for the real exchange rate, now based on factor prices (wages), instead of goods prices, we
21The results shown exclude professions that were included in the surveys only after 1976 to ensure availability
of at least twelve panel observations per profession. Adding professions with fewer observations did not
materially change the outcome and the results are not reported. As with previous results, the results
shown here exclude pairs of cities within the same country and pairs with closely linked currencies in
Europe.
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investigate whether deviations from FPE have historically been better explained by the
variability in the wages between countries, or by the variability of wages within countries,
thereby providing an empirical yardstick for models of international factor prices.
Using a number of di↵erent wage indices and three di↵erent measures for variability,
as well as profession-level wage data corrected for fixed e↵ects, our results show that
historically the variability of identical wage indices between countries has been higher than
the variability of di↵erent wage indices within a country. This result is analogous to Engel’s
early result, and indicates that deviations from FPE are more likely driven by the higher
variability of wages between countries, than by the variability of di↵erent wages within
countries. As in Engel’s analysis this result is, however, based primarily on descriptive
statistics as numerous hurdles put into question the validity of statistical hypothesis testing.
Interestingly, there is no clear evidence of structural di↵erences in the wage comparisons
involving only developed markets and those involving also wages in emerging markets.
With regards to the traditional analysis of the real exchange rate this analysis is
informative in that it shows that the Balassa-Samuelson assumptions of a constant real
exchange rate in the tradables sector, and of wage equalisation between the tradables
and non-tradables sectors have a di↵ering importance with regard to movements in the
real exchange rate. While the literature mostly confirms that these assumptions do not
hold empirically, our analysis points to a larger impact on the real exchange rate likely
stemming from the movements in the real exchange rate of tradables (pT   s   p⇤T ) =
(wT   s w⇤T )  (mplT  mpl⇤T ) and only to a lesser extent from the lack of equalisation of
wages within countries in (wT wN ) and (w⇤T w⇤N ). Broadly speaking this analysis is in line
with the Balassa-Samuelson projections in that it finds more homogeneity of wages within
a country, than between countries. It emphasizes that models of international factor prices
explaining deviations from FPE should encompass explanations for the large di↵erences
and variability in wages of equivalent workers in equivalent jobs across di↵erent countries,
and o↵er explanations of much smaller variability in di↵erences between professions’ wages
within a country.
Chapter 3
The E↵ect of India’s Economic
Liberalisation on Urban Wage
Inequality: Evidence from a
Synthetic Control Approach
3.1 Introduction
In this third chapter, which is based on Boes and Weisser (2012), we analyse how wages for
di↵erent skill levels were a↵ected by policy reforms in the context of ongoing globalization
using India, and the city of Mumbai, as a case study.
Far-reaching economic liberalisation started after India’s 1991 balance-of-payments
crisis. The reforms marked a turning point in India’s post-colonial, largely socialist-style
state-directed economy towards a market economy. They included increasing openness
towards international trade and investment through a sharp reduction in tari↵s and non-
tari↵ barriers, deregulation, privatisation, and reforms in taxation policy. The reforms are
credited with having lifted about 300 million people out of extreme poverty by substantially
increasing economic growth. Real GDP per capita, as a measure of average well-being,
rose by around 44% between 1991 and 2001 according to IMF data. While the success of
the reforms in terms of economic growth is widely accepted, studies of the impact on the
income distribution and skill premia have shown diverging results. In particular, some
measures point to a marked increase in inequality, for example, Cain et al. (2010) calculate
an increase of India’s Gini coe cient of about 4 percentage points between the 1980s and
3.1 Introduction 78
2004 levels. This gives rise to concerns that the economic gains from the reforms might
have disproportionately benefitted the better-o↵.
In this chapter, we look at the e↵ect of the reforms on the development of skill premia.
Using data from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys from 1982 to 2009 and Mumbai
as a case study, we seek to compare relative wages with and without the reforms. This
comparison, while theoretically sound, su↵ers from a fundamental identification problem:
the trends in skill premia if no economic reforms had taken place – and India had been
subjected only to ongoing external globalization trends – is a counterfactual outcome, and
is thus unobserved. However, India’s liberalisation provides a good example of a natural
experiment. First, the reforms were not generally anticipated by politicians, the general
public or international investors, as the balance-of-payments crisis escalated suddenly,
providing clear pre- and post-treatment periods.1 Secondly, the reforms were mandated by
the IMF as a condition for the bailout and were thus externally determined and less prone
to distortions by politicians and interest groups.
In order to address the issue of missing counterfactual wage trends we employ the
method of synthetic control, as proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended
in Abadie et al. (2010). We analyse the skill premia in the city of Mumbai due to its
important role as a regional trading and economic hub. We use a broad group of 35 other
large cities as the donor pool, including many trading centres in emerging markets, to
construct the synthetic control. As cities will tend to be a↵ected di↵erently by liberalisation
than rural areas we prefer to compare Mumbai to other global hubs than to country data
which can include large rural/agricultural populations. Also, the development in other
cities internationally is likely to provide a good counterfactual representation of general
globalization trends as compared to the specific e↵ects brought on by India’s internal
reforms.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the related
theoretical and empirical literature on the economic impact of liberalisation in India.
Section 3.3 describes the data, and a brief explanation of the synthetic control method
is given in section 3.4. The estimation results are presented in section 3.5, and several
robustness checks are provided. Section 3.6 discusses the implications of our results, and
section 3.7 concludes.
1While the 1980s did see some limited economic reforms in India they are not comparable in depth or scope
to the reforms of the 1990s.
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3.2 The Impact of Trade and Liberalisation on Wage Inequality
3.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
Conventional trade theory, which combines the Heckscher-Ohlin framework with the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, provides a first guideline as to how one could expect trade
and globalisation to impact wage inequality. In the Heckscher-Ohlin framework (with two
countries, two production factors and two goods) the country in which capital (labour) is
relatively more abundant will specialise on and export more capital- (labour-) intensive
goods. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem provides the link between product prices and
wages: The price of both goods will converge to a world price, which is higher (lower) than
the original price in the country which is relatively abundant (less abundant) in the factor
the good is intensive in. Therefore, the prices of factors that are intensive in export goods
tend to rise, while those intensive in import goods tend to fall. Under the assumption
that developed countries are relatively more abundant in capital and skilled labour, and
developing countries are relatively abundant in unskilled labour, this factor-endowment
framework suggests that the former countries will see wage inequality rise, while the latter
would see it fall when trade is introduced or increased.
As described by Wood (1997) this framework is largely coherent with the experience
of many of the newly industrialised East Asian economies including Hong Kong, Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan from the mid-1960s until the 70s. However, empirical studies of
the e↵ects of increased globalization and trade on the income distribution for developing
nations since the 1980s mostly point in the opposite direction. For example, Cragg and
Epelbaum (1996) provide evidence of sharply rising skill premia in Mexico. Increasing
returns to skill are also identified by Attanasio et al. (2004) for Columbia and by Galiani
and Sanguinetti (2003) for Argentina.2
These mixed results from empirical studies in emerging markets have led to a search for
explanations for the apparent link between economic opening and a rise in wage inequality.
A first line of argumentation extends the Heckscher-Ohlin framework by endogenous
technological change. Through increased international trade developing countries are
likely to acquire more advanced production technologies, increasing the relative demand
for skilled versus unskilled labour (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Robbins, 1996; Wood,
1997). This trade-induced skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is reinforced when
production liberalisation increases foreign direct investment (Berman et al., 1998), or when
multinational companies establish a presence in formerly closed economies. Acemoglu
(2002, 2003) develops a model of endogenous technological change whereby skilled labour’s
2See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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increasing demands for technologically advanced goods induces SBTC through the market
size e↵ect. Although there is no clear consensus among researchers, SBTC is widely
considered a key driver of increased wage inequality in developing countries over the past
decades. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) argue that a relative increase in the demand for skilled
labour in developing economies is reinforced by the trend towards trade in intermediate
products, also referred to as “production sharing” or “outsourcing”.
A second line of argumentation is based on the idea that global production sharing
induces workers to lose bargaining power in wage negotiations through the threat of
outsourcing, especially if they are unskilled. Evidence of this is presented by Choi (2006),
who relates greater international openness to the declining power of trade unions. In this
sense, trade liberalisation can function analogously to an increase in the size of the labour
supply pool, particularly for unskilled workers. In the Heckscher-Ohlin framework this
would apply to unskilled labour in the developed country, see for example Geishecker (2006),
who finds that outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe has reduced the demand for
manual workers in Germany. This framework assumes trade to be between a developing and
a developed country, so-called North-South trade. But trade is also taking place between
countries abundant in unskilled labour, i.e., South-South, which does not imply the gains
to unskilled labour in developing countries expected in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
framework. Gourdon (2011) asserts that increasing wage inequality in some developing
countries is related to growing South-South trade, i.e., trade between countries abundant
in unskilled labour.
A third line of argumentation weakens the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of perfect
competition. Industry wage premia which prior to liberalisation are sustained through
trade protection, imperfect competition or limited factor mobility might not be viable in
the face of post-liberalisation international competition. Tari↵ reductions could reduce
profits of previously protected firms thereby leading to falling industry wages, see e.g.,
Revenga (1997). Thus, patterns of protection prior to liberalisation can di↵er from the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework assumptions. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, p. 11-13) review
the literature for Latin America and unwind the seeming inconsistency for some developing
countries: As unskilled labour-intensive industries in Latin America were often protected
with the highest tari↵s prior to trade liberalisation and therefore experienced the highest
tari↵ reductions during reform, these sectors’ product price adjustment was downwards,
making the increase in wage inequality observed consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem. Di↵ering degrees or speeds of liberalisation across sectors can have a similar
distorting impact on wage inequality.
Finally, tari↵ reductions can lead to productivity improvements in developing countries,
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and gains might be shared with workers. “Defensive innovation” enables companies to keep
up with increased competition (Wood, 1995; Thoenig and Verdier, 2003), in particular if they
are close to the technological frontier of their industries (Aghion et al., 2001). Depending
on whether the industries achieving the strongest productivity improvements employ more
skilled or unskilled labour, this can shift the income distribution. More broadly, wage
inequality might be assumed to be a↵ected through the growth channel, e.g., through higher
growth based on productivity improvements. However, the relationship between trade
liberalisation and economic growth remains controversial, as does the postulated Kuznets
e↵ect of growth on inequality: Most empirical studies reject the Kuznets hypothesis that
economic growth will at first reinforce wage inequality due to the necessary restructuring of
the economy, but subsequently led to a reduction in inequality (Ravallion, 1995; Deininger
and Squire, 1998).
3.2.2 Evidence of the Impact of India’s Liberalisation on Wage Inequal-
ity
As the above review indicates the e↵ects of economic liberalisation can be manifold and
depend on a country’s very specific situation. For India the debate on poverty and
inequality is at times fierce, in part due to the controversial quality of data sources.3
Measures of consumption in India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) show a wide gap to
National Accounts statistics, and this di↵erential has grown over the past years. Further,
the NSS data captures only a small share of private consumption and likely underreports
consumption of the wealthy, but probably is the most accurate source of data for the
consumption of the poor. Tax return data, as used for example by Banerjee and Piketty
(2005), are thought to better capture income in the upper part of the distribution, though
this too is controversial. Substantial di↵erences in trends between states, between the
urban and rural populations, and between the services, manufacturing and agricultural
sectors makes providing generalised results for India even more complex (see Topalova,
2007; Tiwari, 2010).
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
A number of studies find evidence of SBTC in post-liberalisation India. Kijima (2006)
finds that wage inequality in India as measured by the 90th versus the 10th percentiles
of the wage distribution started increasing in the 1980s, but the increase accelerated in
the post-reform 1990s due to an increasing demand for skilled labour. The study finds
3See Deaton and Kozel (2005) for a review of this debate.
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that SBTC (measured as within-industry demand shifts) was the main driver for this
acceleration, whereas trade reforms (measured by between-industry shifts of skilled workers)
were not an important contributor. Banga (2005) uses cross-industry panels from the
Indian manufacturing sector and similarly finds SBTC (and higher FDI) to have pushed up
inequality (while trade is here found to have actually reduced it). In contrast, Srivastava
and Mathur (2011) using translog cost function analysis find that both trade and technology
have tended to increase inequality. Chamarbagwala (2006) uses wages of college versus
non-college educated workers as a measure for inequality and finds that skill-upgrading
within industries was the main driver for the rising demand for skilled labour, and that
domestic liberalisation and reforms to the external sector failed to create work for unskilled
labour. Ramaswamy (2008) and Sen (2008) find a relative increase in employment and
wages of skilled labour consistent with SBTC in the 1990s. However, Sen (2008) also points
to the industry structure of protection pre-liberalisation as a source of increasing inequality,
as discussed in the next section.
Industry wage premia
The second important channel through which trade and liberalisation can a↵ect inequality
is industry wage premia. Both Dutta (2007) and Kumar and Mishra (2008) studied wages in
the Indian (urban) manufacturing sector from 1983 to 1999, but their results diametrically
oppose each other. Dutta (2007) finds that after controlling for worker characteristics
higher tari↵s were indeed related to higher industry wage premia, and that industries in
which tari↵s were reduced experienced falling industry wage premia. As initial levels of
trade protection were on average higher for low-wage sectors, and tari↵s were reduced most
in these sectors, Dutta (2007) concludes that at least some of the increases in India’s wage
inequality were due to trade liberalisation. In contrast, Kumar and Mishra (2008) find
that high trade protection in a sector was related to lower wages in that sector and that
wages increased disproportionately in sectors experiencing the sharpest tari↵ reductions.
This result is consistent with liberalisation-induced firm level productivity gains shared
with the workers. As tari↵ reductions were larger in sectors employing a larger share of
unskilled labour, Kumar and Mishra (2008) suggest that trade liberalisation has actually
lead to a reduction in India’s wage inequality.
Service sector reforms versus trade liberalisation
Cain et al. (2010) and Mehta and Hasan (2012) point to an important weakness in many
studies on wage inequality in India: that they have tended to focus on manufacturing while
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ignoring India’s large services sector. Cain et al. (2010) use inequality decompositions to
show that a large share of the rise in consumption of more skilled households between
1993 and 2004 stem from their incomes derived in the services sector. This sector too
underwent huge reforms as the 1990s trade opening was accompanied by a raft of service
sector liberalisation measures. In fact, with regard to their impact on wage inequality,
Mehta and Hasan (2012) find “that e↵ects of services reforms are many times larger than
those of trade liberalisation”. However, they also estimate that 30% to 66% of the rise in
wage inequality can be empirically explained neither by tradables nor by non-tradables
liberalisation.
Economic opening and bargaining power of unions
Finally, some studies point to the falling bargaining power of unions as a potential source
of increased wage inequality. For example, Mathur and Mishra (2007) confirm membership
declines and a reduction in bargaining power of unions. While o cial data on the union
density is considered suspect (Das, 2000), a number of sources indicate that union declines
began in the 1990s (Kuruvilla et al., 2002).
While many of the studies we cite above report increasing wage inequality in India
since 1991, this result seems to crucially depend on how wage inequality is measured and
which data is used. Many studies confirm an empirical link between rising inequality and
the 1990s economic liberalisation, with trade-induced SBTC probably the best supported
argument to date. We add to the existing literature by exploring a novel data source
to calculate skill premia and, in particular, by constructing a synthetic control group to
investigate in detail the development of these skill premia in the post-liberalisation period.
3.3 Data Description
3.3.1 UBS Prices and Earnings Survey
We calculate skill premia using salary and wage data from the UBS Prices and Earnings
survey. This data is described shortly in section 1.5 and in detail in appendix A. This
survey has been conducted every three years since 1970, producing a dataset that displays
high consistency over time and good global comparability, as in each country the survey
was conducted contemporaneously with an identical questionnaire and comparable methods.
Of the 35 cities that appeared in every, or nearly every wave, 17 are in Europe, six in Latin
America, five in North America, four in Asia, one in Africa, one in the Middle East, and
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one in Australia.4 Data for Mumbai are available from 1982 onwards every three years, so
the pre-treatment data points are 1982, 1985, 1988 and 1991. All cities other than Mumbai
with data available for that period are considered for inclusion in the synthetic control
group.
We use the survey measure “gross annual income” in constructing the skill premia.5
The data are provided in US dollars (USD) as converted from local currency using the
average market exchange rate at the time of the survey. The skill premium for each city was
calculated as the ratio of the skilled to unskilled wage index, with each index representing
the average of wages for skilled or unskilled professions. Clearly, the actual level of skill
premium is related to the selection of professions in the UBS survey, and hence it is not
directly comparable to other skill premium calculations. The advantage of our approach is
that the wage indices and skill premia are constructed identically between all cities and
thus are perfectly comparable over time and geography, making them a suitable device for
use in a synthetic control group.
As in section 1.5 we assign a skill level to each profession based on the following
breakdown:
– Skill level 1: Obligatory schooling only; largely unskilled labour; very limited
training.
– Skill level 2: Obligatory schooling plus full apprenticeship or extensive practical
training. Or completed high school and some practical training.
– Skill level 3: Completed high school and university or college education.
Skill level 1 professions therefore include bus drivers, factory or textile workers, saleswomen,
and construction workers. Skill level 2 professions include secretaries, auto mechanics, bank
tellers or credit clerks, cooks and skilled industrial workers. Finally, skill level 3 professions
include primary school teachers, electrical engineers and department managers in industry.
3.3.2 Data Strengths and Limitations
A key strength of the UBS Prices and Earnings survey is the identical definition of workers
and professions across cities, enabling the construction of a consistent and comparable
outcome measure, i.e., the skill premia, an essential ingredient of the synthetic control
4See table A.1 in the appendix for information on the survey periods, and table A.3 for the cities included.
5This measure is defined in the survey as “Gross annual income (sum of hourly, weekly or monthly earnings)
taking into account family status and tax allowances including all fringe benefits such as profit participation,
bonuses, vacation money, additional monthly salaries as bonus payments, allowances for children etc. but
excluding overtime compensation”. The complete questionnaire is available upon request.
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method. We consider this a significant advantage compared to using nearly any alternative
data source with a comparably long history: Most wage data are compiled from a variety
of sources including each country’s statistical o ces, tax o ces, labour unions, and so on.
Wage indices constructed from such data, for example for the services or manufacturing
industries, will frequently reflect di↵erent professions as not all of them exist in all countries,
or su↵er from di↵ering index compositions of professions between countries. Additionally,
the skill premium is frequently defined as a sector-specific premium, e.g., services to
manufacturing wages. This is mostly done due to data constraints as less aggregated wage
data is often not available. The data we use enables us to compare wages of a smaller
number of professions, which, however, exist and are defined in the same way across all
cities considered.
Focusing on a group of selected large cities has the advantage that we do not have to
worry about urban/rural compositions, i.e., we do not compare, for example, the wage of
a bus driver in a rural environment in one country to that of a bus driver in an urban
environment in another country – the “large city” context is always the same for all data
points. While many analyses use country data rather than cities, for our purpose city data
seems su ciently appropriate, as economic reforms would likely impact rural and urban
earnings very di↵erently, and changes in skill premia would then depend on the composition
of each local sub-economy. Thus, when using a synthetic control method, it seems a valid
approach to use city data to make use of the similarities of the economic structures. It
should also be noted that this approach is not entirely di↵erent from other studies because
many databases used for country comparisons must often make do with data primarily
from urban areas – less a✏uent regions and rural areas are typically underrepresented; see
for example O’Connor (2008, p. 3) and Van Ark and Monnikhof (2000, p. 6).
In terms of limitations, the data do not reflect di↵erences in the structure of labour
markets, as for example household survey data would. This wage data therefore cannot be
assumed to represent all professions within a city, but only certain professions that exist
in all cities. For our current application this limitation does not seem very serious as the
professions for which data is provided represent a good cross section in both manufacturing
and services, and di↵ering skill levels. A more serious limitation is the low data frequency.
Clearly, our data will not capture the very short-term variations in wages. This is a
disadvantage and an annual or bi-annual frequency would have been preferred. However,
as the e↵ects of India’s economic liberalisation can be expected to dissipate slowly through
the economy a focus on the medium- and long-term seems acceptable. Additionally,
the synthetic control group methodology is well suited to small sample sizes and is not
significantly limited by the low data frequency. Finally, despite the identical and precise
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definitions of the professions in the survey, it is still possible that in di↵erent countries
somewhat di↵erent skills are needed for the same professions. Unfortunately, this limitation
cannot be excluded.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
This section provides some descriptive statistics and graphical representations of the macro-
economic context and the UBS Prices and Earnings wage and skill premium data used in
this study.
Macro-economic context
Figure 3.1 shows real GDP growth rates in India in the decades before and after the 1991
economic liberalisation. We use local polynomial regression fitting to add a smoothed
function and standard error. Average real GDP growth in India was about 5.1% between
1980 and 1991, about 6.1% between 1992 and 1999, and about 6.9% between 2000 and 2009,
according to IMF data. This accelerating trend in growth is confirmed when adjusting for
population growth: GDP per capita increased by an average of only around 1.2% between
1960 and 1980, 2.8% in the 1980s, 4.1% in the 1990s and 6.2% in the 2000s (see Mehta and
Hasan, 2012), which points at an accelerating increase in average well-being. However, this
does not yet explain how this increase in wealth was distributed, a question which lies at
the core of the current study.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show import and export volume growth for India over the same
period, again with a smoothed function included. We see that export growth already
started to accelerate in the mid-1980s, reaching its peak at over 20% year-on-year in 2004,
but falling back sharply during the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Import volumes
fell sharply during India’s balance of payments crisis in 1991 and 1992, in line with the
dramatic devaluation of the Indian rupee. However, import growth recovered strongly
and accelerated after 1991 averaging 12.1% between 1992 and 1999 and 10.7% between
2000 and 2009, according to IMF data. Clearly, increased trade in post-1991 India was a
cornerstone of its subsequent economic success.
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Figure 3.1: India real GDP growth. Data source: IMF.
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Figure 3.2: India export volume growth. Data source: IMF.
3.3 Data Description 89
−10
0
10
20
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Im
po
rt 
vo
lum
e 
gr
ow
th
 in
 In
dia
 (y
ea
r−
on
−y
ea
r)
Figure 3.3: India import volume growth. Data source: IMF.
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Wage data from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys
Figures 3.4 to 3.6 show the average wages in nominal USD for Mumbai, Bogota, Jakarta,
London, Oslo and Seoul for each of the three skill levels. The local currency wages were
converted to USD using the average spot exchange rate during each survey period. These
cities were selected to show examples of high, medium and low wage levels in the dataset.
Measured in USD, average wages in Oslo were highest for this selection of cities for all
three skill levels, followed by London’s wages. They are lowest for Jakarta and Mumbai,
which show relatively similar wages for each skill level. Wages for unskilled workers (level 1,
or L1) in Bogota are similar to those in Jakarta and Mumbai, but for skill levels 2 (L2) and
3 (L3), wages are more favourable in Bogota. Wages in Seoul take up the middle ground.
The rising nominal wages in USD for Oslo, London and Seoul reflect that in USD terms
these wages experienced some form of inflation adjustment. The rather lower and more
stable levels for Mumbai, Jakarta and Bogota reflect that in USD terms these wages lost
purchasing power — in part attributable to the local currency devaluation versus the USD.
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Figure 3.4: Average skill level 1 wage for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
(nominal USD)
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Figure 3.5: Average skill level 2 wage for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
(nominal USD)
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Figure 3.6: Average skill level 3 wage for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
(nominal USD)
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Skill premia from the UBS Prices and Earnings survey
Figures 3.7 to 3.9 show the skill premium ratios L3/L1, L3/L2 and L2/L1 for the same
selection of cities. The use of ratios means that currency and inflation e↵ects are eliminated.
On average, countries with a higher GDP-per-capita tend to have lower and less volatile
skill premia in this dataset, as represented here by Oslo and London. The higher the skill
premium levels, the more volatile the series tend to be, as seen here for Jakarta and Bogota.
Out of the 35 cities in the dataset, Mumbai’s skill premium ratios are in the third highest
quartile during most survey periods, but lower than the average for the emerging markets.
As could be expected for the dataset as a whole, the skill premium ratio L3/L1 is on
average highest, followed by L2/L1, with L3/L2 lowest.6 A first look at the data thus
points to highest relative return increases for workers when moving from unskilled to
medium-skilled jobs.
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Figure 3.7: Skill premium ratio L3/L1 for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
6This can be easily seen when comparing Figures 3.7 to 3.9. Note the di↵erence in scale for the ordinate of
Figure 3.7.
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The green horizontal lines represent Mumbai’s average skill premium for the periods
1982-1991, 1994-2000 and 2003-2009. For the skill ratio between highly skilled and unskilled
workers L3/L1 we see that the premium rises moderately at first from an average of 2.6 in
1982-1991 to 2.8 in 1994-2000, but then jumps strongly to an average of 4.1 in 2003-2009.
Over the complete period this indicates substantial losses of low-skilled versus high-skilled
workers’ relative wages and points to an increase in wage inequality.
In Figure 3.8 we see that the situation for medium versus low-skilled workers’ wages
in Mumbai was substantially di↵erent. In the initial post-liberalisation years the average
L2/L1 ratio falls from 1.9 to 1.5. However, medium-skilled workers’ relative wages recovered
strongly in the 2000s with the L2/L1 skill ratio reaching a 2003-2009 average of 2.2, higher
than the pre-liberalisation levels. Thus, while wage inequality between medium and low-
skilled workers fell initially, over the complete period L2/L1 wage inequality as measured
here increased nonetheless.
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Figure 3.8: Skill premium ratio L2/L1 for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
The skill premium earned by highly qualified workers as compared to medium skilled
workers rises from an average of 1.4 in 1982-1991 to a stable level of 1.8-1.9 for 1994-2009.
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Thus, medium skilled workers’ relative wages in Mumbai fell as compared to highly skilled
workers in the initial post-liberalisation period. However, this trend did not continue
and medium and highly skilled workers’ wages on average increased at the same pace in
the later post-liberalisation period. Over the complete period, however, this L3/L2 wage
inequality also increased as measured by this data.
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Figure 3.9: Skill premium ratio L3/L2 for Mumbai and five selected control group cities
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3.4 Synthetic Control Group Methodology
3.4.1 Determining a Suitable Comparison Group
While we can measure and display India’s skill premia as in figures 3.4 to 3.9, we cannot
conclude from the observed trends that these were driven by India’s dramatic economic and
trade liberalisation, or whether they were just the result of common globalization trends.
More technically, we are faced with the problem of the unobserved counterfactual, i.e., the
development of skill premia in India if no economic reforms had taken place are unobserved.
In order to address this problem and to estimate the magnitude of the e↵ect of India’s
economic reforms on wage inequality we construct a synthetic control group. Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) suggest a data-driven procedure for control
group selection which produces a weighted average of control group units that approximate
the most important characteristics of the treated unit during the pre-treatment period. The
composition of the control group is transparent in that the contribution of each available
control unit, and the similarity of the synthetic control group to the treated unit before
treatment (or lack thereof) is made explicit (Abadie et al., 2011, p. 2). In contrast to the
commonly applied di↵erence-in-di↵erences model, the key advantage of this approach is
that it allows for the e↵ect of unobserved characteristics not fixed over time.7
3.4.2 Estimation
In order to construct a suitable control group for Mumbai, weights need to be determined
such that the synthetic control group “resembles the treated unit in all relevant pre-
intervention characteristics” (Abadie et al., 2011, p. 3), i.e., the synthetic control should
be as similar as possible to Mumbai in terms of the outcome variable during the pre-
liberalisation period. We use the average skill premium and the average skill premium
growth rates from 1982-1991, and the absolute skill premium levels in 1988 and 1991
as matching factors. We additionally allow for the following pre-treatment measures as
potential predictors of the skill premium:8
1. Mean real GDP growth rates
2. Nominal GDP per capita in USD
3. Nominal PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in USD
7For a formal and more detailed discussion of the synthetic control group methodology see Abadie et
al. (2010), Abadie et al. (2011), and Mukherji and Mukhopadhyay (2011).
8Data for the predictors 1-6 sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011
edition.
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4. Export volume, percentage change from year ago
5. Import volume, percentage change from year ago
6. Population growth
7. Education index, reflecting overall levels of education9
8. Expected years of schooling of children, in years10
9. Mean years of schooling of adults, in years11
10. Human Development Index (HDI)12
Estimation is performed using the statistical programming tool R and the package
Synth,13 described in Abadie et al. (2011). Control groups are estimated separately for each
of the three skill premium ratios L3/L2, L3/L2 and L2/L1. The di↵erent skill premium
levels 1, 2 and 3 reflect di↵erent sectors and therefore it can be expected that they are
a↵ected di↵erently (and in a non-linear fashion) by liberalisation. This warrants allowing
for di↵erent synthetic control groups for each skill premium ratio. The optimisation
results and the paths comparing Mumbai’s skill premium development to the path of the
counterfactual are shown below. During the optimisation process several of the potential
predictors were found not to improve the pre-treatment fit and were thus omitted from
the subsequent analysis. These include the nominal GDP and PPP-adjusted GDP per
capita, the education index, the expected years of schooling of children, the mean years of
schooling of adults, and the HDI.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Skill Premium for High-Skilled versus Low-Skilled Professions L3/L1
For the L3/L1 ratio, the synthetic control group is made up of Oslo (0.332), Helsinki
(0.223), Buenos Aires (0.191), Seoul (0.117), London (0.087), Jakarta (0.035), Sao Paulo
(0.011) and Luxembourg (0.004), with the figures in brackets indicating the city weights.
Just over half of the total weighting stems from cities in developed markets, the remaining
share from cities in emerging markets. This can be explained by the fact that in the 1980s
and early 1990s Mumbai’s skill ratio as calculated from the UBS Prices and Earnings
9Source: HDRO calculations, as of 2011.
10Source: UNESCO, as of 2011.
11Source: HDRO updates of Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics, as of 2011.
12Source: HDRO calculations based on data as of 2011 from UNDESA, Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO
Institute for Statistics, World Bank and IMF.
13Sourced from R Core Team (2011-2013).
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data were on the lower end compared to most emerging markets, but higher than most
developed markets. Thus an optimal control group includes a significant share of developed
market donors.
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Figure 3.10: Skill premium path plots showing period means for Mumbai and its synthetic
control for skill ratio L3/L1
Figure 3.10 shows the path of Mumbai’s L3/L1 skill premium compared to its synthetic
control. For the pre-treatment period 1982 to 1991, the synthetic control group achieves
a near-perfect fit. The paths of the L3/L1 skill premium in Mumbai and the synthetic
control also stay very close to each other during the 1990s. Only after 1997 and especially
in the 2000s the L3/L1 skill premium in Mumbai rises significantly above the synthetic
control. Therefore, a first conclusion is that during the first phase of liberalisation the
relative e↵ects on the high-skilled professions (L3) and low-skilled professions (L1) are
not distinguishable from what would be expected without the liberalisation. During the
following stages, however, high-skilled workers started to benefit relatively more, and this
benefit would not have been expected without the liberalisation (as from 1994 onwards the
skill ratio of the synthetic control group stayed at a stable level of around 2.3). Therefore,
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the rise in inequality between high- and low-skilled wages from the late 1990s onwards can
likely be attributed to the reform process in India.
Figure 3.10 includes averages of the L3/L1 skill premium for Mumbai and its synthetic
control for the pre-treatment period 1982-1991, and for the early and later post-treatment
periods 1994-1997 and 2000-2009. While the means are identical in the pre-treatment
period and very similar still during the mid 1990s, the averages after 2000 di↵er sharply
with Mumbai’s skill premium at an average of 3.9, while the synthetic controls average
was 2.3.
3.5.2 Skill Premium for High-Skilled versus Medium-Skilled Professions
L3/L2
For the L3/L2 ratio, the synthetic control for Mumbai consists of Oslo (0.503), Jakarta
(0.261), Stockholm (0.202) and Brussels (0.034). Figure 3.11 displays the paths of the
L3/L2 skill premium in Mumbai compared to its synthetic control. Again, there is an
almost perfect fit of the synthetic control during the pre-treatment period.14 From the mid
1990s, Mumbai’s skill premium starts to deviate upwards relative to the synthetic control,
pointing to an increase in relative wages for the high-skilled relative to the medium-skilled
professions. As the skill premium L3/L2 of the synthetic control rebounds after 2003 and
starts to fall back for Mumbai, this relative advantage disappears for the last data point
in 2009. Overall, the L3/L2 skill premium level as calculated from the UBS Prices and
Earnings data suggests that there has been a substantial rise in L3/L2 wage inequality
that can be attributed to India’s economic liberalisation until 2006, with a late relative
catch-up of medium-skilled wages.
Figure 3.11 includes the means for Mumbai’s L3/L2 skill premium and its synthetic
control for the pre-treatment period 1982-1991, and for the early and later post-treatment
periods 1994-1997 and 2000-2009. While these decade means are nearly identical in the
pre-treatment period, the averages increasingly di↵er in the post-treatment periods.
3.5.3 Skill Premium for Medium-Skilled versus Low-Skilled Professions
L2/L1
The synthetic control group for the L2/L1 skill premium is made up of two cities, Madrid
(0.579) and Bogota (0.421). As before about half of the weighting stems from a developed
and half from an emerging market city. Figure 3.12 shows the path of Mumbai’s L2/L1
14The export volumes predictor variable was removed as its inclusion resulted in the optimisation algorithm
not producing a computational result.
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Figure 3.11: Skill premium path plots showing period means for Mumbai and its synthetic
control for skill ratio L3/L2
3.5 Results 101
skill premium, compared to its synthetic control. In contrast to the previous two skill
premium ratios, the synthetic control achieves only a moderate fit for the pre-treatment
period, and hence, the donor cities do not provide an ideal pool for the control group.15 We
observe diverging trends from 1991 onwards with Mumbai’s L2/L1 skill premium falling
below its synthetic control between 1994 and 2000, but rising above it from 2003 onwards.
This would indicate that wages in medium-skilled professions (L2) fell relatively to wages
in low-skilled professions (L1) in the first phase of India’s economic liberalisation, and
that this fall was sharper than the synthetic control suggests it would have been if no
liberalisation had taken place.
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Figure 3.12: Skill premium path plots for Mumbai and its synthetic control for skill ratio
L2/L1
After 2003, this e↵ect reversed. A possible explanation is that the initial steps of
liberalisation had a di↵erent impact on wages than the less dramatic, but ongoing opening
of the Indian economy. One can expect that the di↵erent factors influencing the skill premia
15Two predictor variables (population growth and 1988 skill premium level) were removed as their inclusion
worsened the pre-treatment fit.
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might take e↵ect at di↵erent phases during the economic opening process, in particular
as growth rates in India accelerated substantially in the later post-treatment period. For
example, mechanisms such as SBTC could be expected to impact the skill premium rather
more gradually than the more immediate e↵ects of tari↵ reductions.
3.5.4 Predictors and Predictor Weights
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the characteristics of Mumbai’s skill premium and its
predictors (as described above), and the fit of the predictors of the synthetic control group
as compared to the sample mean for the donor pool. In the optimisation process these
characteristics determine the weights of the predictors, which are shown in the last column.
Table 3.1: Mumbai and donor pool predictors
Treated Synthetic Donors SE Donors Weights
A. L3/L1 skill premium
Real GDP growth 5.184 3.166 3.090 0.316 0.006
Export volume growth 4.847 4.935 5.918 0.459 0.110
Import volume growth 3.388 4.036 5.411 0.551 0.027
Population growth 2.166 0.767 0.960 0.142 0.000
L3/L1 skill premium mean 2.548 2.555 2.762 0.204 0.513
L3/L1 skill premium growth 12.566 8.730 3.532 1.989 0.010
L3/L1 skill premium 1991 3.294 3.295 2.822 0.261 0.247
L3/L1 skill premium 1988 2.365 2.369 2.635 0.212 0.087
B. L3/L2 skill premium
Real GDP growth 5.184 3.265 3.090 0.316 0.001
Import volume growth 3.388 3.364 5.411 0.551 0.130
Population growth 2.166 0.714 0.960 0.142 0.000
L3/L2 skill premium mean 1.398 1.416 1.689 0.053 0.328
L3/L2 skill premium growth 3.105 1.287 2.563 1.920 0.079
L3/L2 skill premium 1988 1.667 1.639 1.650 0.053 0.208
L3/L2 skill premium 1991 1.321 1.337 1.722 0.086 0.254
C. L2/L1 skill premium
Real GDP growth 5.184 3.340 3.090 0.316 0.000
Export volume growth 4.847 6.915 5.918 0.459 0.019
Import volume growth 3.388 6.273 5.411 0.551 0.000
L2/L1 skill premium mean 1.851 1.885 1.621 0.097 0.641
L2/L1 skill premium growth 15.776 14.920 1.799 1.408 0.050
L2/L1 skill premium 1991 2.494 2.403 1.614 0.108 0.290
Notes: Columns display the values for the treated city (Mumbai), the mean values for the synthetic
control (as described in the text), the mean values for the complete donor pool, the standard error
of the mean for the complete donor pool, and the weights assigned for the matching.
For L3/L1 and L3/L2 an excellent pre-treatment fit is achieved, for L2/L1 the fit is
moderate. Overall this indicates that Mumbai’s data does not lie outside the convex hull
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of the donor data. Running the equivalent optimisation allowing only for cities in emerging
markets in the donor pool provides a significantly poorer fit (results not reported here).
In terms of predictor weights, the linear combinations of the pre-treatment skill premia
receive the highest weightings. For all three skill ratios the mean of the specific ratio over
the pre-treatment period receives the highest weighting and the 1991 ratio level the second
highest. For the other predictors no single one systematically receives a stronger weight.
3.5.5 Robustness Checks
To better understand the size and relevance of the deviations between the skill ratio trends
in Mumbai and its synthetic control group, we employ a series of placebo tests. These can
take on many di↵erent forms, for example, by reassigning the treatment to cities in which
no such treatment actually occurred (see Abadie et al., 2011, p. 14). We treat the other
cities as equivalent to Mumbai assuming treatment also to start in 1991. As recommended
in Abadie et al. (2010) and as implemented in Abadie et al. (2011) we exclude cities with
a poor fit for the pre-treatment period. This poor fit is usually due to the city’s data
lying close to the edge or outside the convex hull of the donor cities, i.e., having unusual
pre-treatment characteristics. These cities can be excluded without weakening the results
of the placebo study.
In figures 3.13 to 3.15 we plot the gaps of the placebo tests run on all other cities for
which the data is available and for which the optimisation process has a computational
result. The grey lines represent the gap between the (hypothetical) treatment and its
synthetic control outcome for each donor city. The black line represents the equivalent gap
for Mumbai. As seen in figure 3.13 for L3/L1, only two out of 19 placebo tests (10.5%) –
namely those for Johannesburg and Mexico City – show gaps that are larger than Mumbai’s
L3/L1 gaps at their respective absolute maxima. Singapore and Hong Kong’s gaps are also
large, but only comparable to Mumbai’s gaps in the early 2000s, not the larger gaps in the
late 2000s. This indicates that the relative decline in low-skilled versus high-skilled wages
and thus the rise in wage inequality in Mumbai from 1997 onwards is not only larger than
the synthetic control group would suggest, but also that this di↵erence is probably larger
than would be expected if the economic and trade liberalisation had not occurred.
For L3/L2 in figure 3.14, only Johannesburg shows up a larger absolute maximum gap
out of the 22 placebo comparisons (4.5%). Thus, not only does the rise in the L3/L2 skill
premium stand in contrast to the fall in skill premium of the synthetic control. The gap
between the two, in particular between 2000 and 2006, is also larger than the placebo tests
suggest would be the case if this was driven by chance, not by an actual treatment. By the
end of the post-treatment period the gap narrows to very low levels in the range of the
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Figure 3.13: Placebo test for the L3/L1 skill ratio
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Figure 3.14: Placebo test for the L3/L2 skill ratio
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average placebo results.
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Figure 3.15: Placebo test for the L2/L1 skill ratio
For L2/L1 in figure 3.15, four out of 24 placebo tests (16.6%) show gaps that are larger
(in absolute terms) than Mumbai’s gap at the respective extrema (Mexico City, Singapore,
Bogota and Manila). Thus, for L2/L1 too the placebo tests confirm that the estimated
gap for Mumbai is unusually large relative to the distribution of gaps for the donor pool
cities. This indicates that the relative decline in medium-skilled professions’ wages to
unskilled professions’ in the first phase of India’s economic liberalisation was sharper than
the synthetic control would suggest and probably larger than would be expected if no
treatment had taken place. The same is true for the relative rise in medium-skilled wages
versus low-skilled wages after 2003.
While the placebo tests suggest that the gaps in the skill premia between Mumbai and
its synthetic control are unusually large, these results are not fully conclusive, as a few
donor cities do show up similarly large gaps. Since the pre-and post-treatment periods span
over 25 years, we cannot exclude that individual cities in the donor pool have experienced
similarly dramatic changes comparable to India’s and that these had an impact on their
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skill premia, too. We therefore conclude that given fewer than one sixth of the placebo
runs produce larger gaps than Mumbai our e↵ects of liberalisation on wage inequality are
rather unlikely to have been produced by chance.
3.5.6 Alternative Approach: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences
As a second robustness check, we estimate the e↵ect of economic liberalisation on wage
inequality using a standard di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DID) approach. DID is based on the
idea of computing two di↵erences, one over time (before-after) and one across subjects
(treated-untreated). By subtracting the pre-treatment mean di↵erence of the outcome
between the treated and the untreated group from the post-treatment di↵erence, time-
invariant factors specific to only the treated or untreated units are accounted for, eliminating
the type of selection bias related to these time-invariant characteristics. However, the
DID method cannot account for time-variant factors, and thus the critical identifying
assumption is that the counterfactual trend in the treated unit is equivalent to the trend
in the control group.
The main di↵erences between the synthetic control group methodology and DID
are threefold: First, the former uses a data-driven process to create a control group
which approximates the most important characteristics of the treated unit during the
pre-treatment period. The composition of this synthetic control is transparent in that
the contribution of each available control unit and the similarity (or lack thereof) of the
synthetic control group to the treated unit before treatment is made explicit (Abadie et
al., 2011, p. 2). The latter permits the researcher to select a control group according to
what plausibly seems sensible (and, of course, what data is available). Second, the former
allows for the e↵ect of potentially unobserved characteristics that are not fixed over time,
while the latter corrects only for time-invariant characteristics. Third, DID generally uses
two distinct points in time on which the comparison is based, usually the period before the
treatment occurs, and a period after the treatment. If more pre- or post-treatment data is
available, this is averaged to one single pre-treatment and one single post-treatment value.
The synthetic control group is aimed at observing the e↵ects as they unfold over several
time periods.
As the selection of a control group for DID estimation can be done in many ways,
we here select examples of control groups that seem plausible and enable an interesting
comparison to the previous methodology: First, we use the synthetic control group that
was calculated previously, but now use DID methodology. Second, we use the average over
all donor cities available as our DID control group.
A simple DID can be calculated by di↵erencing the double di↵erences, or equivalently
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as we do it here, by finding the DID e↵ect by estimating the following equation with OLS:
Yi,t = ↵+  Ti +  Pt +  (Ti · Pt) + ✏i,t (3.1)
Yi,t is the skill premium in City i and Year t.
Ti is the binary variable (dummy) for treatment, = 1 if City i is Mumbai, else = 0.
Pt is the binary variable (dummy) for the period, = 0 for pre-treatment 1982-1991, = 1 for
post-treatment.
Ti · Pt is the interaction term.
↵,  ,   and   are regression variables to be estimated: ↵ (intercept) is the average skill
premium for the untreated control group in the pre-treatment period.   is the initial
di↵erence (i.e. di↵erence of pre-treatment averages) between treated and untreated units,
while   is the di↵erence of pre- and post-treatment averages for the untreated control
group. Finally, the coe cient of the interaction term,  , is the DID e↵ect that we are
interested in. It indicates the treatment e↵ect, i.e. the e↵ect that cannot be explained by
the control group.
Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences results for L3/L1
Using the synthetic control group calculated previously as the untreated group, and taking
the data over the complete sample period 1982-2009, the DID estimate for the treatment
e↵ect is 1.137. This can be calculated as follows (see table 3.2). The L3/L1 skill premium
ratio rose from its pre-treatment average of 2.548 to a post-treatment average of 3.436
(di↵erence +0.888). However, the skill premium of the control group fell from a pre-
treatment average of 2.555 to a post-treatment average of 2.306 (di↵erence -0.249). The
treatment e↵ect is the di↵erence-in-di↵erences, i.e., 0.888  ( 0.249) = 1.137.16 In figure
3.16, which includes both the DID and the synthetic control group results, one of the
important di↵erences between these two approaches becomes clear: DID is a more crude
measure of the liberalisation e↵ect because it distinguishes only pre- and post-treatment
averages and does not explain the development over time. Nonetheless, the DID results
confirm those of the synthetic control group methodology.
Using the complete donor pool as the untreated group, the DID treatment e↵ect
becomes a bit smaller at 0.963 (= 0.888  ( 0.075), see the last row of table 3.2).17 In this
case, the average skill premium of the control group falls by less, or, put di↵erently, there
is a larger pre-treatment di↵erence between Mumbai and the control group, pointing to a
16See table D.1 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
17See table D.2 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
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Table 3.2: DID results for skill premium ratio L3/L1
1982-1991 1992-2009 Di↵erence
(1) Mumbai 2.548 3.436 0.888
(2) Synthetic Control 2.555 2.306 -0.249
(3) Complete donor pool 2.762 2.687 -0.075
Di↵erence (1)-(2) -0.007 1.130 1.137
Di↵erence (1)-(3) -0.214 0.749 0.963
DID
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Sk
ill 
pr
em
ium
 L
3/
L1
Mumbai
Synthetic control
Figure 3.16: Skill premium path plots showing pre- and post-treatment means for Mumbai
and its synthetic control for skill ratio L3/L1
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potential problem when assuming equal time trends in these groups (see figure 3.17). For
the synthetic control group discussed above, the pre-treatment di↵erence is practically and
statistically not distinguishable from zero.
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Figure 3.17: Skill premium path plots showing pre- and post-treatment means for Mumbai
and the control group (complete donor pool) for skill ratio L3/L1
Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences results for L3/L2
For L3/L2, using the synthetic control group yields a DID estimate for the treatment
e↵ect of 0.382 (see table 3.3).18 While the average skill premium of the control group rises
slightly (+0.071), Mumbai’s skill premium rises by more, leaving a still clear treatment
e↵ect in the L3/L2 skill premium, i.e., an increase in urban wage inequality. When the
complete donor pool is used as the control group, the DID treatment e↵ect is 0.477.19 In
this case, the average skill premium of the control group fell only very slightly (-0.024),
and thus the full rise in Mumbai’s skill premium is attributed to the treatment. Again, the
18See table D.3 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
19See table D.4 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
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DID results broadly confirm our results from the synthetic control group methodology, but
without providing detail regarding the development of the treatment e↵ect over time.
Table 3.3: DID results for skill premium ratio L3/L2
1982-1991 1992-2009 Di↵erence
(1) Mumbai 1.399 1.852 0.453
(2) Synthetic Control 1.416 1.486 0.071
(3) Complete donor pool 1.689 1.665 -0.024
Di↵erence (1)-(2) -0.017 0.366 0.382
Di↵erence (1)-(3) -0.290 0.187 0.477
Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences results for L2/L1
For the L2/L1 skill premium ratio, we calculate the DID e↵ect once for the post-treatment
period 1994-2003 and once for 2006-2009 (see table 3.4). Using the synthetic control group
and taking the data over the sample period 1982-2003, the DID estimate for the treatment
e↵ect is -0.550.20 While the average skill premium of the control group rises (+0.244),
Mumbai’s post-treatment average L2/L1 skill premium falls from 1.851 to 1.545, resulting
in a clearly negative treatment e↵ect. In contrast, for the post-treatment period 2006-2009
Mumbai’s average L2/L1 skill premium rose (+0.590), while the control group’s fell (-0.238)
relative to the pre-treatment levels, resulting in a treatment e↵ect of +0.828.21
When the complete donor pool is used as the control group over the time period
1982-2003, the DID treatment e↵ect is -0.322.22 The rise in the average skill level of the
complete donor pool is smaller than that of the synthetic control of the previous section,
resulting in a slightly smaller treatment e↵ect for Mumbai. For the post-treatment period
2006-2009 the DID treatment e↵ect indicates a rise in the skill premium of 0.689.23 As
before, there is a di↵erence between the DID e↵ect in the complete donor pool and for the
synthetic control group indicating a potential violation of the common trends assumption.
3.6 Discussion
Using data from the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys from 1982 to 2009, we find that
in a first phase after the 1991 liberalisation in India medium-skilled wages fell relative
20See table D.5 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
21See table D.6 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
22See table D.7 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
23See table D.8 in appendix D for the detailed regression results.
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Table 3.4: DID results for skill premium ratio L2/L1
1982-1991 1992-2003 Di↵erence 2006-2009 Di↵erence
(1) Mumbai 1.851 1.545 -0.306 2.441 0.590
(2) Synthetic Control 1.885 2.129 0.244 1.647 -0.238
(3) Complete donor pool 1.621 1.638 0.017 1.522 -0.099
Di↵erence (1)-(2) -0.034 -0.584 -0.550 0.794 0.828
Di↵erence (1)-(3) -0.230 -0.552 -0.322 0.459 0.689
to high- and low-skilled wages. Our synthetic control group shows that these losses were
stronger than would have been expected if no reforms had been implemented. This implies
a reduction in medium- to low-skilled wage inequality, but an increase in high- to medium-
skilled inequality. From the late 1990s onwards, growth of high-skilled workers’ wages
outpaced both other groups. This suggests that after the first steps of liberalisation, new
forces of globalization started to act on relative wages. We find some evidence that in
a third phase, from the second half of the 2000s, medium-skilled wages accelerated and
by 2009 had compensated for the previous losses relative to high-skilled wages. Versus
the low-skilled, medium-skilled workers were even able to overcompensate earlier losses
relative to what would have been expected without treatment. Of course, the further
away from the initial steps of liberalisation in 1991 we move, the more sensitive the results
get to secondary influences that, in fact, may have had little to do with India’s economic
liberalisation, and hence we place a cautionary mark on these very long-term results.
Regarding the medium-term impacts of India’s economic liberalisation, our study points
to a possible explanation of the diverging results in the previous literature. On the one
hand, we confirm Kijima (2006) who found accelerating wage inequality between the
high-skilled and low-skilled wages in the 1990s as measured by the 90th versus the 10th
wage quantile. On the other hand, recalling the decline in medium-skilled relative to
low-skilled wages during the initial post-liberalisation phase we also provide a potential
explanation for Kumar and Mishra’s (2008) result of falling wage inequality in some
manufacturing sectors. While most studies distinguish only between skilled and unskilled
workers, and group together a large number of di↵erent sectors, our results suggest that
di↵erent levels of skill, such as in our case low-, medium- and high-skilled workers were
likely impacted very di↵erently. Therefore, a more disaggregated analysis seems likely to
be more informative than the general definitions often used in the literature to define the
skill premia, a promising direction for future research.
Regarding the methodological aspects of our study, we emphasise the importance of
control group selection to suitably capture wage inequality trends under the counterfactual
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scenario of no liberalisation. Constructing a synthetic control group for a narrowly defined
treatment region, namely the city of Mumbai, turns out to be a favourable approach to
avoid a number of problems like urban/rural di↵erences in sector compositions, diverging
skill requirements across professions and countries, etc. While we used DID as a robustness
check for the synthetic control group methodology, there are several di↵erences between
the two approaches that should be highlighted. First, the latter uses a data-driven process
to create a control group which approximates the most important characteristics of the
treated unit during the pre-treatment period. The composition of this synthetic control
is transparent in that the contribution of each available control unit and the similarity
(or lack thereof) of the synthetic control group to the treated unit before treatment is
made explicit (Abadie et al., 2011, p. 2). Second, the synthetic control group allows for the
e↵ect of potentially unobserved characteristics that are not fixed over time, while DID only
corrects for time-invariant characteristics. Third, standard DID uses two distinct points
in time on which the comparison is based, usually averages over the periods before and
after the treatment. If more pre- or post-treatment data is available such an approach
neglects the additional time variation. The synthetic control group methodology is aimed
at exactly that, i.e., observing the e↵ects as they unfold over time.
As the selection of controls for DID estimation can be done in many ways, we confined
ourselves to two examples: First, we used the synthetic control group as determined before
and then calculated the treatment e↵ect using standard DID. Second, we used all donor
cities as the DID control. Our results suggest that by using the synthetic control group
most of the pre-treatment di↵erences to Mumbai disappear, whereas with the complete set
of donor cities we observe important discrepancies in pre-treatment characteristics. These
di↵erences may be critical regarding the DID identifying assumption of equal time trends
in the treatment and the control group (which possibly explains the di↵erent estimates of
the treatment e↵ect). While the DID comparison with the synthetic control group tends
to be more credible than using all donor cities, with standard DID we still forego the
detailed information on the di↵erential time trends. For a critical evaluation of the impact
of India’s economic liberalisation on wage inequality, we therefore argue that the synthetic
control group methodology is a suitable and promising approach. Even if one extends the
basic DID framework to allow for flexible post-treatment trends, we still recommend using
the synthetic control group methodology as a data pre-processing device to make the DID
assumptions more plausible.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyse the impact on the skill premium of far-reaching economic and
trade liberalisation following India’s dramatic balance-of-payments crisis in the early 1990s.
As urban and rural areas are a↵ected very di↵erently by trade opening, we focus on urban
wage inequality and the city of Mumbai, an important trading hub, using data from the
UBS Prices and Earnings surveys from 1982 to 2009. We address the identification problem
of the unobserved counterfactual outcome - i.e. the development of skill premia in Mumbai
if no economic reforms had taken place - by employing the method of the synthetic control
group, as proposed in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in Abadie, Diamond
and Hainmueller (2010). We use a broad group of 35 other large cities, including many
trading centres in emerging markets, to construct the synthetic control.
We see two main conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis. First, India’s
economic and trade liberalisation starting in the early 1990s had very di↵erential impacts
on skill premia, both over time and over skill levels. The most striking result probably is the
large increase in wage inequality of high-skilled versus low-skilled professions. Second, the
results from both the synthetic control group method and DID suggest that a significant part
of this increase in wage inequality can be attributed to India’s liberalisation. While DID
provides rather uninformative results, the synthetic control group methodology suggests
that this overall rise in inequality was not a one-way process because we find some periods
in which measures of wage inequality were stable, or even falling. Overall, we emphasise
the careful selection of a suitable control group in the analysis of liberalisation e↵ects and
encourage a more detailed analysis of wage inequality by multiple skill levels in the future.
Appendices
Appendix A
UBS Prices and Earnings Survey
This appendix introduces and describes the UBS Prices and Earnings dataset, in particular
focussing on the data subset related to the labour market.1 This dataset has been lauded
from several corners,2 but has not been exploited much in the academic literature. As this
dataset has been reworked and reformatted and as detailed information is provided on it
here, it is likely to become more accessible and valuable for future academic research.
A.1 Overview
In 1970 the Chief Economist of Union Bank of Switzerland, the forerunner to today’s
Swiss bank UBS, on a trip to New York realised the value of being able to compare the
prices of goods and services internationally, especially within the context of local wage
levels. Starting in 1970 the bank therefore commissioned its economics research department
to do a survey of international prices and wages every three years, producing a dataset
which displays remarkable consistency over the last 40 years. This consistency over time
is backed by unusual global comparability, as in each country the survey was conducted
contemporaneously with an identical questionnaire and comparable methods.
This time-consistency/global-comparability is the key distinguishing feature of the UBS
Prices and Earnings dataset. In contrast, the vast majority of long-term international wage
1The information in this section is largely drawn from the original UBS Prices and Earnings survey
questionnaires and publications.
2For instance, John O’Connor praises the UBS Prices and Earnings data and lists several of its characteristics
that he believes provide a useful guide as to how the World Bank’s International Comparison Program
(ICP) could improve its approach. Referring to the ICP’s calculation of PPP’s he concludes that “(t)he
weakest link at present is the income approach, which only UBS has tried to tackle” (O’Connor, 2008, p.
9).
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comparisons are based on country data that stem from each country’s national statistical
o ces, or other local sources. Data in these comparisons tend to vary from country to
country exhibiting both known di↵erences, for which adjustments can sometimes be made,
and unknown di↵erences that may never be identified. Many inconsistencies between
the data of di↵erent countries are, for instance, due to di↵ering compositions of markets,
indexes, baskets, di↵erent definitions of prices, wages, and preferences, di↵erent time
spans or dates of the surveys and di↵erent motives for data collection. These problems
are side-stepped by the UBS approach of using identical questionnaires resulting in the
measurement of a uniform basket of goods and services, and of the measurement of labour
market data for comparable “representative” workers across the globe. The main drawback,
clearly, is the lack of adaptation to local preferences and characteristics of local labour
markets, which is discussed in more detail in section A.3.
A.2 Description: UBS Prices and Earnings Survey
From 1970 the UBS Prices and Earnings survey collected data every three years on approx-
imately 122 standardised goods and services (approx. 95 goods, 27 services) and earnings
data from professions in the manufacturing and services sector from 31 cities around the
world in 1970, growing to 71 cities in 2009. The survey now yields over 30 000 data points
which are merged into some 80 published aggregates per city.
The major variables surveyed in the “Earnings” section of the survey are gross annual
wages, taxes and social security contributions, yielding net annual wages. Additionally,
weekly working hours and days of paid annual holiday are collected. Professions surveyed
were selected based on two criteria. First, they had to constitute a representative cross-
section of the workforce in the manufacturing and service sectors. Second, the professions
needed to be common in most metropolitan centres around the world and it had to be
possible to define and consistently capture the data globally. The indicators include data
for five professions in 1970, rising to twelve occupations in 1979, with fourteen professions
surveyed in 2009. Except for the expansion in the number of cities and professions surveyed,
the questionnaire on earnings has remained largely unchanged since 1970. However, data
is not available for all cities in all years and especially the data on daily working hours and
paid leave days is not complete for all professions and all years.
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A.3 Methodology
As mentioned above, the main di↵erence in methodology between the UBS Prices and
Earnings data and other international datasets is the fact that the UBS data is based on a
uniform survey across all cities, which has remained largely unchanged since 1970. The
second significant di↵erence is that UBS does not attempt to provide country estimates,
but only provides data for selected cities, which in part justifies a smaller data sample.
While it seems sensible to compare countries rather than cities, many databases used for
country comparisons must often also make do with data primarily from urban areas – less
a✏uent regions and rural areas are frequently poorly represented (cf. O’Connor, 2008,
p. 3, and Van Ark and Monnikhof, 2000, p. 6↵). Thus, the UBS data is likely to prove
quite similar to some country data, while being more explicit about its lack of country
representativeness.
Conducting the Survey In each survey year UBS recruits local surveyors – mostly
three to four independent surveyors could be found in each city through the bank’s own
network of employees, through correspondent banks, consumer organisations, chambers of
commerce, universities and members of the student organisation AIESEC. The surveyors
receive detailed instructions on how to proceed with the survey, including the time frame
during which the survey is to be conducted,3 for which types of businesses prices and wage
data are to be collected, how value-added tax, rebates etc. should be treated, and which
product quality range should be selected. With regard to the labour market information,
surveyors are instructed to request data from representative companies of the specific sectors.
Once the survey data has been received, the data points are scanned for outliers. If
outliers are found the relevant surveyor is contacted in order to clarify the relevant data
point. If it is not possible to clarify the questions on the data point, it is omitted from
further analysis. The remaining data for each survey item are averaged across surveyors.
Aggregates are constructed for most categories within the “Prices” section of the surveys
and for some sections, including the surveyed wages, the averaged values are rounded.
In 1976 for the first time the data was evaluated “with the help of a computer”, as is
proudly stated in that year’s publication, from 2000 onwards an Access database has been
employed. The data for each survey year is published in the booklets “UBS Prices and
Earnings Around the Globe”, later simply “UBS Prices and Earnings” – these data form
the basis of the dataset used in chapters 1 to 3. When a data range was provided in the
3See table A.1 on page 119 for the time frame of each survey.
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Table A.1: Survey periods: UBS Prices and Earnings
Edition Survey year Survey months, if specified
1 1970 July
2 1973 July - August
3 1976 May - June
4 1979 June - July
5 1982 March - April
6 1985 March - April
7 1988 April - May
8 1991 April - May
9 1994 2nd quarter
10 1997 2nd quarter
11 2000 2nd quarter
12 2003 February - March
13 2006 February - April
14 2009 March
UBS Prices and Earnings publications, the mid-point of the range was selected as the data
point for the dataset. If the mid-point seemed not to provide a plausible value (e.g. the
data range was very wide), the data point was omitted.
The measures are provided in USD as converted from local currency using the average
market exchange rate during the period of the survey. Expressing wage data in US dollars as
converted by market exchange rates has the advantage of providing a clear-cut comparison
of current prices expressed in current US dollars, allowing analyses across time and space.
It does, however, not take into account di↵ering price levels and therefore purchasing power
in global comparisons. Therefore, for certain applications the UBS Prices and Earnings
data must be adjusted to reflect purchasing power, by using appropriate conversion rates,
for instance, those provided in the Penn World Tables.
A.4 Definitions of Indicators and Professions
In the following we provide the definitions of the labour market indicators in the UBS
Prices and Earnings surveys and the precise descriptions of the professions surveyed in
each year.
A.4 Definitions of Indicators and Professions 120
A.4.1 Indicators
Gross annual income Gross annual income (sum of hourly, weekly or monthly
earnings) taking into account family status and tax allowances including all fringe benefits
such as profit participation, bonuses, vacation money, additional monthly salaries as bonus
payments, allowances for children etc., but excluding overtime compensation.
Taxes Amount of income taxes due (to federal and state or local authorities) on the
listed annual gross income with allowance made for dependants and generally permitted
deductions.
Social insurance contributions Mandatory contributions payable by employee
(calculated on listed annual gross income) for government old age, survivors, disability and
unemployment insurance and for government health insurance. Also included are employee
contributions to company-sponsored health insurance, pension fund etc., if they are locally
or nationally common practice.
Weekly working hours Normal number of working hours per week stipulated in
employment contract, without overtime. In the case of the primary school teacher, the
number of hours of instruction including the related preparatory hours are surveyed.
Note: Comparability of working hours of primary school teachers in the data is limited
as some data include preparation time, while others only indicate the actual hours of
school lessons. Information on paid vacation days and legal holidays is also patchy for this
profession.
Paid vacations Number of paid working days per year.
Legal holidays Number of paid legal holidays per year.
Note: Paid vacation days and legal (public) holidays are aggregated and published as
“vacation per year”. These data have not been published in all editions of the UBS Prices
and Earnings publication, but the data has been made available and is included in the
dataset.
A.4.2 Professions
This section provides an overview of the professions surveyed. As mentioned above, pro-
fessions surveyed were selected based on two criteria. First, they had to constitute a
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representative cross-section of the workforce in the manufacturing and service sectors. Sec-
ond, the professions needed to be common in most metropolitan centres around the world
and it had to be possible to define and consistently capture the data globally. While the
descriptions mostly define gender, educational level, years of experience, approximate age
and family status, these data are di↵erent to micro-economic household survey data in that
they provide information from actual companies on representative agents, not actual agents.
Not all characteristics of the “representative agents” listed below are explicitly listed
in the survey questionnaire for all professions. “NA” marks where they are not explicitly
listed. Where the profession is considered to be primarily held by female workers, “implied
female” is assumed, else “implied male” is assumed. The skills levels listed below are
ascribed by the author (not the survey) based on the following breakdown:
Level 1: Obligatory / statutory schooling only; largely unskilled labour; very limited
training.
Level 2: Obligatory / statutory schooling plus full apprenticeship or extensive practical
training. Or completed high school and some practical training.
Level 3: Completed high school and university or college education.
Somewhat di↵erent training levels can exist for professions across countries so that this
attribution is simplified, but it nonetheless provides a good first approximation in defining
skill levels. The professions listed below are enumerated according to how long they have
been included in the survey, with those included since 1970 appearing first.
1) Primary school teacher: Teaching in the state (also “public” / “government”)
school system (not private schools) for about 10 years; approx. 35 years old, married, two
children.
Survey inclusion: Included in all surveys 1970 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied female
On the job experience in years: 10
Age: 35
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 3
Note: 1970: 5 years experience, aged approx. 30
Note: 1970-1992: no children
A.4 Definitions of Indicators and Professions 122
Note: Comparability of working hours of primary school teachers in the data is limited
as some data include preparation time, while others only indicate the actual hours of
school lessons. Information on paid vacation days and legal holidays is also patchy for
this profession. For information on working hours for the other professions, see section A.5.2.
2) Bus driver: Employed by the municipal transportation system (also “public”, or
“municipal transport operator”), about 10 years driving experience; about 35 years old,
married, two children.
Survey inclusion: Included in all surveys 1970 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 10
Age: 35
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 1
Note: Fully consistent description over time.
3) Automobile (“car”) mechanic: With completed apprenticeship and about 5
years of experience; 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in all surveys 1970 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 5
Age: 25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
Note: Fully consistent description over time.
4) Construction worker / building labourer: Unskilled or semi-skilled labourer;
about 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in all surveys 1970 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: NA
Age: 25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
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Skills level ascribed to profession: 1
Note: Fully consistent description over time.
5) Bank teller or bank credit clerk: Completed bank training and has about 10
years of experience (in a bank); approx. 35 years old, married with 2 children.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1970 – 2009.
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 10
Age: 35
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
Note: 1970-1991: “Bank teller” (but detailed description as above)
Note: 1994-2009: “Bank credit clerk / o cer” (but detailed description as above)
6) Secretary: Secretary (“personal assistant”) to a department manager in an indus-
trial company (“firm” or “organisation”), about 5 years experience (shorthand, typing, PC
skills (“computer knowledge”), one foreign language); about 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1970 – 2009
Gender: female
On the job experience in years: 5
Age: 25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
Note: 1970: 3 years experience, around 22 years old
Note: 1970-1991: no “PC skills” or “computer knowledge” required
Note: 1994-2000: “industrial or commercial company”
Note: 2003-2009: “industrial or service company”; “shorthand” not required anymore
7) Department manager in industry: Operational head (“operations manager”,
“technical manager”, or just “head”) of a production department (more than 100 employees)
in a sizable company of the metal working industry; completed vocational training with
many years of experience in the field; about 40 years old, married, two children.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1973 – 2009.
Gender: NA / implied male
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On the job experience in years: 15+
Age: 40
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 3
Note: 1973: “Personnel Manager in an industrial organisation with about 1000 employees”;
one child
Note: 1976-1991: no children
8) Skilled industrial worker: Skilled mechanic (“worker”) with vocational training
and about 10 years experience with a large company in the metal working industry; about
35 years old, married, two children.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1976 – 2009.
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 10
Age: 35
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
Note: 1976-1988: “Toolmaker / Lathe operator” (but detailed description as above)
Note: 1991: “Machinist” (but detailed description as above)
9) Female factory worker: Unskilled or semi-skilled (machine) operator in a medium-
sized company (“plant”, “mill”), mainly in the textile industry; about 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1976 – 2009
Gender: female
On the job experience in years: NA
Age: 25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 1
Note: 1976-1991: “Textile worker (female)” (but detailed description as above)
Note: 1994-2000: “Industrial worker (female)” (but detailed description as above)
10) Female sales assistant: Female sales assistant (“Saleswoman”) employed in a
women’s clothing section (“ladies wear”) of a large department store; sales training plus
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some years of sales experience; about 20 to 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1979 – 2009
Gender: female
On the job experience in years: 5
Age: 20-25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 1
Note: 1979-1991: aged 20 to 24
Note: 1979-1991: some training but not specifically sales training
11) Electrical engineer: Employed by an industrial firm in the electrical engineering
sector; university or technical college graduate with at least 5 years’ of work experience,
about 35 years old, married, two children.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1979 – 2009.
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 5-10
Age: 35
Children: 2
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 3
Note: 1979-1991: no children
Note: 1997-2009: “Engineer”, “electrical” not explicitly mentioned
Note: 1979-2003; “in the machinery or electrical equipment industry, electric power com-
pany or similar”
12) Cook: Works in the kitchen of a good restaurant or hotel with a fairly large sta↵.
His position is that of the deputy of the Chief Cook or Chef de Partie, supervising 2-3
cooks; completed vocational training as cook and has about 10 years of experience; approx.
30 years old, single. / Salary data include value of free meals and lodging, if such are
provided.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 1979 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: 10
Age: 30
Children: 0
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Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
13) Product Manager: Employed in the pharmaceuticals, chemicals or food industry,
middle-management position, university or technical college graduate with at least 5 years’
experience in the field; about 35 years old, married, no children.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 2003 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied female
On the job experience in years: 5+
Age: 35
Children: 0
Marital status: married
Skills level ascribed to profession: 3
Note: Fully consistent description over time.
14) Call centre agents: Trained agent at an inbound call / service centre, e.g. in the
telecommunications or technology sector, about 25 years old, single.
Survey inclusion: Included in surveys 2006 – 2009
Gender: NA / implied male
On the job experience in years: NA
Age: 25
Children: 0
Marital status: single
Skills level ascribed to profession: 2
Note: Fully consistent description over time.
A.5 Important Characteristics, Strengths and Limitations
“A more mundane but no less important lesson learned is that data issues are important.
One cannot reliably know what data tell us if one does not first understand data limitations
and strengths. Such an understanding requires thorough knowledge of how data surveys are
constructed and attention to a host of measurement and estimation issues.”
Barry T. Hirsch (2008, p. 16)
In the following sections we review the strengths and limitations of the UBS data, often
juxtaposing with characteristics of alternative sources of data for international comparisons.
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A.5.1 Strengths
Time consistency and international comparability As discussed above, these
are the key distinguishing features of the UBS Prices and Earnings data – and also their
most important strength. Linked to this is the advantage that no third party sources are
involved.
No third party sources involved The UBS Prices and Earnings dataset in itself
does not rely on third party statistical sources, or on data that has been collected through
di↵ering systems and using diverging methods, such as national or labour account statistics,
or household or firm-level surveys. It sidesteps the problems of di↵ering compositions of in-
dexes, baskets, di↵erent definitions of prices, wages, and preferences, di↵ering structures of
markets, di↵erent time spans or dates of the surveys and di↵erent motives for data collection.
These present major hurdles to many alternative data sources. While national account
statistics are largely harmonised internationally, they still di↵er sharply in nature and
quality of the statistics. Labour accounts, which are usually derived from population
or labour force surveys, are mostly even less harmonised internationally than national
accounts systems (see Van Ark and Monnikhof, 2000, p. 4). Salverda, Nolan, and Smeed-
ing (2009, p. 76) mention a number of factors that “impinge on data comparability” in
micro-level data, for instance, di↵erences in the source of data (e.g. household surveys,
administrative archives, income tax records), the treatment of people entering and leaving
the population, bottom- and top-coding of data in the course of collection of the data
(see, for instance, Ryscavage, 1995, regarding the US Current Population Survey) or by
researchers aiming to reduce noise (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1996; Burkhauser et al.,
2007), and problematic methods of ranking household survey observations. Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2004, p. 5) remind of the scrutiny households surveys have come under
due to the “suspected increase in the non-response rates of richer households”, which
in particular make them less suitable for assessing inequality. In terms of international
comparisons they emphasise that “the design of the surveys from developing countries often
changes from year to year, making comparisons across years di cult”, citing Colombia
as an example (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, p. 6).4 A further alternative to the UBS
data could be seen in firm level data. In these the information on worker and job-type
characteristics is, however, mostly much more limited than both in household surveys
and the UBS data, resulting in researchers frequently only being able to distinguish
4See the papers on poverty measurement by Ravallion (2003) and Deaton (2003) for a detailed discussion
on the inconsistencies in the design of household surveys.
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between production and non-production workers. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, p. 20)
see this lack of accuracy in the measurement of skills as a major drawback of firm-level data.
Many measurement problems are also known to exist in data that has been assimilated
from di↵erent sources, for instance, di culties in taking into account the inconsistently
measured services sector, or the diverging weighting systems, which are frequently adjusted
at di↵erent intervals (see, for instance, Van Ark and Monnikhof, 2000, p. 2). These
di↵erences and inconsistencies are particularly important, when levels are compared, as
described below.
Levels, as well as growth rates When growth rates are compared over time –
if distortions remain constant over the period – the impact of errors is more limited.
Maddison (1996), for example, suggests that over the past 40 to 50 years distortions in
growth measures of OECD countries due to non-comparability of the data account for “less
than 0.2% a year (and) should probably not be regarded as significant” (Maddison, 1996,
p. 30). While levels are more sensitive to errors they clearly are more informative and are
useful in a larger number of applications. The fact that the UBS data is available in level
terms, and not only in growth rates, distinguishes it from other databases.
USD or local currency The original UBS Prices and Earnings data is provided in
current USD as converted from local currencies using the average market exchange rates
during the periods of each survey. However, local currency values can be calculated based
on the original conversion rates.
Wages include private sector employment Mainly due to confidentially concerns
and di culties in surveying, many data sources provide only data on public sector wages
(if wage data is supplied at all), omitting private sector professions. As public sector wages
are often not representative of the labour market, e.g. due to factors such as generous
pension and holiday allowances, and higher job security, the provision of data on private
sector employment in the UBS data is another positive.
A.5.2 Limitations
Uniform basket Many researchers who have specialised in international data com-
parisons will see the UBS Prices and Earnings data’s largest weakness in its use of a
uniform basket of goods, services and professions across countries. Clearly, the lack of
adaptation to local preferences, idiosyncrasies and market characteristics can be seen as a
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strong drawback. If the desire is to compare baskets that in each case are adapted to the
local environment, then comparing data from the national statistical o ces will usually be
more appropriate. In this sense, the UBS data fills a di↵erent gap: For the labour market
survey professions were selected that exist in most large cities and are representative of
both the service and manufacturing sectors – for these professions the UBS data is highly
comparable. However, clearly, the data does not provide for di↵erences in the structure of
labour markets, as household survey data would. This means that this wage data cannot
be assumed to represent all professions within a city.
Gerschenkron e↵ects Related to the selection of a uniform basket is the possible
occurrence of Gerschenkron e↵ects: The negative correlation between prices and volumes
in consumer demand patterns means that the overrepresentation of less common goods
can result in indices being biased (see, for instance, Jonas and Sardy, 1970). However, this
di culty is not specific to the UBS Prices and Earnings data; rather it is a pertinacious
problem of index numbers that commonly arises especially when comparing economies at
di↵erent levels of development, or in rapid development.
Cities, not countries The UBS surveys are done in specific cities only, and do not
necessarily reflect each country’s situation as a whole. While it would be more useful to
compare countries rather than cities, many databases used for country comparisons must
often also make do with data primarily from urban areas – less a✏uent regions and rural
areas are frequently poorly represented (see, for instance, O’Connor, 2008, p. 3, and Van
Ark and Monnikhof, 2000, p. 6↵).
Frequency Conducted only every three years, the UBS Prices and Earnings survey
provides earnings data that will not easily show up short-run changes in relative wages,
e.g. due to economic shocks, as these might not be captured. Rather, the data are likely
to show up long run, general equilibrium e↵ects that spread over several years (e.g. wage
e↵ects stemming from the dynamic indirect link from trade, to growth, to income).
No reflection of total labour costs for employers Labour compensation data
in the UBS Prices and Earnings dataset show representative gross and net earnings of
employees for di↵erent professions in current prices. The data, however, do not reflect total
labour costs of employers, as taxes and social security contributions that are paid directly
by the employer to the state, as well as other labour costs (such as insurances) are not
captured.
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Manufacturing and services, not agriculture As the surveys are undertaken in
major metropolitan centres around the world, professions were selected to be representative
of both the manufacturing and services sectors (with about half of professions in either
sector), and based on the existence and comparability of these professions across major
cities. No data from the agricultural sector is included. Thus, in particular for countries
with large agricultural sectors, the wage data of the UBS Prices and Earnings surveys
should not be assumed to reflect the country as a whole.
The two above data characteristics are largely comparable with the characteristics of
labour market data based on wage indices (in contrast to full compensation measures),
as wage or earnings indices typically exclude employers’ contributions to tax and social
security and often refer to certain types of workers, or specific economic activities, usually
excluding the agricultural sector.5
Sampling and data gaps A weakness of the UBS data is the fact that for each data
point published usually only three to four sampling points will have been gathered, i.e. in
each city three to four independent surveyors will have provided one sampling point each.
This is only slightly improved by the screening for and exclusion of outliers. Also, the data
shows significant data gaps: The first is the surprising inconsistency in the selection of
cities for each survey – cities will sometimes have appeared in the survey for many years,
then suddenly disappear (e.g. Panama City 1976-2000, Houston 1988-2000, Du¨sseldorf
1970-1994), while others will only be included for one specific year, and never again (e.g.
Vaduz 2006, Lugano 2003, Basel 2003). While explanations are sometimes given, e.g. Berlin
replaced Du¨sseldorf after the fall of the Berlin wall, it becomes clear from these selections
that the surveys were each time focusing on providing a once-o↵ comparison of data around
the globe, and not intentionally working on building time series data. Of the 35 cities
that appeared in every, or nearly every survey, 17 are in Europe, six in Latin America,
five in North America, four in Asia, one in Africa, one in the Middle East and one in Aus-
tralia. Table A.3 on pages 132 to 134 shows which cities were included in which survey years.
The second significant data gap is the data on working hours and number of holidays for
primary school teachers. While weekly working hours for this profession are not provided at
all in 1970, the subsequent publications mostly state that where weekly working hours are
given for teachers, comparability is limited as preparation work was sometimes excluded,
sometimes included.
5Cf. Van Ark and Monnikhof (2000, p. 6↵).
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Comparability of working hours Looking at working hours more broadly, the
UBS survey measures paid working hours (i.e. those contractually agreed), thus unpaid
and paid overtime is generally excluded. This problem is encountered in all attempts at
international comparisons of working hours and Van Ark and Monnikhof (2000, p. 4), for
example, state that “(c)omprehensive estimates of annual working hours are di cult to
obtain and their international comparability is limited”, in particular citing the di culty in
measuring hours actually worked versus paid hours. While not reflecting “the whole truth”,
paid working hours measured by UBS vary sharply between countries and do provide very
insightful information as to the working conditions of actual labour markets.
A.6 Conclusion
The UBS Prices and Earnings dataset is unique in its high comparability across a broad
range of countries and its consistency over time. Nonetheless, this data is not suitable
for all applications and strengths and limitations must be considered before selecting this
dataset as a source.
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Table B.1: Profession-level wage growth regressed on initial real GDP per capita with city
fixed e↵ects for 1970-2009, and the sub-periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 (Amsterdam=baseline)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS + OLS + OLS +
Fixed e↵ects Fixed e↵ects Fixed e↵ects
(City) (City) (City)
1970-2009 1970-1988 1988-2009
Total period Estimated Estimated
separately separately
(balanced) (unbalanced) (unbalanced)
Intercept 1/ 2 -0.065 (0.108) -0.212 (0.205) -0.016 (0.282)
Ln GDP/capita 1970 / 1988 0.010 (0.011) 0.028 (0.020) 0.003 (0.027)
factor(City)Athens 0.017 (0.008)* 0.018 (0.017) 0.012 (0.019)
factor(City)Bangkok 0.029 (0.058)
factor(City)Bogota 0.025 (0.021) 0.052 (0.039) 0.007 (0.047)
factor(City)Brussels 0.011 (0.006). 0.023 (0.011)* -0.001 (0.008)
factor(City)Buenos Aires 0.027 (0.013)* 0.002 (0.025) 0.050 (0.037)
factor(City)Cairo 0.090 (0.069)
factor(City)Caracas -0.010 (0.033)
factor(City)Chicago 0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.008) 0.006 (0.006)
factor(City)Copenhagen 0.007 (0.005) 0.009 (0.010) 0.004 (0.007)
factor(City)Dublin 0.019 (0.017)
factor(City)Duesseldorf 0.011 (0.010)
factor(City)Frankfurt 0.003 (0.007)
factor(City)Geneva -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007)
factor(City)Helsinki 0.015 (0.007)* 0.019 (0.013) 0.013 (0.008).
factor(City)Hong Kong 0.039 (0.014)** 0.071 (0.026)** 0.014 (0.010)
factor(City)Istanbul -0.001 (0.043)
factor(City)Jakarta 0.021 (0.075)
factor(City)Johannesburg 0.000 (0.017) 0.015 (0.032) 0.003 (0.046)
factor(City)Kuala Lumpur 0.036 (0.049)
factor(City)Lisbon 0.015 (0.013) 0.012 (0.024) 0.033 (0.021)
factor(City)London 0.020 (0.007)** 0.036 (0.013)** 0.009 (0.009)
factor(City)Los Angeles 0.009 (0.006)
factor(City)Luxembourg 0.012 (0.004)** 0.018 (0.007)* 0.003 (0.010)
factor(City)Madrid 0.008 (0.008) 0.004 (0.016) 0.020 (0.013)
factor(City)Manama 0.001 (0.015)
factor(City)Manila 0.013 (0.071)
factor(City)Mexico City -0.021 (0.014). -0.047 (0.027) 0.016 (0.033)
factor(City)Milan 0.006 (0.007) 0.017 (0.013). 0.001 (0.008)
factor(City)Montreal 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.009) -0.002 (0.006)
factor(City)Mumbai 0.037 (0.084)
factor(City)Nairobi 0.019 (0.089)
factor(City)New York 0.006 (0.004) -0.008 (0.008) 0.020 (0.006)**
factor(City)Nicosia 0.025 (0.023)
factor(City)Oslo 0.008 (0.005) 0.003 (0.009) 0.009 (0.006)
factor(City)Paris 0.014 (0.006)* 0.017 (0.011) 0.013 (0.007).
factor(City)Rio de Janeiro 0.002 (0.020) -0.004 (0.038) 0.017 (0.041)
factor(City)Rome -0.000 (0.007)
factor(City)Sao Paulo 0.010 (0.020) 0.023 (0.038) 0.020 (0.041)
factor(City)Seoul 0.020 (0.031)
factor(City)Singapore 0.021 (0.011).
factor(City)Stockholm -0.002 (0.004) -0.018 (0.008)* 0.010 (0.007)
factor(City)Sydney 0.009 (0.004)* 0.005 (0.008) 0.015 (0.006)*
factor(City)Tel Aviv 0.019 (0.015)
factor(City)Tokyo 0.017 (0.007)* 0.032 (0.013)* 0.008 (0.007)
factor(City)Toronto 0.001 (0.006)
factor(City)Vienna 0.010 (0.006). 0.021 (0.011). 0.003 (0.007)
factor(City)Zurich -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.007)
Multiple R2 0.76 0.79 0.48
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.74 0.43
Num. obs. 144 141 539
Notes: The term “balanced” indicates that only cities were included, for which data was available for both periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009, or for
the total period 1970-2009. In the “unbalanced” panels additional cities, for which data was only available in one of the periods were added to benefit
from the larger sample size. The standard errors are shown in brackets.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1
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Table B.2: Wage regression estimates jointly for the periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 on
profession-level data, including the fertility rate and education expenditure as steady state
control variables, and country fixed e↵ects (Argentina=baseline)
Solow-Swan conditional convergence
with two steady state control variables and country fixed e↵ects
(Intercept) 0.253 (0.013)⇤⇤⇤
log(InitialWagePPP)  0.023 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
EduExpenditurePercGNI  0.006 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
FertilityRate 0.001 (0.002)
factor(Country)Australia 0.032 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Austria 0.031 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Bahrain 0.008 (0.009)
factor(Country)Belgium 0.029 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Brazil  0.001 (0.007)
factor(Country)Canada 0.040 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Colombia  0.001 (0.010)
factor(Country)Cyprus 0.021 (0.007)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Denmark 0.043 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Egypt 0.035 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Finland 0.034 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)France 0.029 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Greece 0.008 (0.010)
factor(Country)Hong Kong 0.017 (0.006)⇤⇤
factor(Country)India 0.001 (0.008)
factor(Country)Indonesia  0.035 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Ireland 0.037 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Israel 0.031 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Italy 0.024 (0.007)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Japan 0.031 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Kenya 0.003 (0.012)
factor(Country)Korea, Republic of 0.015 (0.007)⇤
factor(Country)Luxembourg 0.027 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Malaysia 0.019 (0.008)⇤
factor(Country)Mexico  0.027 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Netherlands 0.037 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Norway 0.036 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Philippines  0.029 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Portugal 0.018 (0.007)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Singapore 0.008 (0.007)
factor(Country)South Africa 0.010 (0.009)
factor(Country)Spain 0.015 (0.006)⇤
factor(Country)Sweden 0.035 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Switzerland 0.029 (0.006)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Thailand 0.003 (0.007)
factor(Country)Turkey  0.017 (0.007)⇤
factor(Country)United Kingdom 0.035 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)United States of America 0.042 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Venezuela  0.023 (0.007)⇤⇤
R2 0.618
Adj. R2 0.592
Num. obs. 646
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
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Table B.3: Wage regression estimates jointly for the periods 1970-1988 and 1988-2009 on
profession-level data, including the fertility rate, education expenditure, life expectancy at
birth and investment share of GDP as steady state control variables, and country fixed e↵ects
(Argentina=baseline)
Solow-Swan conditional convergence
with four steady state control variables and country fixed e↵ects
(Intercept) 0.708 (0.076)⇤⇤⇤
log(InitialWagePPP)  0.019 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
EduExpenditurePercGNI  0.007 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
FertilityRate  0.016 (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
LifeExpAtBirth  0.006 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
InsShareGDP  0.002 (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Australia 0.054 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Austria 0.034 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Bahrain 0.053 (0.012)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Belgium 0.037 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Brazil  0.025 (0.008)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Canada 0.050 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Colombia  0.012 (0.010)
factor(Country)Cyprus 0.059 (0.010)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Denmark 0.044 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Egypt 0.002 (0.010)
factor(Country)Finland 0.048 (0.011)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)France 0.039 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Greece 0.024 (0.011)⇤
factor(Country)Hong Kong 0.046 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)India  0.049 (0.011)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Indonesia  0.068 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Ireland 0.048 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Israel 0.049 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Italy 0.035 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Japan 0.068 (0.011)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Kenya  0.012 (0.012)
factor(Country)Korea, Republic of 0.018 (0.012)
factor(Country)Luxembourg 0.026 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Malaysia 0.038 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Mexico  0.019 (0.007)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Netherlands 0.051 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Norway 0.064 (0.011)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Philippines  0.039 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Portugal 0.018 (0.008)⇤
factor(Country)Singapore 0.042 (0.012)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)South Africa  0.033 (0.011)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Spain 0.031 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Sweden 0.047 (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Switzerland 0.048 (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Thailand 0.031 (0.012)⇤⇤
factor(Country)Turkey  0.074 (0.011)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)United Kingdom 0.034 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)United States of America 0.040 (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
factor(Country)Venezuela  0.011 (0.007)
R2 0.641
Adj. R2 0.615
Num. obs. 646
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
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Table C.1: Example of results for inter-city industry versus services for all variability measures (here City2
selected as Singapore)
City City2 IntraCityQadj InterCityQadj IntraCityLMResidVar InterCityLMResidVar IntraCityMAD InterCityMAD
Amsterdam Singapore 0.06976 0.11268 0.00918 0.07280 0.04665 0.20280
Bogota Singapore 0.09505 0.11743 0.23349 0.06806 0.05644 0.16351
Brussels Singapore 0.10402 0.26107 0.02469 0.06948 0.08769 0.17356
Buenos Aires Singapore 0.21851 0.49557 0.09916 0.21918 0.05728 0.50679
Caracas Singapore 0.10465 0.21771 0.07522 0.34284 0.16087 0.78315
Chicago Singapore 0.09753 0.14396 0.02491 0.05269 0.12155 0.31667
Copenhagen Singapore 0.06211 0.23478 0.01973 0.05933 0.04882 0.18011
Dublin Singapore 0.04369 0.27435 0.01342 0.04466 0.06846 0.18337
Geneva Singapore 0.04423 0.18419 0.02035 0.07310 0.08072 0.19731
Helsinki Singapore 0.04329 0.21644 0.01048 0.07083 0.03243 0.15681
Hong Kong Singapore 0.17861 0.21919 0.03878 0.07097 0.12778 0.13773
Johannesburg Singapore 0.12233 0.15540 0.03442 0.03864 0.19322 0.20223
Lisbon Singapore 0.16250 0.28803 0.07078 0.07672 0.05538 0.16349
London Singapore 0.08854 0.11917 0.01288 0.04249 0.08343 0.13133
Los Angeles Singapore 0.06769 0.16007 0.00646 0.02674 0.05244 0.21736
Luxembourg Singapore 0.06327 0.17580 0.02899 0.06568 0.07611 0.16305
Madrid Singapore 0.13659 0.36632 0.08765 0.07437 0.10614 0.18700
Manila Singapore 0.11164 0.16683 0.02505 0.06952 0.10817 0.23474
Mexico City Singapore 0.15219 0.30500 0.05244 0.27545 0.07923 0.48918
Milan Singapore 0.06436 0.31536 0.04024 0.05838 0.02558 0.21461
Montreal Singapore 0.06316 0.10359 0.00473 0.03347 0.07622 0.26507
New York Singapore 0.05350 0.14424 0.01869 0.02646 0.04437 0.15590
Oslo Singapore 0.08281 0.15208 0.01017 0.04495 0.08342 0.09373
Paris Singapore 0.12202 0.09497 0.02438 0.04615 0.09825 0.15007
Rio de Janeiro Singapore 0.29091 0.27938 0.10086 0.15309 0.05485 0.46372
Sao Paulo Singapore 0.18643 0.29742 0.12288 0.22443 0.07223 0.53604
Stockholm Singapore 0.03923 0.17733 0.01452 0.05359 0.06135 0.20919
Sydney Singapore 0.08343 0.16085 0.00886 0.05925 0.05604 0.29782
Tel Aviv Singapore 0.06696 0.16769 0.01794 0.03789 0.09975 0.12566
Tokyo Singapore 0.04451 0.16465 0.03483 0.04923 0.06321 0.11814
Toronto Singapore 0.10272 0.14776 0.00674 0.01486 0.05873 0.27163
Vienna Singapore 0.04643 0.17838 0.03899 0.04395 0.05064 0.17247
Zurich Singapore 0.01840 0.19622 0.01522 0.06686 0.04636 0.13243
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Table C.2: Overview of results: Intra- and inter-country wage variability
comparison. Composition of wage indices held constant over time, i.e. professions
added to the survey after 1970 are excluded. With this limited data the indices
reflecting the competitive versus uncompetitive sectors are not reported as
insu cient professions are available to usefully construct these indices.
Wage variability # of # of V (wij) < V (wii⇤) % of V (wij) < V (wii⇤)
compared comparisons ResVar MAD Qadj ResVar MAD Qadj
All wage comparisons 4000 3779 3663 3502 94.5% 91.6% 87.6%
Inter-country indus-
try, vs services
1000 971 937 884 97.1% 93.7% 88.4%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
1000 914 895 859 91.4% 89.5% 85.9%
Inter-country skilled
vs unskilled
1000 929 905 873 92.9% 90.5% 87.3%
Inter-country un-
skilled vs skilled
1000 965 926 886 96.5% 92.6% 88.6%
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Table C.3: Overview of results: Intra- and inter-country wage variability
comparison. 1976-2009: Composition of wage indices held constant over time,
i.e. professions added to the survey after 1976 are excluded.
Wage variability # of # of V (wij) < V (wii⇤) % of V (wij) < V (wii⇤)
compared comparisons ResVar MAD Qadj ResVar MAD Qadj
All wage comparisons 6000 5690 5507 5150 94.8% 91.8 % 85.8%
Inter-country indus-
try, vs services
1000 977 927 859 97.7% 92.7% 85.9%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
1000 933 924 864 93.3% 92.4% 86.4%
Inter-country compet-
itive vs uncompetitive
1000 985 927 899 98.5% 92.7% 89.9%
Inter-country uncom-
petitive vs competi-
tive
1000 877 891 822 87.7% 89.1% 82.2%
Inter-country skilled
vs unskilled
1000 966 907 860 96.6% 90.7% 86.0%
Inter-country un-
skilled vs skilled
1000 952 931 846 95.2% 93.1% 84.6%
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Table C.4: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country industry, vs services
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 31 2 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
8 Dublin 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
14 London 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 12 11 NA NA NA
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
34 Zurich 8 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
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Figure C.1: Distribution of ratios for inter-city industry vs services
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
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Figure C.2: Distribution of ratios for inter-city services vs industry
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij)
De
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from MAD
V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij)
De
ns
ity
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from Q_adj
V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij)
De
ns
ity
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
146
Figure C.3: Distribution of ratios for inter-city competitive vs uncompetitive
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
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Figure C.4: Distribution of ratios for inter-city uncompetitive vs competitive
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
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Figure C.5: Distribution of ratios for inter-city skilled vs unskilled
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
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Figure C.6: Distribution of ratios for inter-city unskilled vs skilled
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from linear regression model
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Table C.5: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country services, vs industry
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 32 1 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 6 25 3.23 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
8 Dublin 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 9 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 17 16 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 10 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 7 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
14 London 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 8 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
17 Madrid 18 5 NA NA NA
18 Manila 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 9 14 0.83 Do not reject Do not reject
21 Montreal 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 3 28 4.31 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 15 17 0.18 Do not reject Do not reject
27 Singapore 11 22 1.74 Reject Do not reject
28 Stockholm 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 13 10 NA NA NA
34 Zurich 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
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Table C.6: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country competitive, vs uncompetitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 31 2 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 8 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
8 Dublin 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
9 Geneva 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 8 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
14 London 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 16 7 NA NA NA
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
22 New York 14 17 0.36 Do not reject Do not reject
23 Oslo 19 14 NA NA NA
24 Paris 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 7 26 3.13 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 8 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 13 10 NA NA NA
34 Zurich 5 27 3.71 Reject Reject
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Table C.7: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country uncompetitive, vs competitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 33 0 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 14 9 NA NA NA
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 21 10 NA NA NA
7 Copenhagen 10 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
8 Dublin 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
9 Geneva 9 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 13 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 9 14 0.83 Do not reject Do not reject
14 London 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 13 10 NA NA NA
17 Madrid 19 4 NA NA NA
18 Manila 10 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 7 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
21 Montreal 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 21 10 NA NA NA
23 Oslo 23 10 NA NA NA
24 Paris 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 14 19 0.70 Do not reject Do not reject
28 Stockholm 17 16 NA NA NA
29 Sydney 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 15 8 NA NA NA
34 Zurich 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
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Table C.8: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country skilled, vs unskilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 21 12 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 7 24 2.87 Reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 9 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 23 10 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 16 17 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
17 Madrid 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
22 New York 6 25 3.23 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 15 18 0.35 Do not reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
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Table C.9: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country unskilled, vs skilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 13 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 9 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
11 Hong Kong 20 13 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 3 28 4.31 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 7 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 4 27 3.95 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 5 27 3.71 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 22 10 NA NA NA
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 9 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
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Table C.10: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country industry,
vs services
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 5 26 3.59 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 13 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
24 Paris 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
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Table C.11: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country services,
vs industry
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 9 22 2.16 Reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 5 27 3.71 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 8 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 7 26 3.13 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
24 Paris 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.12: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country competitive,
vs uncompetitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
2 Bogota 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 8 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 5 26 3.59 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
11 Hong Kong 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 19 14 NA NA NA
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 14 19 0.70 Do not reject Do not reject
24 Paris 14 9 NA NA NA
25 Rio de Janeiro 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.13: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country uncompet-
itive, vs competitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 7 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 7 24 2.87 Reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
14 London 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 9 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 17 16 NA NA NA
24 Paris 10 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.14: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country skilled, vs
unskilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 3 28 4.31 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 8 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 8 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
22 New York 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
24 Paris 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
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Table C.15: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country unskilled,
vs skilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
22 New York 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
24 Paris 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
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Table C.16: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country industry, vs
services
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
14 London 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
24 Paris 10 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 9 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
26 Sao Paulo 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 5 27 3.71 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.17: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country services, vs
industry
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 5 26 3.59 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 20 13 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 4 29 4.18 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 13 10 NA NA NA
14 London 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 5 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
24 Paris 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 20 12 NA NA NA
26 Sao Paulo 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
163
Table C.18: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country competitive,
vs uncompetitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 10 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
6 Chicago 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 8 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
14 London 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 16 17 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
24 Paris 8 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 2 30 4.77 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 8 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
27 Singapore 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 4 28 4.07 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.19: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country uncompeti-
tive, vs competitive
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 5 28 3.83 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 13 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
6 Chicago 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 4 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
11 Hong Kong 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 18 5 NA NA NA
14 London 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 7 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 3 30 4.53 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 4 28 4.07 Reject Reject
22 New York 0 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 22 11 NA NA NA
24 Paris 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 8 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.20: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj, for inter-country skilled vs
unskilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 13 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
3 Brussels 3 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 30 3 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 24 7 NA NA NA
7 Copenhagen 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 15 8 NA NA NA
14 London 7 26 3.13 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 10 21 1.80 Reject Do not reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 12 11 NA NA NA
18 Manila 7 26 3.13 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 8 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
22 New York 2 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 10 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 23 9 NA NA NA
26 Sao Paulo 21 11 NA NA NA
27 Singapore 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 18 15 NA NA NA
31 Tokyo 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
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Table C.21: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country unskilled vs
skilled
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 6 27 3.48 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 26 7 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 5 26 3.59 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 7 26 3.13 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 13 10 NA NA NA
14 London 2 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 5 26 3.59 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 20 3 NA NA NA
18 Manila 9 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 1 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 6 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 6 26 3.36 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 7 25 3.01 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 21 12 NA NA NA
31 Tokyo 1 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 3 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.22: Summary of results of Dixon and Mood statistical sign test for
each city with all of its valid inter-city pairs, excluding data from professions
included in the survey after 1970.
Dixon & Mood test H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05 H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05/34
H0: V (wij) > V (wii⇤) (no multiple correction) (Bonferroni correction)
% of cities % of cities
Variability measures ResVar MAD Q adj ResVar MAD Q adj
All wage comparisons 101136=96%
129
136=95%
121
136=89%
126
136=93%
118
136=87%
115
136=85%
Inter-country industry,
vs services
33
34=97%
34
34=100%
30
34=88%
33
34=97%
31
34=94%
29
34=85%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
32
34=94%
31
34=94%
30
34=88%
30
34=88%
30
34=88%
28
34=82%
Inter-country skilled vs
unskilled
32
34=94%
32
34=94%
30
34=88%
30
34=88%
26
34=76%
28
34=82%
Inter-country unskilled
vs skilled
33
34=97%
32
34=94%
31
34=91%
33
34=97%
31
34=91%
30
34=88%
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Table C.23: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country industry, vs services, excluding professions included
in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
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Table C.24: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country services, vs industry, excluding professions included
in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 8.00 25.00 2.79 Reject Do not reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30.00 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 3.00 20.00 3.34 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32.00 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 33.00 0.00 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 8.00 25.00 2.79 Reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 1.00 22.00 4.17 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31.00 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21.00 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32.00 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32.00 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31.00 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32.00 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 2.00 21.00 3.75 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32.00 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32.00 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 6.00 27.00 3.48 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 16.00 17.00 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33.00 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32.00 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23.00 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 4.00 28.00 4.07 Reject Reject
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Table C.25: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country skilled, vs unskilled, excluding professions included in
the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 9.00 22 2.16 Reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 4.00 27 3.95 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 25.00 8 NA NA NA
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 8.00 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
171
Table C.26: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country unskilled, vs skilled, excluding professions included in
the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 12.00 21 1.39 Do not reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.27: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country industry,
vs services, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 10.00 21 1.80 Reject Do not reject
16 Luxembourg 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 7.00 25 3.01 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 9.00 23 2.30 Reject Do not reject
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Table C.28: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country services,
vs industry, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 4.00 27 3.95 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 22.00 11 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
14 London 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 11.00 20 1.44 Do not reject Do not reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
22 New York 3.00 28 4.31 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
24 Paris 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 13.00 19 0.88 Do not reject Do not reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
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Table C.29: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country skilled, vs
unskilled, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 7.00 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
14 London 8.00 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
15 Los Angeles 3.00 28 4.31 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 11.00 22 1.74 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
24 Paris 6.00 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 14.00 19 0.70 Do not reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 10.00 22 1.94 Reject Do not reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.30: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country unskilled,
vs skilled, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
14 London 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 17.00 16 NA NA NA
19 Mexico City 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
24 Paris 10.00 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.31: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country industry, vs
services, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 20.00 13 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 17.00 6 NA NA NA
14 London 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 9.00 22 2.16 Reject Do not reject
23 Oslo 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
24 Paris 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 22.00 11 NA NA NA
31 Tokyo 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
32 Toronto 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.32: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country services, vs
industry, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 32.00 1 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 20.00 3 NA NA NA
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 3.00 28 4.31 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 10.00 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
24 Paris 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 23.00 10 NA NA NA
31 Tokyo 12.00 21 1.39 Do not reject Do not reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
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Table C.33: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj, for inter-country skilled vs
unskilled, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 31.00 2 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 15.00 16 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 18.00 5 NA NA NA
14 London 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 4.00 27 3.95 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 10.00 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
18 Manila 10.00 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 8.00 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
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Table C.34: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country unskilled vs
skilled, excluding professions included in the survey only after 1970
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 19.00 14 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 5.00 26 3.59 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 17.00 6 NA NA NA
14 London 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 6.00 25 3.23 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 10.00 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
18 Manila 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
22 New York 5.00 26 3.59 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 7.00 25 3.01 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
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Table C.35: Summary of results of Dixon and Mood statistical sign test for
each city with all of its valid inter-city pairs, 1976-2009 data while holding the
composition of the indices constant.
Dixon & Mood test H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05 H0 rejected, ↵ = 0.05/34
H0: V (wij) > V (wii⇤) (no multiple correction) (Bonferroni correction)
% of cities % of cities
Variability measures ResVar MAD Q adj ResVar MAD Q adj
All wage comparisons 198204=97%
192
204=94%
174
204=85%
192
204=94%
182
204=89%
161
204=79%
Inter-country industry,
vs services
34
34=100%
32
34=94%
29
34=85%
33
34=97%
31
34=91%
27
34=79%
Inter-country services,
vs industry
32
34=94%
33
34=97%
29
34=85%
31
34=91%
29
34=85%
27
34=79%
Inter-country competi-
tive vs uncompetitive
34
34=100%
32
34=94%
31
34=91%
34
34=100%
30
34=88%
27
34=79%
Inter-country uncom-
petitive vs competitive
31
34=91%
30
34=88%
26
34=76%
28
34=82%
27
34=79%
24
34=71%
Inter-country skilled vs
unskilled
34
34=100%
32
34=94%
30
34=88%
34
34=100%
32
34=94%
28
34=82%
Inter-country unskilled
vs skilled
33
34=97%
33
34=97%
29
34=%
32
34=94%
33
34=97%
28
34=82%
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Table C.36: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country industry, vs services, 1976-2009 data while holding
the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.37: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country services, vs industry, 1976-2009 data while holding
the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 6.00 25 3.23 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 17.00 16 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 21.00 12 NA NA NA
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 6.00 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.38: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country competitive, vs uncompetitive, 1976-2009 data while
holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
24 Paris 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.39: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country uncompetitive, vs competitive, 1976-2009 data while
holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 20.00 11 NA NA NA
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 11.00 21 1.59 Do not reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 11.00 22 1.74 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 25.00 8 NA NA NA
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
24 Paris 6.00 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.40: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country skilled, vs unskilled, 1976-2009 data while holding
the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.41: Dixon and Mood test based on the variance of the regression
residuals, for inter-country unskilled, vs skilled, 1976-2009 data while holding
the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 8.00 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 18.00 14 NA NA NA
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.42: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country industry,
vs services, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 3.00 28 4.31 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
24 Paris 10.00 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.43: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country services, vs
industry, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 11.00 20 1.44 Do not reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 8.00 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 8.00 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
22 New York 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 7.00 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.44: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country competitive,
vs uncompetitive, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices
constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 19.00 14 NA NA NA
13 Lisbon 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
24 Paris 10.00 13 0.42 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.45: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country uncompeti-
tive, vs competitive, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices
constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 9.00 14 0.83 Do not reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 16.00 15 NA NA NA
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 8.00 25 2.79 Reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 10.00 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
24 Paris 8.00 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.46: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country skilled, vs
unskilled, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 11.00 20 1.44 Do not reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 12.00 21 1.39 Do not reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
14 London 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
24 Paris 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 10.00 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 7.00 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
34 Zurich 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
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Table C.47: Dixon and Mood test based on MAD, for inter-country unskilled,
vs skilled, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 6.00 25 3.23 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
14 London 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
22 New York 3.00 28 4.31 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
24 Paris 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 8.00 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
34 Zurich 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
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Table C.48: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country industry, vs
services, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
2 Bogota 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 23.00 10 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 22.00 11 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 13.00 10 NA NA NA
14 London 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 14.00 9 NA NA NA
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 19.00 14 NA NA NA
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.49: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country services, vs
industry, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
2 Bogota 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 5.00 28 3.83 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 15.00 18 0.35 Do not reject Do not reject
6 Chicago 4.00 27 3.95 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 31.00 2 NA NA NA
12 Johannesburg 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 15.00 8 NA NA NA
14 London 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 5.00 26 3.59 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
18 Manila 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 8.00 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
31 Tokyo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
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Table C.50: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country competitive,
vs uncompetitive, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices
constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 21.00 12 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 6.00 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
6 Chicago 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 10.00 22 1.94 Reject Do not reject
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 10.00 23 2.09 Reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 8.00 15 1.25 Do not reject Do not reject
14 London 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
18 Manila 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
24 Paris 7.00 16 1.67 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
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Table C.51: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country uncompeti-
tive, vs competitive, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices
constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 25.00 8 NA NA NA
3 Brussels 9.00 14 0.83 Do not reject Do not reject
4 Buenos Aires 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 14.00 19 0.70 Do not reject Do not reject
6 Chicago 15.00 16 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
7 Copenhagen 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 17.00 15 NA NA NA
10 Helsinki 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 15.00 18 0.35 Do not reject Do not reject
12 Johannesburg 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 15.00 8 NA NA NA
14 London 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
18 Manila 15.00 18 0.35 Do not reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 4.00 29 4.18 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
22 New York 0.00 31 5.39 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 15.00 18 0.35 Do not reject Do not reject
24 Paris 6.00 17 2.09 Reject Do not reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 0.00 32 5.48 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
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Table C.52: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj, for inter-country skilled vs
unskilled, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 31.00 2 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 7.00 25 3.01 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
13 Lisbon 15.00 8 NA NA NA
14 London 6.00 27 3.48 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 2.00 29 4.67 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 4.00 19 2.92 Reject Do not reject
18 Manila 17.00 16 NA NA NA
19 Mexico City 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
20 Milan 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 8.00 24 2.65 Reject Do not reject
22 New York 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
24 Paris 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 1.00 31 5.13 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 9.00 24 2.44 Reject Do not reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
34 Zurich 3.00 29 4.42 Reject Reject
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Table C.53: Dixon and Mood test based on Qaadj , for inter-country unskilled vs
skilled, 1976-2009 data while holding the composition of the indices constant
City # of pairs with # of pairs with Dixon & Mood H0 H0
V (wij) larger V (wii⇤) larger test statistic (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
2 Bogota 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
3 Brussels 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
4 Buenos Aires 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
5 Caracas 27.00 6 NA NA NA
6 Chicago 1.00 30 5.03 Reject Reject
7 Copenhagen 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
8 Dublin 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
9 Geneva 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
10 Helsinki 1.00 22 4.17 Reject Reject
11 Hong Kong 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
12 Johannesburg 13.00 20 1.04 Do not reject Do not reject
13 Lisbon 15.00 8 NA NA NA
14 London 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
15 Los Angeles 5.00 26 3.59 Reject Reject
16 Luxembourg 2.00 21 3.75 Reject Reject
17 Madrid 12.00 11 NA NA NA
18 Manila 16.00 17 0.00 Do not reject Do not reject
19 Mexico City 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
20 Milan 0.00 23 4.59 Reject Reject
21 Montreal 6.00 26 3.36 Reject Reject
22 New York 5.00 26 3.59 Reject Reject
23 Oslo 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
24 Paris 3.00 20 3.34 Reject Reject
25 Rio de Janeiro 5.00 27 3.71 Reject Reject
26 Sao Paulo 2.00 30 4.77 Reject Reject
27 Singapore 7.00 26 3.13 Reject Reject
28 Stockholm 1.00 32 5.22 Reject Reject
29 Sydney 0.00 33 5.57 Reject Reject
30 Tel Aviv 2.00 31 4.87 Reject Reject
31 Tokyo 3.00 30 4.53 Reject Reject
32 Toronto 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
33 Vienna 5.00 18 2.50 Reject Do not reject
34 Zurich 4.00 28 4.07 Reject Reject
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Figure C.7: Distribution of ratios of inter-country to intra-country mean
variances for profession level data corrected for city, year and profession fixed
e↵ects
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from profession level data
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Table C.54: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-industry vs
services
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 7 16 23 0
2 Bogota 29 4 33 0
3 Brussels 14 9 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 6 27 33 0
5 Caracas 0 33 33 0
6 Chicago 7 24 31 0
7 Copenhagen 6 17 23 0
8 Dublin 5 18 23 0
9 Geneva 20 12 31 1
10 Helsinki 4 19 22 1
11 Hong Kong 18 15 33 0
12 Johannesburg 27 6 33 0
13 Lisbon 11 12 23 0
14 London 13 20 31 2
15 Los Angeles 8 23 29 2
16 Luxembourg 9 14 23 0
17 Madrid 16 7 23 0
18 Manila 17 16 33 0
19 Mexico City 0 33 33 0
20 Milan 10 13 23 0
21 Montreal 4 28 30 2
22 New York 12 19 30 1
23 Oslo 11 22 30 3
24 Paris 15 8 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 14 18 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 16 16 32 0
27 Singapore 13 20 33 0
28 Stockholm 12 21 32 1
29 Sydney 5 28 32 1
30 Tel Aviv 11 22 33 0
31 Tokyo 12 21 33 0
32 Toronto 5 27 31 1
33 Vienna 12 11 23 0
34 Zurich 15 17 32 0
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Table C.55: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-services vs
industry
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 9 14 23 0
2 Bogota 31 2 33 0
3 Brussels 16 7 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 7 26 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 19 12 31 0
7 Copenhagen 6 17 23 0
8 Dublin 6 17 22 1
9 Geneva 19 13 30 2
10 Helsinki 3 20 21 2
11 Hong Kong 26 7 33 0
12 Johannesburg 18 15 33 0
13 Lisbon 12 11 23 0
14 London 14 19 30 3
15 Los Angeles 6 25 31 0
16 Luxembourg 17 6 23 0
17 Madrid 16 7 23 0
18 Manila 27 6 33 0
19 Mexico City 0 33 33 0
20 Milan 15 8 23 0
21 Montreal 7 25 31 1
22 New York 9 22 31 0
23 Oslo 16 17 32 1
24 Paris 13 10 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 11 21 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 22 10 32 0
27 Singapore 16 17 33 0
28 Stockholm 13 20 33 0
29 Sydney 8 25 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 22 11 33 0
31 Tokyo 14 19 33 0
32 Toronto 12 20 32 0
33 Vienna 14 9 23 0
34 Zurich 15 17 31 1
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Table C.56: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-competitive vs
uncompetitive
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 9 14 22 1
2 Bogota 30 3 32 1
3 Brussels 16 7 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 11 22 33 0
5 Caracas 0 33 33 0
6 Chicago 21 10 31 0
7 Copenhagen 12 11 23 0
8 Dublin 6 17 23 0
9 Geneva 22 10 31 1
10 Helsinki 10 13 22 1
11 Hong Kong 24 9 33 0
12 Johannesburg 28 5 33 0
13 Lisbon 16 7 23 0
14 London 10 23 33 0
15 Los Angeles 10 21 30 1
16 Luxembourg 15 8 23 0
17 Madrid 21 2 23 0
18 Manila 26 7 33 0
19 Mexico City 3 30 33 0
20 Milan 9 14 23 0
21 Montreal 13 19 31 1
22 New York 23 8 31 0
23 Oslo 27 6 33 0
24 Paris 18 5 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 10 22 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 8 24 32 0
27 Singapore 24 9 33 0
28 Stockholm 22 11 33 0
29 Sydney 14 19 32 1
30 Tel Aviv 3 30 33 0
31 Tokyo 17 16 33 0
32 Toronto 6 26 30 2
33 Vienna 13 10 23 0
34 Zurich 13 19 31 1
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Table C.57: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-uncompetitive
vs competitive
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 10 13 23 0
2 Bogota 29 4 33 0
3 Brussels 15 8 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 14 19 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 24 7 31 0
7 Copenhagen 12 11 23 0
8 Dublin 8 15 22 1
9 Geneva 19 13 32 0
10 Helsinki 6 17 22 1
11 Hong Kong 27 6 33 0
12 Johannesburg 18 15 33 0
13 Lisbon 18 5 23 0
14 London 12 21 30 3
15 Los Angeles 7 24 30 1
16 Luxembourg 17 6 23 0
17 Madrid 18 5 23 0
18 Manila 32 1 33 0
19 Mexico City 5 28 33 0
20 Milan 13 10 23 0
21 Montreal 13 19 32 0
22 New York 22 9 31 0
23 Oslo 25 8 33 0
24 Paris 17 6 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 11 21 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 20 12 32 0
27 Singapore 23 10 33 0
28 Stockholm 18 15 33 0
29 Sydney 9 24 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 16 17 33 0
31 Tokyo 10 23 33 0
32 Toronto 10 22 31 1
33 Vienna 14 9 23 0
34 Zurich 12 20 30 2
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Table C.58: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-skilled vs unskilled
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 13 10 23 0
2 Bogota 30 3 33 0
3 Brussels 8 15 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 6 27 33 0
5 Caracas 7 26 33 0
6 Chicago 22 9 31 0
7 Copenhagen 3 20 22 1
8 Dublin 1 22 21 2
9 Geneva 16 16 32 0
10 Helsinki 8 15 22 1
11 Hong Kong 27 6 33 0
12 Johannesburg 31 2 33 0
13 Lisbon 2 21 23 0
14 London 20 13 32 1
15 Los Angeles 19 12 30 1
16 Luxembourg 13 10 23 0
17 Madrid 9 14 22 1
18 Manila 8 25 33 0
19 Mexico City 6 27 33 0
20 Milan 3 20 23 0
21 Montreal 20 12 32 0
22 New York 18 13 31 0
23 Oslo 19 14 33 0
24 Paris 16 7 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 21 11 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 25 7 32 0
27 Singapore 18 15 33 0
28 Stockholm 4 29 32 1
29 Sydney 7 26 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 26 7 33 0
31 Tokyo 3 30 32 1
32 Toronto 20 12 32 0
33 Vienna 7 16 22 1
34 Zurich 13 19 32 0
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Table C.59: One-sided Levene test over all city pairs for inter-unskilled vs
skilled
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 11 12 23 0
2 Bogota 29 4 33 0
3 Brussels 9 14 22 1
4 Buenos Aires 5 28 33 0
5 Caracas 10 23 33 0
6 Chicago 19 12 31 0
7 Copenhagen 5 18 20 3
8 Dublin 0 23 22 1
9 Geneva 14 18 31 1
10 Helsinki 7 16 22 1
11 Hong Kong 24 9 32 1
12 Johannesburg 25 8 33 0
13 Lisbon 3 20 23 0
14 London 20 13 32 1
15 Los Angeles 17 14 29 2
16 Luxembourg 13 10 23 0
17 Madrid 13 10 23 0
18 Manila 20 13 33 0
19 Mexico City 6 27 33 0
20 Milan 4 19 21 2
21 Montreal 19 13 32 0
22 New York 18 13 30 1
23 Oslo 14 19 32 1
24 Paris 15 8 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 29 3 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 30 2 32 0
27 Singapore 2 31 31 2
28 Stockholm 7 26 29 4
29 Sydney 6 27 32 1
30 Tel Aviv 29 4 33 0
31 Tokyo 4 29 32 1
32 Toronto 18 14 30 2
33 Vienna 7 16 22 1
34 Zurich 13 19 31 1
206
Table C.60: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-industry vs
services
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 9 14 23 0
2 Bogota 28 5 33 0
3 Brussels 12 11 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 6 27 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 9 22 31 0
7 Copenhagen 6 17 23 0
8 Dublin 7 16 23 0
9 Geneva 20 12 32 0
10 Helsinki 3 20 22 1
11 Hong Kong 20 13 33 0
12 Johannesburg 30 3 33 0
13 Lisbon 12 11 23 0
14 London 13 20 32 1
15 Los Angeles 10 21 31 0
16 Luxembourg 9 14 23 0
17 Madrid 15 8 23 0
18 Manila 16 17 33 0
19 Mexico City 0 33 33 0
20 Milan 9 14 23 0
21 Montreal 4 28 32 0
22 New York 11 20 31 0
23 Oslo 14 19 32 1
24 Paris 15 8 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 13 19 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 11 21 32 0
27 Singapore 15 18 33 0
28 Stockholm 17 16 32 1
29 Sydney 8 25 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 11 22 33 0
31 Tokyo 10 23 33 0
32 Toronto 8 24 32 0
33 Vienna 7 16 23 0
34 Zurich 14 18 32 0
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Table C.61: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-services vs
industry
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 8 15 23 0
2 Bogota 30 3 33 0
3 Brussels 17 6 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 7 26 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 19 12 31 0
7 Copenhagen 6 17 23 0
8 Dublin 7 16 23 0
9 Geneva 19 13 32 0
10 Helsinki 2 21 23 0
11 Hong Kong 25 8 33 0
12 Johannesburg 19 14 33 0
13 Lisbon 14 9 23 0
14 London 15 18 32 1
15 Los Angeles 10 21 31 0
16 Luxembourg 16 7 23 0
17 Madrid 15 8 23 0
18 Manila 28 5 33 0
19 Mexico City 0 33 33 0
20 Milan 14 9 23 0
21 Montreal 7 25 32 0
22 New York 7 24 31 0
23 Oslo 16 17 33 0
24 Paris 14 9 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 5 27 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 21 11 32 0
27 Singapore 16 17 33 0
28 Stockholm 13 20 33 0
29 Sydney 9 24 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 20 13 33 0
31 Tokyo 12 21 33 0
32 Toronto 12 20 32 0
33 Vienna 11 12 23 0
34 Zurich 13 19 32 0
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Table C.62: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-competitive vs
uncompetitive
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 11 12 23 0
2 Bogota 13 20 33 0
3 Brussels 16 7 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 15 18 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 21 10 31 0
7 Copenhagen 3 20 23 0
8 Dublin 8 15 23 0
9 Geneva 20 12 32 0
10 Helsinki 11 12 23 0
11 Hong Kong 24 9 33 0
12 Johannesburg 28 5 33 0
13 Lisbon 15 8 23 0
14 London 11 22 32 1
15 Los Angeles 9 22 31 0
16 Luxembourg 13 10 23 0
17 Madrid 19 4 23 0
18 Manila 22 11 33 0
19 Mexico City 8 25 33 0
20 Milan 7 16 23 0
21 Montreal 10 22 32 0
22 New York 20 11 31 0
23 Oslo 25 8 33 0
24 Paris 18 5 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 9 23 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 12 20 32 0
27 Singapore 23 10 33 0
28 Stockholm 22 11 33 0
29 Sydney 14 19 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 3 30 33 0
31 Tokyo 3 30 33 0
32 Toronto 7 25 32 0
33 Vienna 9 14 23 0
34 Zurich 12 20 32 0
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Table C.63: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-uncompetitive
vs competitive
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 10 13 23 0
2 Bogota 12 21 33 0
3 Brussels 16 7 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 16 17 33 0
5 Caracas 1 32 33 0
6 Chicago 25 6 31 0
7 Copenhagen 1 22 23 0
8 Dublin 11 12 23 0
9 Geneva 21 11 32 0
10 Helsinki 8 15 23 0
11 Hong Kong 25 8 33 0
12 Johannesburg 22 11 33 0
13 Lisbon 16 7 23 0
14 London 14 19 32 1
15 Los Angeles 5 26 31 0
16 Luxembourg 16 7 23 0
17 Madrid 15 8 23 0
18 Manila 32 1 33 0
19 Mexico City 9 24 33 0
20 Milan 6 17 23 0
21 Montreal 11 21 32 0
22 New York 14 17 31 0
23 Oslo 26 7 33 0
24 Paris 17 6 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 12 20 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 20 12 32 0
27 Singapore 23 10 33 0
28 Stockholm 17 16 33 0
29 Sydney 11 22 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 16 17 33 0
31 Tokyo 0 33 33 0
32 Toronto 12 20 32 0
33 Vienna 5 18 23 0
34 Zurich 10 22 32 0
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Table C.64: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-skilled vs unskilled
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 13 10 23 0
2 Bogota 30 3 33 0
3 Brussels 8 15 23 0
4 Buenos Aires 9 24 33 0
5 Caracas 8 25 33 0
6 Chicago 23 8 31 0
7 Copenhagen 3 20 23 0
8 Dublin 2 21 23 0
9 Geneva 12 20 32 0
10 Helsinki 8 15 23 0
11 Hong Kong 26 7 33 0
12 Johannesburg 31 2 33 0
13 Lisbon 4 19 23 0
14 London 22 11 32 1
15 Los Angeles 18 13 31 0
16 Luxembourg 11 12 23 0
17 Madrid 10 13 23 0
18 Manila 13 20 33 0
19 Mexico City 9 24 33 0
20 Milan 2 21 23 0
21 Montreal 21 11 32 0
22 New York 16 15 31 0
23 Oslo 20 13 33 0
24 Paris 16 7 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 19 13 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 25 7 32 0
27 Singapore 20 13 33 0
28 Stockholm 6 27 33 0
29 Sydney 8 25 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 26 7 33 0
31 Tokyo 5 28 33 0
32 Toronto 19 13 32 0
33 Vienna 6 17 23 0
34 Zurich 10 22 32 0
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Table C.65: One-sided Fligner test over all city pairs for inter-unskilled vs
skilled
City # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs # of pairs
for which for which for which for which
H0 not rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(Bonferroni) (Bonferroni)
1 Amsterdam 11 12 23 0
2 Bogota 29 4 33 0
3 Brussels 11 12 22 1
4 Buenos Aires 9 24 33 0
5 Caracas 11 22 33 0
6 Chicago 19 12 31 0
7 Copenhagen 4 19 22 1
8 Dublin 1 22 22 1
9 Geneva 14 18 32 0
10 Helsinki 7 16 23 0
11 Hong Kong 25 8 33 0
12 Johannesburg 24 9 33 0
13 Lisbon 5 18 23 0
14 London 21 12 32 1
15 Los Angeles 17 14 31 0
16 Luxembourg 9 14 23 0
17 Madrid 15 8 23 0
18 Manila 21 12 33 0
19 Mexico City 7 26 33 0
20 Milan 1 22 23 0
21 Montreal 19 13 32 0
22 New York 17 14 31 0
23 Oslo 17 16 33 0
24 Paris 18 5 23 0
25 Rio de Janeiro 29 3 32 0
26 Sao Paulo 29 3 32 0
27 Singapore 4 29 33 0
28 Stockholm 7 26 32 1
29 Sydney 3 30 33 0
30 Tel Aviv 28 5 33 0
31 Tokyo 5 28 32 1
32 Toronto 18 14 32 0
33 Vienna 6 17 23 0
34 Zurich 13 19 31 1
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Figure C.8: Distribution of ratios of inter-country to intra-country mean
variances for profession level data corrected for city, year and profession fixed
e↵ects and city-year interaction terms
Histogram of V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij) from profession level data
V(w_ii*)/V(w_ij)
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Table C.66: Comparison of variance of inter- and intra-country wage di↵erentials
after correcting for city, year and profession fixed e↵ects
City Inter-county Intra-country Inter larger? Ratio of mean
mean variance mean variance variances
1 Amsterdam 0.15 0.02 TRUE 7.18
2 Bogota 0.22 0.19 TRUE 1.16
3 Brussels 0.17 0.03 TRUE 5.62
4 Buenos Aires 0.31 0.18 TRUE 1.72
5 Caracas 0.75 0.29 TRUE 2.57
6 Chicago 0.14 0.04 TRUE 3.46
7 Copenhagen 0.16 0.02 TRUE 9.94
8 Dublin 0.22 0.02 TRUE 8.91
9 Geneva 0.13 0.02 TRUE 5.76
10 Helsinki 0.17 0.02 TRUE 11.30
11 Hong Kong 0.27 0.23 TRUE 1.17
12 Johannesburg 0.22 0.10 TRUE 2.14
13 Lisbon 0.24 0.10 TRUE 2.45
14 London 0.16 0.03 TRUE 4.97
15 Los Angeles 0.13 0.06 TRUE 2.39
16 Luxembourg 0.17 0.03 TRUE 6.47
17 Madrid 0.19 0.07 TRUE 2.73
18 Manila 0.19 0.14 TRUE 1.40
19 Mexico City 0.50 0.19 TRUE 2.60
20 Milan 0.20 0.03 TRUE 5.83
21 Montreal 0.14 0.05 TRUE 2.85
22 New York 0.14 0.05 TRUE 2.98
23 Oslo 0.13 0.03 TRUE 4.32
24 Paris 0.16 0.07 TRUE 2.45
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.29 0.17 TRUE 1.75
26 Sao Paulo 0.27 0.16 TRUE 1.67
27 Singapore 0.20 0.09 TRUE 2.36
28 Stockholm 0.13 0.01 TRUE 8.62
29 Sydney 0.13 0.02 TRUE 6.04
30 Tel Aviv 0.17 0.09 TRUE 1.92
31 Tokyo 0.18 0.04 TRUE 4.49
32 Toronto 0.13 0.04 TRUE 3.02
33 Vienna 0.17 0.02 TRUE 7.86
34 Zurich 0.14 0.01 TRUE 9.60
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Table C.67: Comparison of variance of inter- and intra-country wage di↵erentials
after correcting for city, year and profession fixed e↵ects, and city-year interaction
terms
City Inter-county Intra-country Inter larger? Ratio of mean
mean variance mean variance variances
1 Amsterdam 0.12 0.02 TRUE 5.71
2 Bogota 0.19 0.19 FALSE 1.00
3 Brussels 0.13 0.03 TRUE 4.33
4 Buenos Aires 0.28 0.18 TRUE 1.58
5 Caracas 0.47 0.29 TRUE 1.62
6 Chicago 0.11 0.04 TRUE 2.71
7 Copenhagen 0.12 0.02 TRUE 7.57
8 Dublin 0.12 0.02 TRUE 5.02
9 Geneva 0.10 0.02 TRUE 4.43
10 Helsinki 0.13 0.02 TRUE 8.62
11 Hong Kong 0.21 0.23 FALSE 0.93
12 Johannesburg 0.13 0.10 TRUE 1.31
13 Lisbon 0.18 0.10 TRUE 1.84
14 London 0.11 0.03 TRUE 3.25
15 Los Angeles 0.11 0.06 TRUE 1.99
16 Luxembourg 0.13 0.03 TRUE 4.73
17 Madrid 0.14 0.07 TRUE 2.05
18 Manila 0.16 0.14 TRUE 1.14
19 Mexico City 0.32 0.19 TRUE 1.70
20 Milan 0.15 0.03 TRUE 4.51
21 Montreal 0.11 0.05 TRUE 2.12
22 New York 0.11 0.05 TRUE 2.38
23 Oslo 0.10 0.03 TRUE 3.33
24 Paris 0.12 0.07 TRUE 1.84
25 Rio de Janeiro 0.24 0.17 TRUE 1.48
26 Sao Paulo 0.23 0.16 TRUE 1.43
27 Singapore 0.14 0.09 TRUE 1.62
28 Stockholm 0.10 0.01 TRUE 6.54
29 Sydney 0.10 0.02 TRUE 4.69
30 Tel Aviv 0.13 0.09 TRUE 1.51
31 Tokyo 0.13 0.04 TRUE 3.33
32 Toronto 0.10 0.04 TRUE 2.33
33 Vienna 0.12 0.02 TRUE 5.68
34 Zurich 0.10 0.01 TRUE 7.17
Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 3
Table D.1: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L3/L1 using the synthetic
control as the untreated control group
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.5567 0.3555 7.1918 0.0000
Treatment -0.0083 0.5028 -0.0166 0.9870
Period -0.2409 0.4590 -0.5248 0.6069
Treatment:Period 1.1285 0.6491 1.7387 0.1013
Table D.2: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L3/L1 using all other
cities as the untreated control group
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.7624 0.1082 25.5300 0.0000
Treatment -0.2140 0.6492 -0.3297 0.7418
Period -0.0754 0.1397 -0.5397 0.5897
Treatment:Period 0.9630 0.8381 1.1490 0.2513
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Table D.3: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L3/L2 using the synthetic
control as the untreated control group
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.4035 0.1142 12.2868 0.0000
Treatment -0.0050 0.1615 -0.0308 0.9758
Period 0.0793 0.1475 0.5375 0.5983
Treatment:Period 0.3734 0.2085 1.7903 0.0923
Table D.4: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L3/L2 using all other
cities as the untreated control group
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.6893 0.0302 55.8558 0.0000
Treatment -0.2908 0.1815 -1.6026 0.1099
Period -0.0244 0.0390 -0.6244 0.5328
Treatment:Period 0.4770 0.2343 2.0362 0.0425
Table D.5: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L2/L1 using the synthetic
control as the untreated control group, 1982 to 2003
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.8637 0.1629 11.4414 0.0000
Treatment -0.0130 0.2304 -0.0566 0.9558
Period 0.2350 0.2304 1.0200 0.3278
Treatment:Period -0.5406 0.3258 -1.6593 0.1229
Table D.6: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L2/L1 using the synthetic
control as the untreated control group, post-treatment 2006-2009
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.8637 0.1856 10.0434 0.0000
Treatment -0.0130 0.2624 -0.0497 0.9616
Period -0.2282 0.3214 -0.7101 0.4978
Treatment:Period 0.8186 0.4545 1.8008 0.1094
217
Table D.7: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L2/L1 using all other
cities as the untreated control group, 1982 to 2003
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.6212 0.0513 31.6154 0.0000
Treatment 0.2295 0.3077 0.7460 0.4563
Period 0.0168 0.0725 0.2323 0.8165
Treatment:Period -0.3224 0.4351 -0.7411 0.4593
Table D.8: Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences regression results for skill ratio L2/L1 using all other
cities as the untreated control group, post-treatment 2006-2009
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.6212 0.0502 32.2772 0.0000
Treatment 0.2295 0.3014 0.7616 0.4472
Period -0.0987 0.0870 -1.1349 0.2577
Treatment:Period 0.6890 0.5220 1.3201 0.1882
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